

# GEORGE C. MARSHALL AND AMERICAN MEDIATION IN CHINA

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## I

In the eventful decade of Sino-American relations since Pearl Harbor, several American names stand out prominently—Stilwell, Chennault, Hurley, Wedemeyer and Marshall. It is interesting to note that all except Hurley were military men par excellence and all had played a significant role in either forming U.S. China policy or serving in China during the decade. However, among these Americans, two were remembered by the Chinese, particularly the Nationalist Chinese, for harboring bias against the Kuomintang (KMT) government—General Joseph W. Stilwell and General George C. Marshall. In a former article, this author has dealt with the military mission carried out by General Stilwell in wartime China between 1942-1944 and analyzed the factors contributing to its failure.<sup>1</sup> It is the purpose of this paper to deal with General Marshall's mediation efforts between 1945-1947 to end China's internal strife between the Central Government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Second World War in China, or the "Resistance War Against Japan" as the Chinese would call it, ended in mid-August 1945 when Japan surrendered. However, the Chinese were not to enjoy the peace and rest that they deserved and eagerly waited for during their eight years of war with Japan. Dark clouds of war soon loomed again, this time between the

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<sup>1</sup> Wei Liang-tsai, "A Wrong Man in the Wrong Place: An Assessment of the Failures of General Joseph W. Stilwell in China," *American Studies*, XI, Nos. 2 & 3 (September, 1981), 127-166.

KMT-dominated Central Government and the CCP. The power struggle between the KMT and the CCP existed for almost two decades dating back to the mid-1920's. Between 1923-1938 the KMT and the CCP twice attempted to cooperate with each other without lasting results. When the "Resistance War Against Japan" broke out in July, 1937, both the KMT and the CCP were urged by the Chinese populace, including many intellectuals and non-Whampoa military leaders, to relinquish their mutual antagonism and to fight together against the common enemy. Two months after the Japanese militarists began their brutal onslaught against China, a united front was established between the two parties.

However, cooperation between the KMT and the CCP proved to be only nominal and short-lived because both sides had no intention of abandoning either its ideology or its ambition to control the whole of China. As the war dragged on, the rift between the KMT and the CCP became more apparent and the Chinese Communists grew more restless. Sporadic military conflicts increased continuously. The years of 1937-1940 saw the struggle between the Nationalist and Communist forces for possession of guerrilla bases throughout China. By mid-1939, the Central Government used General Hu Tsung-nan's First Group Army, the best equipped of the Nationalist forces, to blockade the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Undoubtedly, this internal struggle seriously undermined China's ability to fight against Japan.

When the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941, it brought the United States face to face with China's internal strife. In order to facilitate military cooperation between the Allied Powers and China, the decision was made at the Arcadia Conference in Washington in late December, 1941 by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill to establish a China Theater. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was offered the position, which he readily accepted, as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the China Theater. However, before China was able to fully exploit her military potentiality, she had first to become unified by solving the antagonism

between the KMT and the CCP. This was just what Roosevelt intended to do. However, it was not until the later stage of the Pacific War that Roosevelt considered the possibility of forming a "coalition" between the two parties. In this aspect, his decision was influenced considerably by two military men, Stilwell and Marshall.

General Stilwell was sent to Chungking by President Roosevelt in February, 1942, to serve as Generalissimo Chiang's Chief of Staff. Stilwell's relations with Chiang, which had never been cordial, further deteriorated after his military debacle in Burma between March and April, 1942. Henceforth, Stilwell, inspired and encouraged by his political advisors John P. Davies and John S. Service, continuously pressed for permission to arm and use the Communist forces in helping him to reconquer Burma. He sold this idea to his superior and patron in Washington, General Marshall, who in turn conveyed it to President Roosevelt. Though Roosevelt endorsed the plan, it met vehement opposition from the Generalissimo. It later became one of the main reasons for Chiang's insistence on Stilwell's recall from China.

In September, 1944 President Roosevelt sent Major General Patrick J. Hurley to Chungking as his personal envoy to mediate relations between the Generalissimo and Stilwell.<sup>2</sup> Hurley's efforts to mend the rift between the two failed. Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer as Chiang's Chief of Staff in October while Hurley himself became ambassador to China after Clarence Gauss' resignation in early November. Stilwell's recall undoubtedly dealt a serious blow to the morale of the American military personnel and career diplomats in China. And it had detrimental effects on Washington-Chungking relations.

However, Roosevelt was not ready to give up his plan to "bring together" the KMT and the CCP. In his efforts to

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<sup>2</sup> For more detailed background led to Hurley's appointment, see Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N. Y. and London, 1973), pp. 147-150.

achieve this goal, Roosevelt found a willing agent in the person of his new ambassador in Chungking, Hurley. As a matter of fact, ever since his arrival at Chungking in early September, 1944 as Roosevelt's personal representative, Hurley had already held discussions with Chiang and his representatives and Communist representatives in Chungking in an attempt to achieve a settlement between the two parties.<sup>3</sup> At the outset, both sides indicated their willingness to talk and this increased Hurley's confidence considerably. In late October Hurley drew up a five-point draft which he proposed to the KMT and the CCP as a basis for discussion: (1) the two parties would work to unify their military forces to defeat Japan; (2) the Communists would acknowledge Generalissimo Chiang as the Chinese President and military leader; (3) both parties would support democratic principles and those of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; (4) the CCP would be legalized; and (5) only one army would exist in China with equal treatment for all.<sup>4</sup> Both Chiang and Communist representatives agreed to the proposal. On November 7, 1944, Hurley and his advisors flew to Yen-an, the Communist "capital" in northern Shensi, to meet Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP, and other Chinese Communist leaders.<sup>5</sup>

During his stay in Yen-an, Hurley held a two-day conference with Mao. According to Hurley's own account, Chinese Communist leaders seemed deeply impressed by his visit. To use his somewhat boastful words:

They expressed great admiration that I had come into Yen-an at a time when it was necessary for my plane to be covered by fighter escort. This seemed to be of great significance to them. In opening our first formal meeting, Chairman Mao Tse-tung stated that our meeting was so important that I had risked my life to come to see him. That fact, he stated, im-

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164-5.

<sup>4</sup> Draft by Hurley, October 28, 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter referred to as *FRUS*), 1944, VI, p. 659; cited in Buhite, p. 166.

<sup>5</sup> For a vivid description of Hurley's meeting with CCP leaders, see Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (New York, 1946), p. 253; Buhite, pp. 167-8.

pressed him with the earnestness of our desire to see all Chinese military forces united to defeat Japan and to prevent civil war in China.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the courtesy and hospitality showed to him, Hurley found the Chinese Communists were not easy to bargain with. On November 10, at the end of their discussions, Hurley and Mao signed a five-point agreement entitled: "An Agreement Between the National Government, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China."<sup>7</sup> In some respects, this agreement was considerably different from the draft Hurley brought to Yen-an. As one of Hurley's biographers pointed out: "Decidedly vague, the plan avoided comment on how the coalition would work and clearly did nothing to diminish the differences between the two parties."<sup>8</sup>

Nevertheless, Hurely presented the agreement to the Central Government after his return to Chungking. As expected, it was turned down. Instead the Central Government submitted a "Three-Point Agreement" as a counter-proposal, which was in turn rejected by the Communists.<sup>9</sup> However, Hurley was not disheartened. Through his efforts, negotiations between the KMT and the CCP continued, though without any concrete accomplishment. One of the last attempts made by Hurley in his mediation efforts was a second trip to Yen-an in late August 1945. At that time he brought Mao with him to Chungking for a face-to-face talk with Chiang. Mao stayed in Chungking for about a month and a half and his talks with Chiang were limited in progress. While the KMT-CCP negotiations dragged on, Hurley left for Washington in September, 1945, for consultation and a physical checkup. Mao departed for Yen-an on October 11 and on the same day the Central Government released a text of the agreement reached with the

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<sup>6</sup> Hurley to Secretary of State, January 31, 1945, Hurley Papers, cited in Buhite, p. 168.

<sup>7</sup> For text of the agreement, see Department of State, *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (hereafter referred to as *China White Paper*), pp. 74-5.

<sup>8</sup> Buhite, p. 170.

<sup>9</sup> For contents of the "Three-Point Agreement," see *China White Paper*, p. 75.

Communists. The 12-point statement covered a wide-ranging discussion of issues and proposed solutions.<sup>10</sup> Among several other things, both sides agreed that a Political Consultation Conference should be convened as early as possible. But on one crucial issue, namely "local governments in the liberated area," no agreement was reached. The Communist representatives proposed four formulas and all were rejected by the Central Government. Finally it was decided that the problem "be submitted to the Political Consultation Conference for discussion and settlement."<sup>11</sup> Later events were to prove that this issue was one of the major obstacles that led to the final collapse of the KMT-CCP negotiations. However, when the agreement was first released in October, 1945, it seemed to bring optimism to all of those concerned. This superficial optimistic atmosphere was soon to change.

While he was in the States, Hurley learned to his displeasure that several of his former Embassy staff members (the ones he had gotten rid of such as John Service, George Atcheson and John Carter Vincent) were appointed to key positions from where they could considerably curtail his efforts in China. Both Atcheson and Service were sent to Tokyo to work as General Douglas MacArthur's advisors while Vincent became Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department. Hurley had long suspected these men of being disloyal by sabotaging his mediation efforts and therefore had them recalled. The reassignment of them was an indication to Hurley that he was not being given full support by the State Department. One other factor that might have contributed to Hurley's decision to quit the China post was that his financial affairs, which had been neglected during his absence, demanded personal care. As if all these were not enough, the situation in China also deteriorated by late October. Military conflicts between the Nationalist and Communist forces grew more frequent and bloody. Some of Amer-

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<sup>10</sup> For contents of the agreement, see *ibid.*, Annex 49 (pp. 577-581).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 579-580.

ican newspapers also began to criticize Hurley's role in the negotiations. Furthermore, Hureley learned from at least two indirect sources that he would soon be relieved from his ambassadorship.<sup>12</sup>

Under such distressing circumstances, Hurley took what he felt was his only alternative. On November 27 he formally announced his resignation at a press conference in Washington. In a prepared statement, he severely criticized U.S. policy in China. In his long letter of resignation presented to President Truman, Hurley made the most widely-covered and harsh criticism of U.S. foreign policy ever made by an American diplomat. He told the President:

The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct of international relations. . . . We finished the war in the Far East furnishing lend-lease supplies and using all our reputation to undermine democracy and bolster imperialism and Communism.<sup>13</sup>

Hurley was even more blunt in his attack against the State Department and those recalled career men who once served under him in China:

. . . . The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

Despite these handicaps we did make progress toward unification of the armed forces of China. We did prevent civil war between the rival factions, at least until I had left China. We did bring the leaders of the rival parties together for peaceful discussions. Throughout this period the chief opposition of the accomplishment of our mission came from the

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<sup>12</sup> Buhite, pp. 265-6.

<sup>13</sup> The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman, November 26, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, VII, p. 722. Hurley's letter of resignation was also included in *China White Paper*, Annex 50 (pp. 581-4).

American career diplomats in the Embassy at Chungking and in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department.<sup>14</sup>

Despite Hurley's reputation of being hot-tempered and having an impetuous personality, a considerable portion of the accusations made by him against U.S. foreign policy in general and American career diplomats in particular indicated a perceptive insight and had a tragic ring of truth.

Nevertheless, Hurley's abrupt change of attitude and harsh criticism enraged President Truman. According to Truman, just few hours before Hurley announced his resignation, they had a conversation at the White House and Hurley promised to return to China. Truman later wrote in his *Memoirs*:

To me, this was an utterly inexplicable about-face, and what had caused it I cannot imagine yet. I realized, however, that Hurley would have to go, and the Cabinet concurred. The same day I learned to my surprise that a "letter of resignation" from Hurley was given by him to the press; but he would have been out, with or without that letter.<sup>15</sup>

Truman readily accepted Hurley's resignation and almost immediately found a suitable replacement — General of the Army George Catlett Marshall.

## II

Marshall, an average graduate of Virginia Military Institute in 1901, had served in Europe during World War I under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces. It was in France that Pershing began to perceive Marshall as a first-rate staff officer and Marshall became one of his proteges. However, due to the internal strife within the U.S. Army hierarchy, Marshall's rise up the military ladder was very slow despite Pershing's support. It was not until 1936 and only after General Malin Craig, one of the "Pershing gang" and Marshall's old acquaintance,

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 723.

<sup>15</sup> Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, in two volumes, vol. two, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York, 1956), p. 66.

succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Chief of Staff did Marshall finally become a brigadier general at the age of 56.<sup>16</sup>

From 1936 on, Marshall's late-blooming military career advanced speedily. He became Chief of Staff in early September 1939. The Pearl Harbor Incident in 1941 formally brought the United States into World War II on the side of the Allied Powers. In the ensuing four years, Marshall was to fully utilize his genius as a staff officer to help organize and supply an efficient huge American military force. In December 1944 he was promoted to the newly created five-star rank of General of the Army. Shortly after the War, Marshall retired from active duty. He was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal and an Oak Leaf Cluster. President Truman praised in the citation:

In a war unparalleled in magnitude and in horror, millions of Americans gave their country outstanding service. General of the Army George C. Marshall gave it victory . . . .

Statesman and Soldier, he had courage, fortitude, and vision, and best of all a rare self-effacement. He has been a tower of strength as counsellor of two Commanders in Chief. His standards of character, conduct and efficiency inspired the entire Army, the Nation and the world. To him, as much as to any individual, the United States owes its future. He takes his place at the head of the great commanders of history.<sup>17</sup>

In the eyes of the President and many other Americans, Marshall was the "organizer of victory" as far as U.S. military efforts in World War II were concerned. Marshall's military prestige and popularity was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why Truman considered him for the China mission.

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<sup>16</sup> There are several biographical and semi-biographical works on Marshall: Katherine Tupper Marshall (wife of General Marshall), *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* (New York, 1946); Robert Payne, *The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall* (New York, 1951); Harold Faber, *Soldier and Statesman: General George C. Marshall* (New York, 1964); Rose Page Wilson, *General Marshall Remembered* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968); Leonard Mosley, *Marshall: Hero of Our Times* (New York, 1982). However, the best and most authentic biography of Marshall is still the three-volume set by Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall* (New York, 1963-1973).

<sup>17</sup> Katherine Marshall, pp. 290-1; Faber, p. 173.

On November 27, 1945, the same day when he accepted Hurley's resignation, President Truman contacted Marshall by telephone at his home in Leesburg, Virginia. Marshall, who had just retired from active military service a week ago and was very anxiously looking forward to a peaceful civilian life and rest, was caught off his guard by the President's call.<sup>18</sup> He was reluctant to give up the retired life which he had waited for so long. However, being a soldier all his life, Marshall was not trained for turning down a call for duty from the President, constitutionally the Commander in Chief of the nation. Marshall accepted the assignment without showing any hesitation, much to the vexation of Mrs. Marshall.

The White House formally announced on November 27 the resignation of Hurley and the appointment of General Marshall as President Truman's special envoy to China with the personal rank of Ambassador.<sup>19</sup> Two days later, Marshall went to the White House to discuss his mission with the President and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Truman asked Marshall to work out with the State Department a set of instructions that would become his directive for the general's mission to China. During the ensuing two weeks, a series of meetings were held between the President, Marshall, Byrnes and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson to discuss and revise the draft of the directive.<sup>20</sup> The formal draft of the directive was signed by President Truman on December 14 and was made public the next day. In the directive, the President first expressed his appreciation of Marshall's willingness to undertake the

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<sup>18</sup> General Marshall was Chief of Staff during the War. He turned over the office to General Dwight D. Eisenhower on November 20, 1945. According to Buhite, Marshall was recommended by Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson at Cabinet meeting on November 27. See Buhite, p. 272. See also Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York, 1979), p. 289, and Gary May, *China Scapegoat, the Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 140.

<sup>19</sup> *FRUS*, 1945, VII, p. 726. See also Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1970), p. 189.

<sup>20</sup> For detailed description of the process to draft the directive, see Acheson, pp. 197-9. See also May, pp. 140-2.

difficult mission and his confidence in the general's ability to handle the task. Then Truman stated that it was his desire that Marshall, as his Special Representative, would "bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States" so that "the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible."<sup>21</sup> However, the most important part of the directive was in the following paragraph:

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed U.S. military advisory group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.<sup>22</sup>

Attached to President Truman's directive to Marshall were two other documents: a memorandum by Secretary Byrnes for the War Department and a statement by the President on "U.S. Policy Towards China."<sup>23</sup> In the "U.S. Policy Towards China," issued on the same day as the directive,<sup>24</sup> President Truman expressed American concern about the turbulent situation then prevailing in China. He stated emphatically that:

A China, disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife is an

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<sup>21</sup> *China White Paper*, Annex 61 (p. 605); Truman, p. 67; *Marshall's Mission to China*, hereafter referred to as *Mission to China* (Arlington, Virginia, 1976), in two volumes, vol. II, Appendix A, Document 1a (pp. 1-2). The last cited is the best primary source of Marshall Mission. It includes almost all documents and records of negotiations related to the mission.

