Globalization and Varieties of Modernity

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Abstract

Global processes are restructuring inequalities in complex ways. Globalization has uneven impacts on social formations as a consequence of the path dependent nature of societal development and variations in the forms of modernity. The multiple varieties of modernity, including neoliberalism and social democracy, involve diverse forms of gender regime as well as diverse forms of capitalism. Including gender inequalities in addition to class alters how we see the nature and changing patterns of inequalities. The paper investigates the extent to which variations in the form of gender and class inequalities in employment and in welfare provision map onto each other, using data from OECD countries. Significant points of divergence are found, leading to the conclusion that conceptualisation and analysis of varieties of modernity should include a gender dimension and not presume that this is reducible to class.

Key Words: modernity, class, gender, employment, welfare
I. Introduction

Global processes are restructuring inequalities in complex ways. There is more than one variety of modernity, including both neoliberal and social democratic forms. Existing approaches to the study of globalisation need replacing with new ones that address multiple complex inequalities, including gender. This paper addresses gendered as well as class aspects of varieties of modernity. It investigates whether, and if so how, to distinguish between varieties of modernity in Europe and North America, including what difference it might make if gender is taken into account. The central question of this paper concerns the difference that gender makes to models of the varieties of modernity. Its specific focus is on the economy of the global north.

The paper draws on, and goes beyond, existing debates as to the possible varieties of modernity. These include discussions that address the nature of “modernity” itself, for example in the debates started by Eisenstadt (2002). It addresses the varieties of capitalism literature, which leads from differences in forms of production (Hall & Soskice, 2001). It also addresses the “welfare state regime” literature, which makes distinctions between forms of capitalism lead from variations in welfare provision welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The literature on variations in “gender relations” has often started from differences in gendered welfare state regimes (Lewis, 1992, 2002; O’Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999).

The paper critically examines these theoretical and empirical approaches, in order to produce a revised model of the varieties of modernity. It conducts an empirical analysis of the extent to which variations in class relations and variations in gender relations map onto each other in the economy, both in employment and in the welfare state. The paper utilises harmonised data on government expenditure in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While this paper is focused on experiences in North America and Europe, where the majority of
OECD countries are located, it has implications for the analysis of other countries, where further varieties of modernity may be found.

II. Variations in Modernity

Modernity is a concept rooted in classical sociological theory, such as that of Durkheim (1984) and Simmel (1955). It was originally used to capture the major changes in social forms associated with industrialisation, as ones from premodern to modern. In recent social theory the interest has shifted to the variations in modernity, and differing conceptualisations of this. There has been concern with temporal variations in the form of modernity, conceptualised as late or high modernity (Giddens, 1991); reflexive or second modernity (Beck, 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002); liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000). The interest here, by contrast, is primarily with variations in modernity that co-exist in time. There are several approaches here: multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2002; Schmidt, 2006, 2007); varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hanké, 2009; Hanké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007); varieties of welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990); varieties of gender regime (Walby, 2009; Walby, Gottfried, Gottschall, & Osawa, 2007).

The multiple modernities approach of Eisenstadt (2002) postulates a radical discontinuity between forms, yet offers a relatively thin conceptualisation of modernity rooted in cultural values, with little concern for economic and political processes (Schmidt, 2006, 2007). In this paper, by contrast, the varieties of modernity are understood to be rooted in the following institutional domains: economy, polity, civil society and violence. While the implications of ongoing development remain relevant, the main interest here is in the varieties of modernity that coexist in time, albeit in different countries.

Most theorists of modernity pay little attention to gender relations. Yet there are significant gender issues in each of the main topics identified as relevant to modernity. For example, in relation to
the economy, gender relations are not yet modern until women earn their livelihoods predominantly from free wage labour. It is useful to distinguish between those gender regimes that are modern from those that are not: the domestic gender regime is premodern; the public gender regime is modern. In relation to the economy, which is the focus here, the public gender regime involves the free wage labour of both women and men (Walby, 2009).

