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ensure its adoption (Cooper, 2013: 15).
The success of the first yellow card raised hopes that the
Early Warning Mechanism would not be toothless. That success
vindicated the views of some that national parliaments have
become a “virtual third chamber” in the EU, capable of influencing
legislative results (Cooper, 2012, 2013). Yet hopes that this would
provide meaningful oversight were dashed when a second yellow
card was essentially dismissed by the Commission. Far from
constituting a separate third chamber, national parliaments do not
act as a collective agent and the yellow and orange cards that they
collectively issue do not amount to a formal veto power (Goldoni,
2014: 106).
The second yellow card was drawn on 28 October 2013,
when 19 votes from 14 national chambers issued reasoned
opinions on the Commission’s EPPO (the European Public
Prosecutor’s Office) proposal, sharing the view that the proposal
breached the principle of subsidiarity.
8
The establishment of the
EPPO was proposed by the Commission in
July 2013
to probe
cases of fraud against EU expenditures across the EU (European
Commission, 2013a). Fraud against EU expenditures is estimated
to steal at least €500 million from EU coffers every year. According
to the Commission, national prosecutors in some member states
are not doing enough to protect the EU, since national judicial
authorities follow up on less than half of all cases transferred to
them. With the proposed EPPO, a more uniform crime fighting
standards would be integrated into national law systems (Nielsen,
2013b).
However, critics argue that once established the EPPO would
8
This was held by the Dutch Senate, Czech Senate, Dutch House of
Representatives, Cyprus House of Representatives, UK House of Commons,
Hungarian Parliament, Swedish Parliament, Irish Parliament, Romanian
Chamber of Deputies, Slovenian Parliament, French Senate, Maltese
Parliament and the UK House of Lords (Council of the European Union,
2013).