<sup>22</sup> *China White Paper*, Annex 61 (p. 606); Truman, p. 68; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix A, Document 1a (p. 2).

<sup>23</sup> For full text of the two documents, see *China White Paper*, Annex 61 (pp. 606-7); Truman, pp. 68-72; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix A, Document 1b (pp. 3-4) and Document 1c (pp. 5-6).

<sup>24</sup> In his memoirs, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), Secretary Byrnes mistakenly stated that Truman's statement of policy was issued on December 18 (p. 229).

undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. . . . It is thus in the most vital interest of the U.S. and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation.<sup>25</sup>

Truman was also disturbed by the fact that “the present National Government of China is a ‘one-party government.’ ” He believed that in order to achieve “peace, unity and democratic reform in China,” the National Government must broaden its basis “to include other political elements in the country.”<sup>26</sup> As far as the KMT’s National Government was concerned, the most attractive part of Truman’s statement was his promise of future aid as a reward for unification and internal reform:

As China moves towards peace and unity along the lines described above, the U.S. would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China’s national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. Specifically, the U.S. would be prepared to grant a Chinese request for an American military advisory group in China, to dispatch such other advisors in the economic and financial fields as the Chinese Government might require and which this Government can supply, and to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which contribute towards the development of a healthy economy in China and healthy trade relations between China and the U.S.<sup>27</sup>

With all guidelines and procedures set, Marshall was ready for his mission to China. He left Washington for China by a U.S. Army Air Force transport plane on December 15, 1945.

### III

Marshall arrived in Shanghai on December 20. Meeting him

<sup>25</sup> *China White Paper*, Annex 62 (p. 607); Truman, p. 68; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix A, Document 1c (p. 5).

<sup>26</sup> *China White Paper*, Annex 62 (p. 608); Truman, p. 70; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix A, Document 1c (pp. 6-7).

<sup>27</sup> *China White Paper*, Annex 62 (p. 609); Truman, pp. 70-1; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix A, Document 1c (pp. 7-8).

at the Kiangwan Airport were General Wedemeyer, one of Marshall's protégés and then commander of the American troops in the China Theater and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and Walter Robertson, charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Chungking who was in charge of the Embassy after Hurley's departure in September. Robertson was a cousin of Wedemeyer's.<sup>28</sup>

Shortly after checking in the suite that Wedemeyer had reserved for him in the Cathay Hotel, Marshall showed Wedemeyer the President's directive and asked Wedemeyer's opinion of the mission. Knowing from experience that Marshall had always professed his appreciation of candid and straightforward opinions, Wedemeyer told his former chief point-blank:

I told General Marshall that he would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and Nationalists, since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup>

To this reply, Marshall reacted angrily and said: "Wedemeyer, it *is* going to work! I *am* going to do it! And what's more, *you* are going to help me do it! (emphasis in original)"<sup>30</sup> Wedemeyer was stunned and hurt by this emotional outburst of fury which ran so counter to Marshall's temperament. However, Wedemeyer tried "to find all kinds of excuses" for Marshall's outburst. He rationalized that "the gruelling work and tremendous strain of the war had exacted a heavy toll

<sup>28</sup> Mosley, p. 371. However, Wedemeyer did not mention this relationship in his book, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York, 1958).

<sup>29</sup> Wedemeyer, p. 363. For a more recent and vivid description by Wedemeyer in an interview to Mosley several years ago (about 1979 or 1980), see *Hero of Our Times*, pp. 366-8. However, according to Schaller, one week before Marshall's arrival in China, Wedemeyer already confided his bitterness towards the Marshall Mission in two letters to Colonel Ivan Yeaton, who had been appointed by Wedemeyer as commanding officer of the U.S. Observation Group in Yen-an. See Schaller, p. 296.

<sup>30</sup> As told to Mosley by Wedemeyer in *Hero of Our Times*, p. 367. See also Wedemeyer, p. 363.

both on his physical condition and his nerves, and that he was also fatigued by his long air trip from the United States.”<sup>31</sup>

Unfortunately, Marshall had taken Wedemeyer’s remarks more personally. A few days later Marshall told Robertson: “I think he (Wedemeyer) is getting too big for his breeches.”<sup>32</sup> Upon hearing this from Robertson, Wedemeyer finally realized that he had enraged Marshall by telling him the truth. Wedemeyer was deeply hurt by Marshall’s remarks. He later confessed to Marshall’s most recent biographer: “I was hurt because of his attitude towards me. He obviously didn’t care for me any longer. And I decided from then on that I didn’t give a damn about him either.”<sup>33</sup> Nearly thirty-five years later, Wedemeyer would analyze Marshall’s state of mind at that time in the following words: “He’d been called the greatest man in the world, the greatest American, by Truman, and accolades and awards had been heaped on him. And . . . unwittingly, I had penetrated his armor.”<sup>34</sup> Since that fateful conversation on December 20, 1945, relations between Marshall and Wedemeyer were never the same.

The following day Wedemeyer accompanied Marshall to Nanking where they were received by the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang.<sup>35</sup> During his first meeting with Chiang, Marshall told the Generalissimo very frankly that:

. . . the position of the President depends in a sense almost entirely upon United States public appreciation of the reasonableness and deter-

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<sup>31</sup> Wedemeyer, p. 363. See also Mosley, p. 368. Wedemeyer’s views were also confirmed by General MacArthur, who had met Marshall just before the latter left for China. MacArthur noticed that Marshall “mentally . . . had aged immeasurably. . . . The former incisiveness and virility were gone. The war had apparently worn him down into a shadow of his former self.” See Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscence* (Greenwich, Conn., 1964), p. 320, cited in Herbert J. Clancy, S. J., “The Marshall Mission Revisited,” *American Studies*, X, 4 (December, 1980), p. 11.

<sup>32</sup> Mosley, p. 371.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>35</sup> *Mission to China*, I, p. 6; Wedemeyer, p. 363. Mosley mistakenly implied that Marshall went directly to Chungking on December 21. See Mosley, p. 369.

mination on the part of both sides to reach satisfactory settlement. *From one point of view that would apply more strongly to the Central Government for throughout the war the United States has supported and assisted the Central Government* (emphasis added).<sup>36</sup>

Unfortunately, the second half of the statement, which was more important for it revealed Marshall's attitude towards the Central Government during the whole period of his mediation, seemed to have eluded the attention of all the Chinese present at the meeting.

Marshall arrived in Chungking on December 22.<sup>37</sup> In Chungking, then still the temporary capital of the National Government, Marshall set up his headquarters in a Western-style villa called "Happiness Gardens."<sup>38</sup> Marshall began his mission almost immediately by having a conference with Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and Tung Pi-wu, CCP representatives in Chungking, on December 23 before seeing any Central Government officials. Marshall generally reiterated what he pointed out to Chiang and emphasized that "he would be happy to see the Communist representatives at any time they might wish to talk to him and state their views to him." On their part, CCP representatives expressed their appreciation of Marshall's efforts to mediate the Chinese internal strife. In a flattering manner, Chou, chief Communist representative, told Marshall that China should learn three things from the United States, namely the spirit of independence, a democratic form of

<sup>36</sup> See "Minutes of Meeting Held at Nanking on December 21," in *FRUS*, 1945, VII, p. 796. These minutes were prepared by General Wedemeyer. Besides Chiang, Marshall, Wedemeyer, also present at the meeting were Madame Chiang, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh and American Minister Robertson.

<sup>37</sup> *Mission to China*, I, p. 7. Gary May mistakenly stated that Marshall arrived in Chungking on December 18, 1945. See May, p. 142. CCP representatives in Chungking also went to greet Marshall at the airport, but the Government police attempted to chase them off the field. Only American intervention prevented the fiasco. See John F. Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven, Record of Civil War, China 1945-49* (Garden City, N. Y., 1971), entry on December 23, 1945 (p. 66). During Marshall's mediation, Melby was Second Secretary at American Embassy. Later he was to become the principal author of the *China White Paper*.

<sup>38</sup> *Time*, December 26, 1945, p. 26, cited in May, p. 142.

government and agricultural reform and industrialization.<sup>39</sup>

Marshall also met with Premier T. V. Soong and some leaders of the Democratic League on December 24 and 26 respectively. He asked Soong just about everything he wanted to know of China, such as the Democratic League and other small parties, Soviet policy and Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria, repatriation of the Japanese, production and communication in China, and the currency situation.<sup>40</sup> In their conversation with the American mediator, leaders of the Democratic League also stated their position which was rather visionary but nonetheless reflected the true desire of all Chinese. They told Marshall:

The primary wish of the Chinese people as a whole is peace. It is how to avoid civil war in China. . . . We are against the Kuomintang or Communist party who started civil war. . . . Already we had 10 years of civil war (1927-1937) and the people have suffered a great deal. The people were all against that civil war. . . . Stop the fighting and if we can stop fighting then we can talk. If we demand the two parties to stop military action then leave all the problems to be handled by the PCC conference, then . . . each side to the conference can compromise. Give and take. The U.S. can help in stopping the war a great deal morally. They supported a great effort in the Pacific and we all know that the civil war will affect the peace in the world. You have a moral right to demand the cessation of the civil war and the Chinese people have a right to demand peace and not another civil strife. No party has any reason to continue the civil war.

. . . . First, stop the war, second start reorganizing to make a temporary coalition govorny (government) and nationalize the Army and then together with the Kuomintang and all the members, plan for a national assembly which will be a prelude for a constitutional government. A lot depends we feel that there are two forces outside from the government. One is the people in the country demanding that this conference will make these things possible, and second is outside opinion, especially American.<sup>41</sup>

This statement by the Democratic League favorably impressed Marshall and apparently had a profound effect on his attitude, for many of the ideas, such as an immediate truce, national-

<sup>39</sup> *FRUS*, 1945, VII, p. 804.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 805-812.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 818.

ization of the Army and convocation of national assembly, were all adopted later by Marshall in his proposal to both the KMT and the CCP.

Marshall asked that a committee be formed to conduct negotiations. A Committee of Three, consisting of General Chang Chun, Chairman of the Szechuan Provincial Government, as the National Government representative, Chou En-lai as the CCP representative and Marshall, as Chairman, was formed on January 5, 1946.<sup>42</sup> The Committee of Three held its first formal meeting on January 7, at Marshall's residence. After five more meetings, an agreement was reached by the Committee on January 10 for the issuance of a "Cessation of Hostilities Order" to be promulgated by Generalissimo Chiang and Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP, simultaneously. The Order directed "all units, regular, militia, irregular and guerrilla" of both the National Armies of the Central Government and Chinese Communist troops that:

- a. All hostilities will cease immediately.
- b. Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease. There may be the movements necessary for demobilization, redispotion, supply, administration and local security.
- c. Destruction of and interference with all lines of communications will cease and you will clear at once obstructions placed against or interfering with such lines of communications.
- d. An Executive Headquarters will be established immediately in Peiping for the purpose of carrying out the agreements for cessation of hostilities. The headquarters will consist of three Commissioners: one representing the Chinese National Government, one representing the Chinese Communist Party, and one to represent the United States of America. The necessary instructions and orders unanimously agreed upon by

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<sup>42</sup> *Mission to China*, I, pp. 10-11; *Chiang Tsung-tung Mi-lu* (Secret Record of President Chiang Kai-shek, hereafter referred to as *Mi-lu*, in 14 volumes, Taipei, 1977), vol. 14, p. 33.

the three Commissioners, will be issued in the name of the President of the Republic of China, through the Executive Headquarters.<sup>43</sup>

However, in a press release made public on the same day, Marshall and Chou agreed on two important exceptions to the Order:

1. Paragraph "b," Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movement south of the Yangtze River for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government.

2. Paragraph "b," Cessation of Hostilities Order, does not prejudice military movements of forces of the National Army into or within Manchuria which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty.<sup>44</sup>

Immediately after the issuance of the cease-fire order, the Political Consultation Conference (PCC, also known as Political Consultative Council), composed of representatives of the KMT, the CCP, the Democratic League, the Youth Party and non-party delegates, also reconvened on January 10 in Chungking. At the opening session of the PCC, Generalissimo Chiang announced the Government's decision to grant the Chinese populace immediately the following fundamental rights:

(1) Freedom of person, creed, speech, publication, assembly and association—no authorities other than the judiciary and police shall cause any person to be arrested or punished.

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<sup>43</sup> For detailed notes on the six meetings of Conference (Committee) of Three, see *Mission to China*, II, Appendix B, Document 4 (a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g); *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 43-115, 119-125. For text of "Cessation of Hostilities Order," see *Mission to China*, II Appendix B, Document 1, 2 and 3 (pp. 19-24); *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 125-6. For a detailed description of the Executive Headquarters, see *Mission to China*, II, Appendix B, Document 5 (pp. 126-8); *China White Paper*, Appendix 63 (pp. 609-610). For Chinese version of the cease-fire order, see *Chiang Tsung-tung Ta-shih Chang-pien*, hereafter referred to as *Ta-shih Chang-pien* (Taipei, 1967), V, pp. 5-9. For KMT-CCP joint agreement on the Executive Headquarters, see *Mission to China*, II, Appendix B, Document 5 (pp. 126-8).

<sup>44</sup> *Mission to China*, II, Appendix B, Document 3, p. 24; *FRUS*, 1946, IX, p. 126.

(2) All political parties shall have equal legal status and may operate openly within the law.

(3) Popular elections will be held and local self-government permitted.

(4) Political prisoners, except traitors and those found to have committed definite acts injurious to the Republic, will be released.<sup>45</sup>

Sessions of the PCC lasted from January 10 to 31 during which ten meetings were held. Five major topics were discussed: (1) reorganization of the government, (2) reorganization of the armies, (3) administrative policy, (4) the National Assembly, and (5) the draft constitution. In its final session, the PCC agreed on a set of resolutions which were divided into five main headings as follows:<sup>46</sup>

### ***(1) Government Organization***

(a) The State Council: pending the convocation of the National Assembly . . . the Kuomintang is to revise the organic law of the National Government to make the State Council the supreme organ of the Government in charge of national affairs . . . resolutions involving changes in administrative policy must obtain a two-thirds vote of members (of the State Council) present for approval. . . . The Council is to be composed of 40 members, who are to be chosen by the President (of the National Government) from KMT and non-KMT personnel, and is to include the Presidents of the five Yuan as ex-officio members. Half the Councillors will be members of the KMT and half members of other parties and non-party personnel.

(b) The Executive Yuan: All Ministers of the Executive Yuan are ipso facto Ministers of State. There may be three to five Ministers of State without portfolio. Of the existing

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<sup>45</sup> *Mission to China*, I, pp. 24-5. See also *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, p. 6.

<sup>46</sup> *Mission to China*, I, pp. 25-9. For full text of these resolutions, see *China White Paper*, Annexes 64-68 (pp. 610-621); *Mission to China*, II, Appendix C, Document 1 (pp. 135-156). For Chinese version of the main points of these resolutions, see *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 26-9.

Ministers in the Executive Yuan and the proposed Ministers without portfolio, seven or eight will be non-KMT personnel. Members of all political parties as well as non-party personnel may become Ministers of State with or without portfolio.

### ***(2) Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction***

Under this program all parties recognize the San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) as the principles for national reconstruction and the national leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek.

### ***(3) Military Problems***

Fundamental principles for the creation of a national army: The army shall be a national army belonging to the State and no political parties shall be allowed to carry on political activities within the army. The army shall not interfere in political affairs and army personnel on active duty shall not serve as civil officials. . . . The Three-Man Military Commission (it was the Military Sub-Committee on which Marshall served as advisor) should proceed according to schedule and agree upon practical methods for the reorganization of the Communist troops at an early date. The Government troops should be reorganized . . . into 90 divisions and this reorganization should be completed within 6 months. When the reorganization . . . has been completed, all troops of the country should be again reorganized into 50 or 60 divisions.

### ***(4) Agreement on the National Assembly***

The National Assembly shall be convened on May 5 (1946) for the purpose of adopting the constitution, which shall be ratified by a vote of three-fourths of the delegates present. The 1200 geographical and vocational delegates who have already or are going to be elected shall be retained. Delegates from the Northeast (Manchuria) and Taiwan (Formosa) shall be ap-

portioned among the various parties and social leaders according to a ratio to be decided upon later. The total number of delegates will thus be 2050. An organ to enforce the constitution will be elected six months after the adoption of the constitution.

### ***(5) The 1936 Draft Constitution***

A committee for reviewing the May 5, 1936, Draft Constitution shall be established to draw up a detailed plan for revision of the Draft Constitution, based on the principles agreed upon by the PCC as well as recommendations of various associations connected with the promotion of constitutionalism. "This plan will be submitted to the National Assembly for adoption."