There is a question as to whether or not globalisation undermines variations in the form of modernity by eroding the reasons for these differences. This raises the issue as to whether it is possible for varieties of modernity to persist over time in a global era. The answer depends at least partly on the extent of globalisation. Some have argued that in some ways the world is already global (Chase-Dunn, 1998; Robinson, 2001; Wallerstein, 1974). Globalisation is not one process, but rather a collection of processes, some of which have proceeded further than others. These processes include global flows of capital, trade and people; the emergence of global institutions and hegemons, as well as global waves. While flows of finance are near-global, movements of people are more constrained. The world may be treated as a single unit for some issues, not for others (Milanovic, 2005).

The world is not yet fully globalised and significant differences remain between social systems. There are path dependent forms of social development, with varied types of social formations. There can be critical turning points at which paths of social development diverge. The trajectories of these particular paths depend, in part, on the nature of the cause of the initial divergence. These concepts of path dependency and critical turning point derive from complexity theory, which offers a more sophisticated treatment of the concept of the social system (Capra, 1997; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Urry, 2003; Walby, 2007, 2009). There are several approaches to the analysis of these differences: varieties of capitalism, which focuses on employment and production; varieties of welfare state regimes, which focuses on state welfare provision; gendered welfare state regimes; and gender regimes.
A. Employment/Production-led Varieties of Capitalism

There have been a number of attempts to produce typologies of the varieties of capitalism; these tend to focus on employment and production, and to be concerned with governmental institutions (Crouch, 1993; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Korpi, 2003; Lash & Urry, 1987; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Streeck, 1992; Whitley, 2000). These often have dichotomies or continua, though some include multiple types. They include: the distinction between corporatism and liberalism (Crouch, 1993; Schmitter, 1974), institutionally thin and thick societies (Streeck, 1992), liberal and non-liberal (Streeck & Yamamura, 2002), and liberal or coordinated market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001).

The distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) has emerged as one of the leading accounts of such distinctions, though it is distinctive in placing firms at the centre of the analysis. According to Hall and Soskice (2001: 8), in “liberal market economies,” “firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements,” while in “coordinated market economies,” “firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate endeavours with other actors and to construct their core competencies.” This distinction between liberal and coordinated forms of market economies is operationalised by the strictness of employment regulation that is based on OECD (1994, 1997) measures of the difficulty of employers dismissing workers in relation to the hiring and firing of individuals and collective dismissals (redundancies), together with a measure of company-based protection (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001). This dichotomous distinction eliminates the social democratic form as a distinct type of market economy, subsuming it under the category of coordinated market economy. This gives rise to difficulties, as will be seen below.
Gendered Employment/Production

The account of the varieties of capitalism by Hall and Soskice (2001) pays little attention to gender relations. This is not unusual in this body of literature. Estevez-Abe (2005, 2006), however, has argued that the schema is appropriate for addressing the nature of gender inequalities in employment. Estevez-Abe considers that women have more opportunities to benefit in liberal rather than coordinated market economies. She offers a “skill-based institutional theory of segregation” that attempts to explain higher levels of occupational segregation by sex in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies as being a result of “institutions such as employment protection and vocationally based educational systems, which facilitate specific skill investments, generally exacerbate sex segregation by increasing gender skill gaps” (Estevez-Abe, 2006: 148).

Her conclusion is perhaps less surprising when it is noted that the measure used, the strictness of employment protection (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001), is likely to benefit “standard workers” especially those that have been employed for the longest period of time and are the best organised—who are disproportionately men (Gottfried, 2000, 2003; Gottschall & Kroos, 2007; Shire, 2007; Walby, 2007; Walby et al., 2007). Thus the use of “strictness of employment protection” as an indicator of the distinction between varieties of coordination regimes inevitably means that the more regulated regimes will appear to treat women less well. This raises the question as to how employment regulation is best operationalised for use in analyses of gendered varieties of employment/production regimes.

A different approach to the distinction between forms of coordination developed by this author is one that directly addresses equality issues. Social democratic forms of regulation of employment are oriented towards equality—especially, but not only that between women and men. This is not the same as employment “protection.” Regulations of employment that are oriented towards equality include: equal treatment in pay, recruitment and promotions; and the regulation of working time so as to enable combination of paid work
and care-work, for example, in maternity, paternity and parental leaves. The implications of using this indicator to measure the extent of the regulation of employment are investigated below.

**B. Welfare State-led Varieties of Capitalism**

There have been a number of attempts to produce typologies of the form of welfare states (Flora & Alber, 1981; Korpi, 1983; Wilensky, 2002), of which the most significant has been that of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1997, 1999). Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology of welfare state regimes has three major forms: liberal, social democratic and conservative corporatist. The theoretical principle underlying the distinctions concerns the extent of de-commodification of labour—whether or not individuals derive their livelihood from the capitalist labour market. There is a further principle to differentiate the conservative corporatist type, which is whether there are collective entities, in addition to the state, participating in the stratification of access to welfare. Countries are clustered into three main groups: Anglos tend to be liberal; Nordics are social democratic; while continental West Europeans tend to be conservative corporatist.

Some commentators have attempted to introduce additional types into this model (Arts & Gelissen, 2002), including a residual form along the Mediterranean (Leibfried, 1993), a wage earner form in Australia (Castles & Mitchell, 1993), while Esping-Andersen (1997) himself acknowledges that there may be other forms and hybrids, such as that found in Japan. A contrasting, and more persuasive, direction of engagement with Esping-Andersen’s typology, based on statistical modelling, argues that there is a single continuum between two forms, which eliminates the conservative corporatist (and any other) form (Hicks & Kenworthy, 2003). In response to this challenge, Esping-Andersen (2003) concedes the single continuum. However, he protests at the renaming of its poles in a way that eliminates the term “social democracy.” The conclusion drawn from these debates is that, in class-led analyses, there is a single continuum ranging from neoliberal to social democratic welfare state regimes.
Gendered Welfare State Regimes

There is considerable controversy over the positioning of gender in Esping-Andersen’s theory (Daly & Rake, 2003; Hobson, 2000; Lewis, 1992; O’Connor et al., 1999; Orloff, 1993; Ostner & Lewis, 1995; Sainsbury, 1994, 1996). Welfare is provided not only by the state and the market, but also by (largely) women’s unpaid domestic care-work. Taking note of this category of domestic care-work, which is organised through premodern relations of production that do not involve free wage labour, disrupts the distinction between neoliberal (market-provided) and social democratic (state-provided) welfare state regime forms. This is a premodern set of social relations, not a variety of modernity. A key distinction among gendered welfare state regimes is between those that are premodern (domestic gender regime) and those that are modern (public gender regime). The latter, modern, forms of public gender regime can then be differentiated into neoliberal and social democratic forms.

The criticism that Esping-Andersen ignores gender is incorrect, as he does empirically note the existence of women in the home and the labour market. It is rather his theorisation of gender that is problematic. The major cause of his theoretical problem is that he reduces gender to the family, rather than seeing and theorising the role of gender in employment and state as well. It is because of this reductionism that Esping-Andersen is unable to include gender as a source of variation in his typology of welfare state regimes. A further issue is that his empirical work focuses on pensions as the major indicator of differences between welfare state regimes, with the consequence that more deeply gendered differences remain out of focus.

In reaction against Esping-Andersen and the associated school of thought, there developed an alternative typology of gendered welfare state regimes in which variations in the gendered form of the family were given central place (Lewis, 1992). In this typology, the key issue is whether there is a male-breadwinner-female-housewife form of household or a dual income form, with variations that include a
“strong,” “modified” or “weak” male breadwinner. While this approach usefully foregrounds the variation in gendered forms of household, it tends to leave out of focus the rest of the gender system, although later variants have tried to include a wider range of issues (Jenson, 1997; O’Connor et al., 1999). There are also significant further inequalities resulting from intersections with other regimes of inequality (Mandel, 2010).

The conclusion drawn here is that a wider range of issues need to be included in the theorisation and comparison of forms of gender regime, including the economy, polity, violence and civil society. Within the public form of gender regime a distinction can be drawn between neoliberal and social democratic forms. In the realm of welfare, an important gendered indicator is that of the extent of public expenditure on childcare.

III. Varieties of Modernity: Class and Gender Regimes

While variations in gender relations have been traditionally presumed to follow variations in class relations, this assumption may now be questioned. Analysis of the variations in employment/production and in state welfare suggests that there should no longer be a presumption that variations in gender relations will map onto variations in class relations. Rather, this issue of overlap should be treated as an empirical as well as theoretical question. For the purposes of this enquiry, class regimes and gender regimes need to be treated as analytically distinct.

The focus of typologies of class regimes has been variously on employment/production and on state welfare provision. While both these aspects of the economy are relevant and important in differentiating between forms of gender regime they are not enough. For a full analysis of the class and gender regimes, it is necessary to consider the domains of polity, violence and civil society, in addition to the economy. In each domain, there are both gender relations and class relations, neither of which is reducible to the other.
The continuum in the forms of modernity from neoliberal to social democratic is relevant in each of the regimes of inequality, and each institutional domain. In the economy (finance, employment/production and welfare) the key differences are the extent of regulation and of the provision of public services. In relation to gender, indicators include regulation for equality in employment, and state provision of child care. In the polity, the issue is the depth of democracy, which includes not only suffrage but also a representative presence in parliament and a wide range of institutions subject to democratic control. In the domain of violence, the key variations are in the extent of the regulation, deployment of, and resilience to violence. In civil society, the issue is whether social relations are organised according to mutualism or commercialism (Walby, 2009).

A. Production and Welfare State

The many analyses of the varieties of capitalism and of the varieties of welfare state regime are curiously often separate, even though each claims to cover the full range of such institutions (although there are recent exceptions to this). In practice, when embarking on empirical analysis, each school has a quite different substantive focus: Hall and Soskice focus on employment regulation, while Esping-Andersen’s classic work focused on pensions. Some writers claim that the same dynamics affect both employment regulation and welfare provision (Hollingsworth, 1997), while others cast doubt on this proposition. Thus, Huber and Stephens (2001: 315) state that “there has been an overall correspondence between these production relations and the welfare state regimes” because “welfare state regimes with generous replacement rates are embedded in production regimes supporting high-skill-high-wage production and having highly regulated labour markets.” By contrast, Ebbinghaus and Manow (2001) suggest that the integration of the typologies of regulation in capitalist production and the form of the welfare state regime is more challenging. Further, Tepe, Gottschall, and Kittel (2010) suggest that the lack of alignment between the
different kinds of regimes is not unusual, while Thelen (2004) argues for a focus on institutions, rather than regimes. This raises the question as to whether the social forces focused on employment are the same as those focused on state welfare. The extent to which variations in employment regulation and welfare provision map onto each other is an empirical question as well as a theoretical one.

B. Gender and Class

The next question here is whether variations in gender relations map onto variations in class relations in the political economy nexus (production/employment and state welfare). If gender is an integral part of the capitalist system, then these typologies should map onto each other. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) argues this both in his early work and in response to his feminist critics. However, if the gender regime is either fully or partially autonomous from the class system (Gottfried, 2000; Hartmann, 1976; Korpi, 2000; Walby, 1986), then gender variations may not map onto class variations. Gender and class typologies may be expected to diverge if the social forces focused on gender relations are different from those focused on class relations. This is an empirical as well as theoretical question.

IV. Investigating the Varieties of Modernity: Employment and Welfare; Gender and Class

These questions are investigated empirically using data from countries that are members of the OECD, which are largely but not entirely the rich countries of Europe and North America. Indicators have been developed to operationalise the key concepts involved, as discussed above. In order to discover the extent to which variations in gender and class in employment regulation and in state welfare map onto each other, the extent of the correlation between the indicators is investigated.

The data sourced from the OECD is centred on the year 2003, and compares 28 of the then 30 members of the OECD (data on the
remaining two members not being available in compatible form) (OECD, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2011). Four measures are developed to indicate the class- and gender-led types of employment regulation and welfare provision. Class-led employment regulation is indicated by a measure of the strictness of employment protection. Gender-led employment regulation is indicated by a measure of the strength of equality legislation. Class-led state welfare is indicated by a measure of public social expenditure. Gender-led state welfare is indicated by a measure of public expenditure on childcare.

