

384
E
UR
A
MERICA
members with access to information for use against the other
Member States. Such practices are particularly detrimental to small
member states and run counter to both democratic accountability
and the original design of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Increased informalization in Council decision-making both
contributes to, and can be partially explained by actors’
socialization into norms of inter-institutional cooperation and
compromise. Socialization, defined as the “process of inducting
actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel,
2005: 804; Johnston, 2001: 494-506) is empirically discernible
and works within, as well as across, EU institutions. Trilogues, in
which a small group of actors engage in repeated and
time-demanding interaction in secluded settings, provide fertile
ground for socialization. Such settings facilitate mutual confidence
and augment the facility of participants in striking political
compromises, which in turn induce cooperative and constructive
behaviors (March & Olsen, 1998: 960; Reh et al
.
, 2013). As a
consequence, contrary to the expectation that empowering the EP
would lead to an enhancement of accountability in the Council, an
even smaller circle of bureaucrats acquired the authority, or the
acquiescence of their peers, to finalize agreements informally
behind closed doors
.
B. The European Council President
(A) Logical Evaluation
The European Council and the Council of the EU are where
national executives act to safeguard their respective national
interests. To what extent does the Treaty of Lisbon reinforce or
undermine the capacity of national executives in ensuring that EU
policies do not come at a cost to their national interests
?
Under
the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council has a semi-permanent
President. Assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, the
responsibilities of the President include: