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Democratic Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon
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I. Preface
The
Treaty of Lisbon was initially proposed, in part, in
response to calls to address the EU democratic deficit. As such, it is
not surprising that Title II TEU is devoted to “Provisions on
Democratic Principles.” How has the Treaty of Lisbon fared in
redressing the democratic deficit? In assessing the answer to this
question, I analyze reforms concerning the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Council, and national parliaments. To
measure improvements introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, two
types of indicators are taken into account. Institutionally and
theoretically, the logical rationale for reforms is considered.
Empirically, a comparison of the situation regarding the
democratic deficit before and after the Treaty of Lisbon came into
effect will be presented. With respect to the European Parliament,
the article focuses on the alleged disconnectedness of MEPs from
the electorate, and the implications of ordinary legislative
procedures on legislative patterns and the legislative behavior of
the EP. With regards to the Council and the European Council,
attention is directed toward the gatekeeping function of national
executives in light of the prevalence of trilogues and the newly
created position of the President of the European Council. As to
national parliaments, the significance of the early warning
mechanism with regards to the principle of subsidiarity as provided
in the Treaty of Lisbon is examined. The findings of the paper
show that there is very weak evidence supporting the claim that the
Treaty of Lisbon has improved the EU’s democratic deficit to any
substantive degree.
II. Some Essence of the Pre-Lisbon
Democratic Deficit Debate
Most analysts of the EU’s democratic deficit approach the
issue by focusing on individual institutions and examining their