The strictness of employment protection legislation is measured by the indicator constructed by the OECD, which summarises 18 items concerning “employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal e.g. months of notice, severance pay”, “regulation of temporary forms of employment e.g. number of successive fixed term contracts that are allowed” and “specific requirements for collective dismissals e.g. delays before notice can start” (OECD, 2004: 102).

The strength of equality legislation is indicated by the breadth and depth of equal treatment regulation, the range of inequalities addressed (in the EU: gender, ethnicity, disability, religion/faith, age and sexual orientation), the use of enforcement mechanisms that go beyond individual complaints; and the regulation of working time so as to enable the combination of paid employment and care-work, especially through maternity, paternity and parental leave. This is estimated from the literature: the Nordic countries have the highest ranking, 3; the rest of the European Union, 2; US and Canada 1.5; other countries 1.

The strength of state welfare provision is indicated by the percentage of GDP spent on “Public social expenditure.” This follows the category developed by the OECD (2006: 180), which includes “cash benefits, direct ‘in-kind’ provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes.” Such benefits may be “targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed or young persons,” while such programmes involve “redistribution of resources across households, or compulsory participation.” The
gendering of state welfare is indicated by the percentage of GDP that is public expenditure on childcare.

In order to assess whether there is an overlap between the variations in gender relations and class relations in production/employment and in state welfare, the potential correlations between these four indicators were investigated. Table 1 shows whether there are any statistically significant correlations between these four variables, with * and ** indicating a correlation that is statistically significant; the larger the number (the Pearson coefficient), the closer is the association. The absence of * or ** indicates that there is no statistically significant correlation.

Table 1  Correlations between Strength of Equality Legislation, Strictness of Employment Protection, Public Social Expenditure, and Public Childcare Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equality legislation</th>
<th>Employment protection strictness</th>
<th>Public social expenditure</th>
<th>Childcare public expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality legislation</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment protection strictness</td>
<td>.717**</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public social expenditure</td>
<td>.617**</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A. Employment Regulation: Gender and Class

The measure of the strictness of employment protection legislation, which indicates variations in the form of the class regime, does not correlate with the measure of the strength of equality legislation, which indicates variations in the form of the gender regime. This is shown in Table 1. There is no statistically significant correlation between countries that have strict employment protection legislation and those that have strong equality legislation.
field of employment regulation, gender and class variations do not map onto each other.

B. State Welfare Provision: Gender and Class

There is no statistically significant correlation between the level of public social expenditure, which indicates variations in the form of the class regime, and the extent of public expenditure on childcare, which indicates variations in the form of the gender regime. This is shown in Table 1. A closer examination of specific countries does, however, reveal some more limited patterns of overlaps. These are shown in Table 2. There is a group of high public spenders on both childcare (gendered) and general matters: this is the Nordic group constituted by Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway, joined by France, Luxembourg and Portugal. There is a group of low public spenders on both gendered and general matters: Australia, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. There are two groups of countries where

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High public expenditure and high childcare expenditure</th>
<th>Low public expenditure and low childcare expenditure</th>
<th>High public expenditure and low childcare expenditure</th>
<th>Low public expenditure and high childcare expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

there is non-alignment between gendered and other public expenditure. These have low general social expenditure and high (gendered) childcare expenditure: Iceland, and the US. These have high general social expenditure and low (gendered) childcare expenditure: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands and Poland.

Within state welfare provision class and gender variations do not map onto each other in a statistically significant manner for the whole group of OECD countries. However, there is a small subset of countries with high state expenditures on general and gendered state welfare; and another subset of countries with low state expenditure on both general and gendered state welfare. But there are also several countries where there is a lack of alignment between general and gendered state welfare. There are sufficient countries lacking such an alignment to prevent a statistically significant alignment of gender and class state welfare provision for the OECD as a whole.

C. Employment Regulation and State Welfare Provision

There is no correlation between indicators of the class-led typology of varieties of capitalism: strictness of employment protection legislation, and state welfare expenditure. See Table 1. High levels of employment protection are not aligned with high levels of state provision of welfare. This is a challenge to the version of the varieties of capitalism thesis that attempts to integrate both employment regulation and welfare state expenditure into a single typology. The typology of the varieties of capitalism (based on employment regulation) does not map onto the typology of welfare state regimes (based on public expenditure).