Reviewing the context of these PCC resolutions, one has to admit that they did offer a satisfactory, if not perfect, blueprint for building up a practical democracy in China. The initial reaction from all of those concerned was encouraging. The CCP, the Democratic League and the Youth Party issued respective statements, announcing their intention to carry out the resolutions. Speaking to the closing session of the PCC on January 31, Generalissimo Chiang also pledged that:

I have followed and studied closely the various resolutions adopted by the Conference. . . . I wish to declare first on behalf of the Government that they will be fully respected and carried out as soon as the prescribed procedures have been completed. . . . I pledge at the same time that I will uphold this program faithfully and will also see to it that all the military and civil subordinates follow it strictly. . . . From now on, I will, whether in the Government or out of it, faithfully and resolutely observe, as a citizen should, all the decisions of this Conference.<sup>47</sup>

In order to facilitate the reorganization of the Chinese armies, a Military Sub-Committee was formed in late January 1946. The Committee consisted of three members among whom were General Chang Chih-chung, Director of the

<sup>47</sup> *Mission to China*, I, p. 24.

Political Training Board of the National Military Council, as the National Government representative, Chou En-lai as the CCP representative, and Marshall as advisor. The first formal meeting of the Committee was held on February 14. Six more meetings were required to reach an agreement.<sup>48</sup> A formal document, entitled "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army," was signed on February 25 by the three members of the Committee.<sup>49</sup> Based on the agreement, schedules were set up to carry out the plan for integrating the Communist Forces into the National Army as well as for an overall military reorganization within a period of 18 months. When the plan was completed, the formal deployment of the Government and the Communist forces should be as follows:<sup>50</sup>

Northeast China: 1 army consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divisions with a National commander and 4 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander – total 5 armies.

Northwest China: 3 armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions, each with a Communist commander – total 3 armies.

North China: 3 armies each consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions, each with a Communist commander; 1 army consisting of 2 National and 1 Communist divisions with a National commander; and 2 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander – total 6 armies.

Central China: 1 army consisting of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions with a Communist commander and 3 armies

<sup>48</sup> For minutes of the seven meetings, see *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 220-258, 265-289. See also *Mission to China*, II, Appendix E, Document 5 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (h). However, in all seven documents, Chang Chih-chung's name was either misspelt or misrecorded.

<sup>49</sup> For full text, see *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 295-300; *Mission to China*, II, Appendix E, Document 4 (pp. 197-204); *China White Paper*, Annex 69 (pp. 622-6). For Chinese version of the main points of the agreement, see *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 42-6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander – total 4 armies.

South China (including Formosa): 2 armies each consisting of 3 National divisions, each with a National commander – total 2 armies.

The signing of the military agreement brought great joy to millions of Chinese. It was even more encouraging to Marshall. He seemed convinced that the end of the civil war was in sight. Unfortunately, the gradual deteriorating military situation in Manchuria was soon to challenge his optimism. Manchuria was occupied by the Soviets at the end of World War II. However, Chinese sovereignty in the area was unequivocally guaranteed by Stalin at least on three occasions: in the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 and in Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 1945.<sup>51</sup> After the War, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria was scheduled to be completed by early December 1945. But the Russians prolonged their occupation well into the spring of 1946, according to some American sources, presumably at the requests of the Nationalist Government.<sup>52</sup>

In early March 1946, the Nationalist Government formally asked the Soviets to leave. The withdrawal of Russian troops began on April 6 and was completed on April 29. Though finally leaving Manchuria, the Russians looted all the industrial equipment there and everything else that was worth taking as “War Booty.” According to Edwin W. Pauley, Special Representative of President Truman for reparations, the estimated value of the industrial equipment taken by the Soviets from Manchuria was worth more than two billion dollars.<sup>53</sup> Worse still, the delay impeded the Nationalist take-over. In the

<sup>51</sup> *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 938-9; *China White Paper*, pp. 114, 117.

<sup>52</sup> *China White Paper*, p. 147; Schaller, p. 293. According to Schaller, the Nationalist Government asked Soviet troops to stay on, for the “Nationalist forces were not yet in a position to reoccupy” Manchuria.

<sup>53</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China* (New York, 1957), an English translation made under the direction of Madame Chiang, p. 170; *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, p. 131. See also *Mi-lu*, Vol. 14, pp. 49-50.

interval the Chinese Communists moved their troops into Manchuria, apparently with the acquiescence of the Soviets, while at the same time the Nationalist troops were refused permission to use Dairen as a port of landing. In some areas, Chinese Communist forces entered before the withdrawal of Russian troops. Thus, from mid-January onward, sporadic skirmishes occurred between the Government and Communist forces.

But generally speaking, during the early months of 1946, the military situation in Manchuria was still under control. Persuaded by Marshall, both the KMT and the CCP, particularly the latter, showed docility. This flexibility on the part of the CCP during the early months of Marshall's mission, was apparently due to the fact that throughout 1946 the CCP was militarily still the underdog. Therefore, it was necessary for Chinese Communists to profess cooperation with Marshall in order to gain what they needed to strengthen their bases, to regroup their military forces and expand into new areas.

On the last day of February 1946, three days after the signing of the military agreement, Marshall, accompanied by Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai, the other two members of the Military Sub-Committee, left Chungking for Peiping to inspect the military situation in North China. During the first week of March, Marshall flew nearly 4,000 miles over North China, visiting a dozen cities, including the CCP stronghold of Yen-an, where he met Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh for the first time. During the tour, Marshall was received by the Chinese people with wild enthusiasm. He was acclaimed as "The Savior of China," "The God of Peace" and "First Lord of all Warlords."<sup>54</sup> Marshall was so touched by the scene that he decided to do his best to bring about the peace they wanted. Before the end of his tour, he spoke at Hankow. He stated that "last month and the next two months are the most critical months in the history of China."<sup>55</sup> Later developments

<sup>54</sup> Payne, p. 265; Robert H. Ferrell, *George C. Marshall*, vol. XV in the series of *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York, 1966), p. 30.

<sup>55</sup> Payne, p. 266; Paul A. Varg, *The Closing of the Door* (East Lansing, Michigan, 1973), p. 256. See also *FRUS*, 1946, IX, p. 510.

proved that the "next two months" were indeed eventful, decisive and even fatal, as far as his mission was concerned. Yet it was during these two months that Marshall took a five-week absence from China.

One day after the signing of the military agreement, Marshall recommended to President Truman that he be recalled to Washington around March 12 for consultation. Truman approved his request and directed him to return to Washington.<sup>56</sup> Marshall left Chungking on March 11 and stayed in the States during the ensuing five weeks. Before his departure, Marshall designated Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. as his representative to both the Committee of Three and the Military Sub-Committee. Historians are puzzled by Marshall's decision to be absent from the scene at this crucial moment. Even Mao had conveyed his wish that Marshall should postpone his departure until "the situation in China . . . became reasonably stabilized."<sup>57</sup> The reasons given by Marshall himself as reported in the *White Paper* are that:

He felt that he should report to the President on the situation in China and he was particularly anxious to take up the question of the transfer of surplus property and shipping and the problem of loans to China. He also wished to make a personal presentation of the situation in China regarding UNRRA and famine conditions. He was of the opinion that he should make a brief visit to obtain financial and economic facilities to aid China and returned to China in time to assist in adjusting differences which were certain to arise over the major problems connected with the agreements reached. It was his opinion that steps had to be taken to assist China and its people in the increasingly serious economic situation and to facilitate the efforts being made toward peace and unity in China and toward the establishment of a unified defense force. General Marshall felt that Chinese political and military unity could only be consolidated and made lasting through the rehabilitation of the country and the permanent general improvement of economic conditions.<sup>58</sup>

#### IV

Unfortunately, it was during Marshall's absence from

<sup>56</sup> *FRUS*, 1946, IX, p. 446. For subsequent communications between Marshall and Truman concerning the brief recall, see pp. 510-511.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>58</sup> *China White Paper*, p. 145; Payne, p. 267. See also *FRUS*, 1946, IX, p. 446.

China that the military situation in Manchuria took a turn for the worse. Five days after Marshall's departure, Communist forces launched an attack against the Government personnel in Szepingkai, a strategic town in Manchuria which had been just taken over from the Russians. According to Generalissimo Chiang's estimate, the Communists made the move in an attempt "to concentrate their troops at Szepingkai to block Government troops moving northward from Mukden for take-over purposes."<sup>59</sup> A week-long fierce battle was fought between Government troops and the Communists. The Communists captured the city but suffered heavy losses. Barely a month later, the Communists attacked Changchun, capital of Manchuria and a major railroad center, on April 15, the day after the withdrawal of the Soviets. Three days later Changchun fell. The Government troops suffered 7,000 casualties.<sup>60</sup>

On April 17, Marshall, this time with his wife, flew to Peiping and arrived in Chungking the next day. He immediately intervened to halt the deteriorating situation in Manchuria. Unfortunately, he tended to overlook the fact that the Communist military offensives in Manchuria constituted not only a flagrant violation of the cease-fire order but also a revelation of a changing attitude on the part of Yen-an. But instead he blamed the Government by pointing out that many of the existing difficulties (in Manchuria) could have been avoided" had the Government consented earlier to send field teams of the Executive Headquarters into Manchuria. He further complained that "in many instances the National Government authorities had offered opportunities to the Communist Party to make accusations against their good faith."<sup>61</sup> Between late April and early June, Marshall kept proposing a truce to both parties but without success. Hostilities in Manchuria continued.

