“Human Rights Protection, Democratic Deliberation”
53
women’s rights as human rights. To be sure, multiculturalism in the
theoretical literature and public policies on the ground were criticized.
Prominent critics often include Brian Barry and Susan Moller Okin.
Where Barry’s and Okin’s arguments overlap,
I think, suggests that
multicultural theorists had underestimated the unintended
consequences, e.g., the perils,
12
of accommodating minority cultures
and the steadfast commitments to liberal principles, especially to
equalitarianism (the same treatment for all), which underpin Barry’s
call to re-universalize human rights and Okin’s defense of women’s
rights as human rights.
13
Granted, we should leave behind the
polemics of Barry’s and Okin’s controversial critiques of
multiculturalism. We might nonetheless wish to take cue from their
endorsements of the basic protections embodied by international
human rights principles, which retain value for any serious attempt at
addressing the phenomenon of VAW. To this end, let me spell out at
some length what is actually involved in applying the fundamental
protections embodied by international human rights principles to
everyone, especially to the vulnerable and the dependent, e.g., victims
of VAW. Thus, with an eye on implementation, I examine the major
approaches to international human rights theory and practices,
14
not have a future, in spite of the hopeful, if misleading, title of
The Future of
Gender
(Browne, 2007: 1). This view notwithstanding, scholars continue to do
gender studies, e.g., research on gender violence, gender’s relationships to
sexuality, the state, the law, and class. Notably, two special issues of
Perspectives
on Politics
(March 2010 and March 2014) are focused on gender in politics.
12
Prior to and near the times of Barry’s and Okin’s interventions, criticisms were
raised, including Greene (1995); Shachar (1998, 2000, 2001); Spinner-Halev
(2000). But Barry’s and Okin’s interventions generated more attentions and
controversies. I have examined Barry’s major interventions, see On (2006).
13
Underlying the two overlaps is a qualified defense of essentialism. Barry (2001:
32-50, 64, 104, 136, 262-263, 279-284, 302; 2002: 206-221); Okin (1994: 9-18;
1995a: 512, 515; 1995b: 275; 1998a: 663-665; 1998b: 42-46; 1999: 11, 18,
22-23; 2005a: 72-75; 2005b: 95-102).
14
The argument that the international human rights discourse should be regarded
as a post-World War II normative practice, to be grasped
sui generis
, has been
defended by Beitz (2009). A notable contrast to Beitz’s practice-based account is
Amartya Sen’s, which deploys a two-level analysis that bifurcates human rights