D. Gender and Class Regimes in the Domain of the Economy

Class-led typologies of variations in capitalism do not map onto gender-led typologies of variations in systems of gender relations. This
is of concern to both of the two major class-led typologies of political economy: the varieties of capitalism approach centred on the firm, production and employment; as well as the welfare state regime approach, centred on state welfare provision. It is also of concern to one of the major gender-led typologies, which is centred on the household and welfare provision, in particular the organisation of childcare. Variations in class relations and variations in gender relations do not generally overlap or map onto each other, with the exception of some overlap in some countries on welfare expenditure.

E. Polities and Politics

There are potentially several reasons for these findings of divergences between class and gender political economic forms. These include the form and content of class and gender politics and their organisation in the polity and civil society considered below. Other reasons are explored in Walby (2009).

One potential explanation concerns the plurality of polities involved. There is more than one polity in operation in some of the OECD countries: in particular EU Member States are subject to EU-level governance as well as to domestic/national state governance. In the regulation of employment conditions, the EU level is preeminent in all EU Member States. In contrast, welfare expenditures are controlled at domestic/national state level in all countries, including EU Member States. This means that in EU Member States there are two polities active in the economy: one for employment regulation (EU level) and another for state welfare provision (national level). The EU polity, constituted at a different time and subject to different political forces than the Member States, has different priorities and practices than national/domestic states. This is part of the reason for differences between the forms of governance in employment and welfare.

A second potential explanation concerns the strength of the organisation of political forces. The strength of the organisation of class and gender interests can be correlated with aspects of protective
and equality legislation, and with state expenditure in general and on childcare. The strength of class organisation is indicated by trade union strength, for which three measures are presented: trade union bargaining coverage (even if not all workers are members of trade unions, unions may have the right to bargain on their behalf); centralisation of collective bargaining (dispersed bargaining is usually seen as weaker than centralised); coordination of collective bargaining (more coordinated bargaining is usually taken as stronger). These indicators were developed by the OECD (1994, 1997). Both the strictness of employment protection and the extent of public social expenditure have statistically significant correlations with trade union strength, as measured by coverage and the centralisation and coordination of collective bargaining, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3  Correlations between the Strength of Protective Legislation, General Public Expenditure, Trade Union Coverage, Centralisation and Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment protection strictness</th>
<th>Public social expenditure coverage</th>
<th>Trade union coverage</th>
<th>Centralisation of collective bargaining</th>
<th>Coordination of collective bargaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public social expenditure</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union coverage</td>
<td>.700**</td>
<td>.751*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation of collective bargaining</td>
<td>.750**</td>
<td>.756**</td>
<td>.865**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of collective bargaining</td>
<td>.581**</td>
<td>.512*</td>
<td>.488*</td>
<td>.528*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The strength of gender or feminist organisation is indicated by the percentage of trade unionists that are women (although this is a measure of the gendering of the trade union movement, at the level of individual membership, not governance of the union); and also by the
percentage of parliamentary (lower house only if there are two chambers) representatives that are female (data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union). The strength of equality legislation and the extent of public expenditure on childcare both correlate with higher percentages of women in parliament and in trade unions, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4  Correlations between the Strength of Equality Legislation, Public Expenditure on Childcare, the Percentage of Parliamentary Members Who Are Women, and the Percentage of Union Members Who Are Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength of equality legislation</th>
<th>Childcare expenditure</th>
<th>Women in Parliament</th>
<th>Women in trade unions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strength of equality legislation expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare expenditure</td>
<td>.617**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Parliament</td>
<td>.600**</td>
<td>.504**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in trade unions</td>
<td>.719**</td>
<td>.725**</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The implication of this analysis is that class-led and gender-led forms of political and mobilisation do not necessarily map onto each other. Class-led forms of organisation and mobilisation are linked to higher levels of employment protection and state welfare provision. Gender-led forms of organisation and mobilisation are linked to stronger equality legislation and childcare expenditure.