The National Government transferred its capital to Nank-

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<sup>59</sup> Chiang, p. 166.

<sup>60</sup> *China White Paper*, p. 149; Varg, p. 259.

<sup>61</sup> For seven such "instances" given by Marshall, see *China White Paper*, p. 151; *Mission to China*, I, p. 103.

ing on May 5, 1946. Marshall also moved to Nanking where he would continue his mediation efforts during the rest of his mission in China. He apparently didn't like the atmosphere of Nanking. Marshall found the new capital depressing.<sup>62</sup> Another factor affecting Marshall's mood was the fact that he was unable to break the stalemate in Manchuria. Ever since his return from Washington, Marshall's relations with Chiang gradually grew cool despite the fact that the latter accepted an American journalist recommended by him to serve as an advisor to the National Government.<sup>63</sup> Between Chiang and Marshall, according to an eyewitness' account, there was "a rapidly growing distrust of each other's motives and judgment."<sup>64</sup>

While the military situation in Manchuria was discouraging, the political atmosphere was also daily becoming more charged with emotion. Though the PCC resolutions were adopted in January, they still were awaiting approval from the two parties. The conservative members within the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, referred to by Marshall as "reactionaries," were against offering the Communists any opportunity to control the "coalition government" while the military leaders of the Whampoa clique were also of the opinion that conflict with the CCP could only be settled by force. On the other hand, the Communists were equally adamant in demanding political rights. It was obvious that the plan for a "coalition government" was not going to work. The CCP and the Democratic League demanded that they be given at least fourteen seats in the State Council, constituting a vetoing

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<sup>62</sup> Payne, p. 273.

<sup>63</sup> John Robinson Beal was Washington news editor for *Time* at the time when Marshall recommended him to the Nationalist Government. According to Beal, his mission as told him by Marshall was to "keep the Chinese out of trouble with the United States." Beal arrived in China in late April 1946. His family joined him in mid-October. He did not leave China until mid-July, 1947. Beal's day-by-day eyewitness account of Marshall's mission since May, 1946, entitled *Marshall in China* (Garden City, N. Y., 1970), is still the best and most objective sources on the subject.

<sup>64</sup> Melby, p. 144.

power, which the Central Government was not willing to give.<sup>65</sup>

The Communists also indicated that they would submit a list of their delegates to the National Assembly only after the reorganization of the government structure had been completed. Generalissimo Chiang was forced to announce on April 29 the indefinite postponement of the National Assembly pending the settlement of outstanding issues.<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile the Government troops increased its military pressure in Manchuria while the Communist forces also stepped-up their offensives. Both sides were criticizing each other through their propaganda organs. Marshall himself also became a victim of vicious attacks by the Communists.

On May 3, 1946, the Nationalists captured Pen-hsi-hu, an important coal-mining city, while the Communist troops attacked Jehol, Chahar, Hopei and Shantung provinces. Tsitsihar and Nung-chiang fell to the Communists on May 6.<sup>67</sup> The Government troops captured Szepingkai on May 19 and Changchun was also retaken four days later following a Communist withdrawal from the city. The Government troops were moving toward Harbin and Kirin. Irritated by this "ir-responsibility" shown by both sides, Marshall issued his first public statement in China on May 20. He said:

General Marshall is daily engaged in discussions with representatives of the Chinese political parties and others concerning the restoration of peace in Manchuria. He is deeply concerned over the critical situation in North China and is endeavoring by every means within his power to avoid the spread of the fighting in Manchuria to this region. The present publicity or propaganda campaigns conducted by both sides naturally inflames feelings and increases the possibility of some hot-head precipitating a general conflagration. This reckless propaganda of hate and suspicion seriously aggravates the present serious situation and can lead to results that would be disastrous for the people of China.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> *Mission to China*, I, pp. 30, 291 and Chiang, p. 172.

<sup>66</sup> Decision was made on July 3 that the National Assembly was to convene on November 12, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's birthday. See *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, p. 125 and Chiang, p. 172.

<sup>67</sup> Varg, pp. 259-260; Chiang, p. 171.

<sup>68</sup> *Mission to China*, II, Appendix I, Document 2 (p. 346); Payne, pp. 271-2. How-

Eager to prevent the hostilities from spreading further, Marshall sent several messages to Chiang during the final week of May, urging a new cease-fire order. The Generalissimo did not acquiesce until June 6 when he finally issued the second cease-fire order for a 15-day truce beginning at noon of June 7. Chiang apparently had good reasons for being hesitant. Despite the fact that the Communists also issued a separate cease-fire order on June 6, they seized Tsaochuang on the same day, which was followed a day later by Tehchow, Taian, Kaomi, Kiaohsien, Nanchuan and Lantsun, all in Shantung province.<sup>69</sup> Communist troops also attacked Shansi and occupied twenty-two counties, including Wenhsi, Suhsien, Hsinchiang, Yuchih and Chiehshiu, thus gradually completing their encirclement of Taiyuan and Tatung.<sup>70</sup>

At the request of Marshall, the Generalissimo publicly announced on June 21 the extension of the truce period in Manchuria in the following statement:

To afford the Chinese Communist Party once again an opportunity to obtain a satisfactory solution of the problems of military conflicts, restoration of communications, army reorganization and redistribution, I have ordered my army commanders to extend the effective period of my previous order to cease advances, attacks and pursuit to noon on June 30, 1946.<sup>71</sup>

Nevertheless, this third cease-fire order turned out to be as futile as the first two because the suspicion between the two parties was too deep to be bridged by a period of truce, long or short. However, after the expiration date of June 30, both Chiang and the CCP leaders issued separate orders prohibiting aggressive action by their own armies.<sup>72</sup> Thus, an informal truce continued while Marshall pursued his mediation efforts.

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ever, Payne mistakenly stated that Marshall's statement was made on May 23.  
<sup>69</sup> *China White Paper*, pp. 156-8; *Mission to China*, I, pp. 120-134; Chiang, p. 171.

<sup>70</sup> Chiang, p. 172.

<sup>71</sup> *Mission to China*, I, p. 158; *China White Paper*, p. 161; *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, p. 119.

<sup>72</sup> For Chiang's radio message and the joint statement by Mao and Chu Teh, see *China White Paper*, Annexes 82 and 83 (pp. 647-8).

Now exhausted and clearly impatient, Marshall needed someone to share his burden. He recommended in early July the appointment of Dr. John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University at Peiping, as U.S. Ambassador to China.<sup>73</sup>

Stuart was born in Hangchow, China, in 1876, the son of an American missionary. He graduated from the Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia in 1902. He married Aline Rodd of New Orleans, Louisiana in 1904. Stuart and his wife arrived in Hangchow in December of that year. Both were working as missionaries of the Southern Presbyterian Church. Stuart had been President of Yenching University since 1919. The U.S. Senate confirmed Stuart's nomination on July 11, 1946. Shortly afterwards, Stuart left for Nanking to join Marshall in his peace efforts.

However, even before Stuart's confirmation, it already became apparent that even with his help, Marshall would probably still be unable to turn the tide that was running against his mission. The CCP changed its attitude towards the United States. On July 7 the Central Executive Committee of the CCP issued a manifesto in commemorating the ninth anniversary of the outbreak of the Resistance War Against Japan. Included in the statement was a strong and bitter attack on American policy towards China and a protest against American military and financial aid to the Central Government.<sup>74</sup> Marshall complained to Chou that the statement dealt a serious blow to his mediation efforts and damaged his personal integrity. However, Marshall was unable to do anything about it.

As the stalemate dragged on, more incidents occurred that were bound to further impede the joint efforts of Marshall and Stuart. Two well-known figures of the Democratic League, Li Kung-pu and Wen I-duo, the latter an American-educated scholar and poet, were assassinated in Kunming on July 11 and 15 respectively. After investigation, it was revealed that the two culprits were junior officers of the Kunming Garrison

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<sup>73</sup> *FRUS*, 1946, IX, p. 1298; *China White Paper*, p. 173.

<sup>74</sup> For full text of the CCP manifesto, see *FRUS*, 1946, IX, pp. 1310-6.

