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considered complementary and mutually reinforcing. However, the
democratic control functions of the EP are quite limited. This lack
of control stems from the flimsy connection between MEPs and
their electorates.
European elections are seldom about the personalities and
parties at the European level, or EU policy agendas. This was
confirmed yet again in the latest European elections, which will be
discussed later in the article. European elections are, by and large,
fought by domestic parties on national rather than European
manifestoes, with candidates selected by domestic party executives.
As
second-order
elections (Marsh 1998; Reif & Schmitt, 1980),
European elections often function as votes of confidence on the
ruling parties of individual Member States. Consistent with the
mid-term election phenomenon, domestic ruling parties often fare
worse than oppositional and smaller parties in EP elections
(Kritzinger, 2003: 225-226; Thorlakson, 2005: 469). As
candidates do not compete on European issues, voters are deprived
of the opportunity to learn and be informed about European affairs
through elections and election campaigns.
Without addressing this problem, decades of treaty reforms
have continued to increase the legislative power of the EP in
response to criticisms of the democratic deficit. As will be
explained later, such reforms have hardly improved the EU’s
credentials on this front. As a result, the Council, which is part
legislature, part executive, continues to make decisions without
proper scrutiny. Although recent treaty reforms have enhanced
transparency requirements with respect to Council decision-
making, “one often needs the mindset of a focused private
investigator to unearth relevant information both about processes
and about its various (sub-) actors. . . . Moreover that secrecy has
permeated the manner in which legislation is adopted at the EU
level more generally especially as the European Parliament has
acquired incrementally a more central role in co-decision” (Curtin,
2009: 129-130). As will be discussed later in the article, nominal