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Democratic Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

391

parliaments should, according to the logic of parliamentary

democracy, have the power to determine whether an issue stays at

home or goes to Brussels independent of what other parliaments

decide. Former German President Roman Herzog complained that,

with 84% of the legal acts adopted by the Federal Republic of

Germany stemming from Brussels, it is questionable whether

Germany can still be called a parliamentary democracy (Mahony,

2007). By demanding solidarity among one-third or even a half of

member state parliaments in order to raise an objection to a

Commission proposal

and only with consultative effect, the

Treaty of Lisbon early warning system is likely to be only rarely

used. With the Commission being able to ignore up to 55% of

member states, a motion by an individual national parliaments to

object to a Commission proposal is likely a waste of time.

(B) Empirical Assessment

The number of reasoned opinions from national parliaments

to the Commission has continued to increase since the Treaty of

Lisbon came into force. In 2010, the Commission received 34

reasoned opinions raising subsidiarity concerns. In 2013, 88 such

reasoned opinions were received (Table 1). Considering that there

are 28 Member States with 41 legislative chambers, and 472 draft

legislative acts have been forwarded to national parliaments by the

Commission the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the number of

reasoned opinions appears to be remarkably low.

There is a large degree of variation in the extent to which

national parliaments actively exercise their power to scrutinize the

extent to which Commission’s legislative proposals are in

accordance with the subsidiarity principle. The national

parliaments which have issued the highest number of reasoned

opinions are the Swedish

Riksdag,

followed by the Netherlands,

and the UK (Table 2). The fact that only a handful of chambers are

particularly active in exercising this power confirms the worry that,

arithmetically, it is difficult to reach the threshold for issuing a

yellow card (Cooper, 2013: 2).