F. Beyond Europe and North America

The analysis provided in this paper focuses on Europe and North America. There is an interesting question as to whether, and if so how, the conclusions would require modification if more countries outside of Europe and North America were to be included. This question has been most thoroughly addressed in relation to Japan and Asia.
The development of neoliberalism is uneven. Neoliberalism may be seen as a project, as a governmental programme or as a social formation (Walby, 2009). Ong’s (2006) analysis of developments in Asia treats neoliberalism as a project, as a technology of power, and as a form of exception that intersects with existing social formations. From this perspective, she traces the varied development and implications of neoliberal practices in Asia. The rapid economic development of China poses questions for the typologies of modernity. While markets have long been present in Chinese economic development, this is not the same as capitalist development (Arrighi, 2007). The changes away from a command economy are not easily interpreted.

Is there a distinctive Asian model of capitalism and welfare regime? The argument in favour of a distinctive variety of capitalism and welfare regime has sometimes been seen as resting on the extent of the provision of welfare outside of state provision (Nakagawa, 1979; Vogel, 1973). In addressing this issue, Esping-Andersen (1997) argues that there is insufficient evidence to consider Asia to be a distinct regime, in the sense of a category additional to his three-fold categorisation of welfare state regimes as social democratic, liberal or conservative corporatist. He considered Japan a “hybrid” case, combining features from a conservative corporatist regime with those from a liberal form, but still undergoing change. The intricacies of the Japanese case are more recently explored by Osawa (2011) in her account of gendered livelihood systems. She shares the conclusion that the Japanese experience does not provide an evidential basis for a distinctive fourth kind of welfare state regime.

V. Conclusions

Much of the macro level analysis of changes in modernity has been conducted using concepts and frameworks in which gender relations are either absent, or seen as predominantly derivative of class relations. However, there have been some important exceptions to
this, in both the employment-led and welfare state-led approaches. Estevez-Abe inserted gender into the analysis the employment-led varieties of capitalism framework. The inclusion of the family and household provides the usual route for the insertion of gender into the welfare state-led framework.

The analysis is taken forward here by the development of indicators that more adequately include gender relations in these frameworks. In the case of employment, the gender-led indicator of the strength of equality legislation is introduced alongside the conventional class-led indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation. In the case of state welfare provision, the gender-led indicator of the percentage of GDP spent by the state on child-care is introduced alongside the conventional class-led indicator of the percentage of GDP spent by the state on social expenditure. The analysis of OECD countries using these indicators reveals that there were no statistically significant correlations between the class-led typology based on employment protection with that based on welfare expenditure, nor were there any statistically significant correlations between the gender-and class-led typologies.

There is cohesion between different aspects of the gender regime. The analysis reveals a statistically significant correlation between the strength of equality legislation and the extent of public expenditure on childcare. Gendered social democratic intervention in the labour market is associated with gendered social democratic provision of state funded childcare. Gender regimes are not reducible to class regimes. There are different dynamics in the trajectories of gender regimes and class regimes. There is a differentiation between the political forces associated with class and gender, which have consequences for the form of regulation of employment and public expenditures.

There are variations in the form of modernity. The resilience of path dependent trajectories of development means that global processes have not significantly diminished differences between them. While the global neoliberal wave is implicated in the reduction of employment protection legislation and in state expenditures in many countries, it has not significantly eroded the differences between them.
References


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全球化與多樣化的現代性

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摘 要

全球化進程正以錯綜複雜的方式重新形塑著不平等。由於社會發展之路徑依賴的本質，及現代性的多樣化，導致全球化對於各社會型態有著不等的衝擊。各種多樣化的現代性，包含新自由主義與社會民主主義，皆涉及多種型態之性別政權與資本主義。在階級議題之外再納入性別不平等的考量，將改變我們檢視不平等的本質及其不斷改變的型態。本文使用OECD成員國的資料，探討在就業與社會福利供給中，各種型態的性別與階級不平等彼此對應的程度。本研究發現兩者有顯著差異，進而導出這樣的結論：要概念化並分析多樣化的現代性時，必須包含性別層面，而不該假設可將其簡化為階級議題。

關鍵詞：現代性、階級、性別、就業、社會福利