Headquarters' Secret Police. Both were executed on August 20.<sup>75</sup> The Communists were determined to fully exploit the tragedy at the expense of the National Government. At this crucial moment, in mid-July the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang flew to Kuling, a remote resort in the Chekiang mountains, for summer vacation. Chiang stayed in Kuling for more than two months, much to the displeasure and inconvenience of Marshall.<sup>76</sup>

During the last two weeks of July, a series of events took place that would further strain Marshall's relations with the Communists. On July 13 seven U.S. Marines were captured by Communist forces in East Hopei. After an effort by an Executive Headquarters field team for their release, they were set free by the Communists on July 24. Five days later, another group of 55 U.S. Marines were ambushed by 300 Communist troops at Anping, between Peiping and Tientsin. Three Marines were killed and twelve more wounded.<sup>77</sup> In August, cases of Marine personnel being fired at by unidentified persons were also reported. And at the same time, the Nationalists kept on blaming the Communists for initiating fighting in Kiangsu and Shansi provinces while the Communists were accusing the Nationalists of doing the same thing in Kiangsu, Shantung and Hupeh.

This situation prompted Marshall and Stuart to issue a joint statement on August 10, which said:

General Marshall and Doctor Stuart have been exploring together every possibility for terminating the present growing conflict in China and for the initiation of the preliminary steps in the development of a truly democratic form of government. The desire for a peaceful solution

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<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1373-4; *Mission to China*, I, pp. 182-3; *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 129, 147.

<sup>76</sup> Between July 14 and September 17 Marshall went to Kuling for nine times to discuss the situation with Chiang. Marshall's stay lasted for several days in each case. See *Mission to China*, I, p. 190; *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 130-157.

<sup>77</sup> *Mission to China*, I, p. 386; Varg, p. 270; Payne, p. 275 and *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, p. 132. However, there was discrepancy on the figures of wounded in the incident. Marshall cited 12 while the figures given by Varg and *Ta-shih Chang-pien* were 11 and 17 respectively.

to the political problems appears practically unanimous on the part of the people. The economic situation demands a prompt solution if a disastrous collapse is to be avoided. The fighting is daily growing more wide spread and threatens to engulf the country and pass beyond the control of those responsible. . . .<sup>78</sup>

Five days later, Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador in Washington, forwarded to Generalissimo Chiang a letter from President Truman, dated August 10. In the letter, Truman expressed his deep concern about the deteriorating situation in China. He told Chiang:

I have followed closely the situation in China since I sent General Marshall to you as my Special Envoy. It is with profound regret that I am forced to the conclusion that his efforts have seemingly proved unavailing. . . .

The rapidly deteriorating political situation in China, during recent months, has been a cause of grave concern to the American people. While it is the continued hope of the United States that an influential and democratic China can still be achieved under your leadership, I would be less than honest if I did not point out that latest developments have forced me to the conclusion that the selfish interests of extremist elements, both in the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, are obstructing the aspirations of the people of China. . . .

American faith in the peaceful and democratic aspirations of the Chinese people has not been destroyed by recent events, but has been shaken. . . . There is an increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by failing to understand the liberal trend of the times. The people of the United States view with violent repugnance this state of affairs.

It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous attitude towards your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America. . . .<sup>79</sup>

<sup>78</sup> For full text of the statement, see *China White Paper*, Annex 84 (pp. 648-9); *Mission to China*, II, p. 380. For Chinese version of the statement, see *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 136-7.

<sup>79</sup> For full text of President Truman's letter, See *China White Paper*, Annex 86 (p. 652); *Mission to China*, II, Appendix L, Document 2 (pp. 381-2). For Chinese translation of the letter, see *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 139-141.

In his reply message to Truman, forwarded by Dr. Koo through the State Department, Chiang admitted that "mistakes have . . . been made by some subordinates on the government side," but he indicated that "compared to the flagrant violation on the part of the Communists, they are minor in scale." The Generalissimo further pledged that he would cooperate with Marshall with all his power. He also warned Truman that the success of American policy must "depend upon the sincerity of the Communists."<sup>80</sup> Unfortunately, sincerity has always been, and still is, the only element missing from the ingredients of a Communist, be it Russian or Chinese.

Furthermore, the Generalissimo lacked the absolute power he needed to make all-out concessions to the Communists, even if he was willing of doing so. Despite that he was the head of both the KMT and the Central Government, Chiang's power was not as dictatorial as that enjoyed by Mao in Yenan. The KMT in the 1940's was a party consisting of many political and military cliques, each with its own nucleus. The party was growing fast but terribly lacking in discipline and permeated with incompetency and corruption. In order to control both the Party and the Government effectively, the Generalissimo often had to compromise with the various factions which curried for his favor while at the same time fought each other for the protection of their own interests. In sum, the Generalissimo managed to maintain a balance, with extraordinary political tactics, among the various and often incompatible elements within the KMT and the Central Government. Any undue concession made by Chiang towards the Communists would certainly lose him the support of most of these factions.

While the Generalissimo would not concede unduly, the Communists were, likewise, in no mood to compromise. After the forming, in early August, of an informal Five Man Committee, consisting of three representatives from the Government and two representatives from the CCP and with Stuart as its

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<sup>80</sup> For full text of Chiang's message, see *Mission to China*, II, pp. 392-3. For Chinese version, see *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 144-7.

chairman, to continue negotiations, Marshall gradually moved himself out of the active mediation.<sup>81</sup> However, the Five Man Committee achieved no success. Chou En-lai left for Shanghai on September 16. It was only after Marshall met him in Shanghai that Chou returned to Nanking on October 21. Seeing no immediate political breakthrough, the Central Government, again, took military action. On October 11 Government forces captured Kalgan, which had been occupied by the Communists since August 23, 1945, and Chihfeng, two strategic towns in North China. On the same day the Government also announced its plan to convene the National Assembly on November 12 of the year.<sup>82</sup> Marshall considered the Government's retaking of Kalgan a clear violation of agreement on the part of Chiang because six days earlier the Generalissimo had issued a ten-day cease-fire order.<sup>83</sup> Marshall was enraged; but he stayed on and even cooperated with Stuart in preparing two policy statements for the Generalissimo.<sup>84</sup>

The long-delayed National Assembly finally convened on November 15, 1946. The Government had postponed it for three more days to wait for the CCP and the Democratic League to join at the last moment. Attending the Assembly were 1355 delegates, from the KMT and other small parties.<sup>85</sup> Both CCP and the Democratic League boycotted the meeting. Chou departed for Yen-an on November 19 in a U.S. Army plane, leaving the other two CCP representatives in Nanking for occasional meetings with Marshall and Stuart. But, the Com-

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<sup>81</sup> Government representatives were: Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Cheng, Chief of Staff and Shao Li-tze, leading member of the PCC. The CCP was represented by Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu, a member of the CCP's CEC and delegate to the PCC. See *Mission to China*, I, pp. 177-8; *China White Paper*, pp. 174-5.

<sup>82</sup> *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 175-7; *China White Paper*, 196-7.

<sup>83</sup> *China White Paper*, pp. 189-192, 662-3; *Mission to China*, I, pp. 289-290; II, Appendix N, Document 7 (pp. 414-5); Varg, p. 274 and Payne, pp. 179-180.

<sup>84</sup> For text of the draft statement, see *China White Paper*, Annexes 104 and 107 (pp. 673-4, 676-8); *Mission to China*, II, Appendix O, Document 2 (pp. 436-8); Appendix P, Document 2 (pp. 445-6).

<sup>85</sup> *China White Paper*, pp. 207-8; *Mi-lu*, vol. 14, pp. 71-2; *Ta-shih Chang-pien*, V, pp. 191-206 and Payne, pp. 281-2.

munist part in the negotiations came to an end.<sup>86</sup>

During the twenty sessions of the National Assembly, which lasted for forty days, Generalissimo Chiang demonstrated his personal leadership and ability to override the opposition from the extreme right-wing clique against the new Draft Constitution. The new Draft Constitution was formally adopted by the National Assembly on December 25.<sup>87</sup> Even the *China White Paper* had to admit the Generalissimo's achievement and acclaimed that he had "restored his prestige through his action in securing the adoption of a constitution of a democratic character in reasonable accord with the PCC resolutions."<sup>88</sup> Unfortunately, the new democratic Constitution came too late to serve its peace-preserving purpose. By early December, 1946, many in China were of the opinion that the civil war between the KMT and the CCP was imminent and unavoidable. Marshall was ready to quit. However, the Generalissimo revealed to Stuart his desire to keep Marshall in China as his advisor. Later when Chiang offered the invitation in person, Marshall reportedly replied with bitterness: "No! If I have been unable to have any influence on you as mediator with the full backing of my Government, how do you expect me to have any as an advisor?"<sup>89</sup>

The Truman Administration also prepared to terminate its mediation efforts. On December 18 the President issued his last formal policy statement towards China pertaining to the Marshall Mission. He said:

It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Because he knows how serious the problem is, and how important it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has remained at his post even though active negotiations have been broken off by the Communist Party. We are ready to help China as she

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<sup>86</sup> Varg, p. 275 and Payne, p. 282.

