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ignore nor bypass, no matter how technical they consider the issue
at hand is. In line with this view, the Federal Constitutional Court
of Germany stated that,
democracy, first and foremost lives on, and in, a viable
public opinion that concentrates on central acts of
determination of political direction and the periodic
allocation of highest-ranking political offices in the
competition of government and opposition. Only this
public opinion shows the alternatives for elections and
other votes and continually calls them to mind also in
decisions relating to individual issues in order that they
remain continuously present and effective in the political
opinion-formation of the people via the parties. (German
Federal Constitutional Court, 2009, paragraph 250, as
cited in Nicol, 2012: 511)
To summarize, remedying the EU’s deficit of democratic
legitimacy has proven challenging. Attempt to balance executive
dominance through the strengthening of the EP risks exacerbating,
rather than solving, the EP’s legitimacy problem. Also, empowering
the EP may inadvertently shift the balance of inter-institutional
power relations in the Council’s advantage. In the following
sections, I assess how the Treaty of Lisbon has impacted these
long-standing concerns.
III. The EP
A. Democratic Legitimacy of the EP
(A) Logical Evaluation
In order to address criticisms that European integration has
resulted in increased executive power and decreased in
parliamentary control, and that the European Parliament is, in
general, weak and toothless, the Treaty of Lisbon greatly enhanced
the power of the European Parliament by expanding the scope of