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not
ex post
, but the voices of national parliaments are also only
consultative under the early warning system as the Commission
need not withdraw proposals opposed by national parliaments, but
may, at its discretion, decide to maintain or amend the proposal.
Even with the orange card, wherein a majority of national
parliament votes can ask 55% of the members of the Council to
block a proposal, “it is not the national parliaments themselves that
are able to stop the proposal, only to provide others with
ammunition” (Kiiver, 2008: 78).
Moreover, apart from the fact that the early warning system
only gives national parliaments a consultative role, the eight-week
time limit allowed national parliaments to not only review, but also
coordinate voting, is a factor which could discourage national
parliaments from taking the reform seriously (House of Lords,
2014: 8). Within this brief period, national parliaments must
hear the views of their national government, allow for
debate both in committee and in the plenary . . . possibly
organize the consultation of regional parliaments, and try
to liaise with the parliaments of the twenty-six other
member states especially when trying to reach the
‘threshold of protest’. Furthermore, the view that a
legislative proposal does not comply with subsidiarity must
be reasoned, which will require some deliberation and
careful drafting (de Witte, 2009: 40).
There is also the risk that, by increasing the burden of
national parliaments, the early warning system diverts the attention
of national parliaments from scrutinizing of the content of
European policies that
do not
raise a subsidiarity issue (de Witte,
2009: 41).
Thirdly, when a national parliament fails to participate
actively in the scrutiny of Commission subsidiarity proposals, the
effectiveness of the voices of the other national parliaments are
affected. Some see this, in effect, as interfering with national
constitution orders (de Witte, 2009: 40). Individual national