<sup>87</sup> For English translation of the full text of the Constitution adopted in 1946, see *Mission to China*, II, Appendix R, Document 3 (pp. 490-515).

<sup>88</sup> *China White Paper*, p. 214.

<sup>89</sup> As reported by Melby, pp. 213-4. For a slightly different and milder version given by Marshall himself, see *Mission to China*, I, pp. 412-3.

moves toward peace and genuine democratic government.

China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the government will find a peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.<sup>90</sup>

President Truman recalled Marshall. Marshall left Nanking by airplane in the morning of January 7, 1947. While he was enroute to Honolulu to pick up Mrs. Marshall, who went to Hawaii a month earlier for vacation to cure her sinus condition, the text of his farewell statement was released in Nanking and Washington. In the long statement, Marshall criticized both parties for obstructing his mission to bring peace to China. He said:

In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other. . . .

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. . . . This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party . . . the dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. . . .

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultation Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. . . .

<sup>90</sup> For full text of Truman's statement, see *China White Paper*, Annex 114 (pp. 689-694); *Mission to China*, II, Appendix R, Document 2 (pp. 481-9).

I have never been in a position to be certain of the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. . . .

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists . . . lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications— regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people.<sup>91</sup>

The accusations were sweeping and harsh; yet the indictment was painfully true. With this bitter statement of denunciation, thus ended the Marshall Mission.

## V

Historians from then and on have been looking for answers to the question: Who were to blame for the tragic ending of the Marshall Mission in China between 1945 and 1947? Each of the three participants— the KMT, the CCP and Marshall—blamed the other two for the failure of the negotiations. While Marshall criticized “reactionaries” and the “irreconcilables” in the two parties for refusing to make reasonable compromise in order to bring about a peaceful settlement, both KMT and the CCP also accused Marshall of being partial by favoring the other side.

Despite the fact that both the Truman Administration and General Marshall attributed the failure of the mission to the deep suspicion between Nationalists and the Communists, historians should not overlook the responsibility of Truman and Marshall. The Truman Administration based its China

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<sup>91</sup> For full text, see *China White Paper*, Annex 113 (pp. 686-9); *Mission to China*, II, Appendix S, Document 1 (pp. 516-521).

policy on two false premises: First, almost all of the Nationalist leaders, including Chiang himself, were corrupt and therefore not worth the American helping hands and second, the Chinese Communists were not real Marxist-Leninists but a group of “agrarian reformers” and thus inclined toward a “democratic and popular” form of government. Nothing could be more remote from the truth than these two premises.

Conceded that some of his trusted political and military subordinates were men of incompetence, unscrupulousness and corruption, the Generalissimo himself was a selfless leader who really cared about the benefit of the nation and welfare of his people. Unfortunately, President Truman, who had never had personal contacts with Chiang, based his judgment of the Generalissimo on the opinions of a few Americans, such as the career diplomats in China and General Stilwell, who had a strong grudge against the Nationalist leader and his followers. It was not only unjust but even outrageous when Truman said he shared Stilwell’s comment that Chiang was a “crook” and that as far as he was concerned, the Chiangs, the Kungs, and the Soongs “were all thieves, every last one of them.”<sup>92</sup> This harsh and biased judgment of Chiang was repudiated by at least two prominent Americans who had served in China and thus had personal contacts with the Generalissimo. General Wedemeyer recalled years later that:

In my two years of close contact with Chiang Kai-shek I had become convinced that he personally was a straightforward, selfless leader, keenly interested in the welfare of his people, and desirous of establishing a constitutional government according to the precepts of Sun Yat-sen.<sup>93</sup>

Wedemeyer’s observation was confirmed by another American, John Robinson Beal, who had been recommended by Marshall to serve as the National Government’s advisor between 1946-1947. Beal said:

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<sup>92</sup> Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1973), p. 289.

<sup>93</sup> Wedemeyer, p. 373.

My contacts with Chiang convinced me that, whatever else he may or may not have been, he was a patriot sincerely dedicated to fulfilling Sun Yat-sen's objective of ending "political tutelage" and introducing democracy. It is difficult to make progress toward this goal while fighting a series of wars. If he failed to comprehend the concepts of democracy we pressed upon him, I found him extraordinarily willing to listen to outside advice when he felt it was well meaning, and to act on it if he thought it was practicable within the Chinese context. His repeated restraints on his generals in response to Marshall's pressure was an illustration of this.<sup>94</sup>

Truman's perception of the true nature of Chinese Communists was also fatally inaccurate and naive. Though Truman later emphasized in his memoirs that neither Marshall nor he "was ever taken in by the talk about the Chinese Communists being just 'agrarian reformers,'" yet his China policy during the last few years of the 1940's proved otherwise. Had he really perceived the true character of the Chinese Communists, then he certainly would never have forced the Nationalists to form an coalition with the Communists that would never work.

As to Marshall, he was certainly not totally innocent of the failure of his mission as he claimed to be. Throughout his mission, Marshall revealed himself as a less than impartial mediator. In his dealings with the two parties, he demonstrated partiality toward the Communists. His attitude probably had something to do with his early unhappy experience in the U.S. Army when he was unfairly treated by the military establishment. In the Chinese Communists Marshall saw the same underdog that he himself had once been decades ago. It is significant to note here that Marshall demanded the Generalissimo to issue cease-fire orders on three different occasions, all at crucial moments when the Government forces were on the verge of a victory. To the Nationalist forces, the second truce order, between June 7-22, 1946, was fatal. According to the Generalissimo:

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The second cease-fire order turned out to be the beginning of the

<sup>94</sup> Beal, p. 365.

Government forces' debacle in Manchuria. If at the time Government pursuit units near Shuangcheng, which is less than 100 kilometers from Harbin, had pressed on toward that city of strategic importance on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Communist remnants in northern Manchuria would have been liquidated and the situation throughout Manchuria stabilized. If the Chinese Communists were driven out of their foothold in northern Manchuria, Soviet Russia would have found no way to send them any more supplies and a fundamental solution to the problem of Manchuria would have been at hand. The subsequent defeat of Government troops in Manchuria in the winter of 1948 was largely due to the second cease-fire order.<sup>95</sup>

Given the political and military impasse then existing in China and the deep suspicion between the two parties, Marshall's mediation was further hindered by his partial attitude. Wedemeyer was a bit of a prophet when he courageously told Marshall that his forthcoming mission (1945-1947) would be a "mission impossible."

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<sup>95</sup> Chiang, p. 168.

## 馬歇爾與美國在中國的調停

魏良才

### 摘 要

在一九四〇年代中美關係史中，史迪威、陳納德、赫爾利、魏德邁及馬歇爾等人皆佔有舉足輕重的地位。在這些人中，除赫爾利外，皆為職業軍人，而且是傑出的將領；其中以史迪威與馬歇爾兩人對國民政府成見最深。一九四二至一九四四年間史迪威來華使命的失敗及被迫召回，對以後中美關係的發展，有非常不利的影響。

本文的目的即在探討自史迪威被召返美，赫爾利繼高思出任美國駐華大使後，美國政府積極調停國共之爭的緣起及經過。赫爾利因不滿國務院內親共份子對其調停使命的破壞，於一九四四年十一月底辭去大使職務。杜魯門乃改派甫自參謀總長職位退休的馬歇爾前來中國，繼續調停工作。

馬歇爾為史迪威之至友兼上司，因史氏被迫召回，而對中國政府軍政領袖深感不滿，此一心態嚴重影響其調停態度的公正。馬氏在中國停留年餘，因對中國共產黨之野心認識不清，一心促成國共聯合政府。最後由於國共雙方均無意妥協讓步，和談終告破裂。馬歇爾於一九四七年元月七日奉召返美，在離華前發表冗長聲明，痛責國共雙方缺乏誠意，應對和談之破裂，負完全責任。

馬氏返美後出任國務卿，隨即斷絕對國民政府之軍經援助，其所以出此決定，主要是報復當年史迪威被迫召回以及其本人來華斡旋失敗之舊仇新恨。馬歇爾此一決定，造成一九四八年及一九四九年國軍剿共的失敗，終而導致整個大陸的赤化。