

The Cognition of Consciousness and Its Criterion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Weimin Shi

Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University
No.1727, Sec.4, Taiwan Boulevard, Xitun District, Taichung 40704, Taiwan
E-mail: wmshi@thu.edu.tw

Abstract

This paper will begin by arguing that Hegel insists upon the inseparability of the knowing subject, knowledge, and the absolute, so that there is for him the problem of the criterion required for a comparison of forms of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It will then be maintained that, as a form of knowing, a form of consciousness is nothing but the conceptual framework through which a certain type of knowing subject constructs the reality it inhabits. Forms of consciousness are thus incommensurable. At last, this paper will offer an account of how Hegel manages to overcome the incommensurability among forms of consciousness and solves the problem of the criterion.

Key Words: Hegel, criterion, consciousness, Phenomenology of Spirit