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裴爾士難題以及邏輯情操
469
Peirce’s Puzzle and Logical Sentiment
Hsi
-
Heng Cheng
Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Tsing Hua University
No. 101, Sec. 2, Kuang-Fu Rd., Hsinchu 30013, Taiwan
E-mail:
hshcheng@mx.nthu.edu.twAbstract
In 1878, Peirce provided a puzzle concerning both his conception
of probability and under what conditions one is permitted to reason in
accordance with probability; he then offered social sentiment
(
or logi-
cal sentiment
)
as solution. Quine and Putnam, two well-known con-
temporary American philosophers, commented upon and interpreted
“Peirce’s puzzle” and his proposed solution. However, their comments
and interpretations are neither illuminating nor faithful, leaving
Peirce’s thought obscure. In this paper, a more credible and faithful
interpretation is suggested with the help of the distinction between
logic and logicality, of the separation of logical sentiment from both
altruistic moral concern and personal interest, and of the derivation of
the contents of Peirce’s three logical sentiments from his conception of
probability.
Key Words
:
Charles S. Peirce, Hilary Putnam, logic, sentiment,
probability