

Peirce's Puzzle and Logical Sentiment

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Abstract

In 1878, Peirce provided a puzzle concerning both his conception of probability and under what conditions one is permitted to reason in accordance with probability; he then offered social sentiment (or logical sentiment) as solution. Quine and Putnam, two well-known contemporary American philosophers, commented upon and interpreted “Peirce’s puzzle” and his proposed solution. However, their comments and interpretations are neither illuminating nor faithful, leaving Peirce’s thought obscure. In this paper, a more credible and faithful interpretation is suggested with the help of the distinction between logic and logicity, of the separation of logical sentiment from both altruistic moral concern and personal interest, and of the derivation of the contents of Peirce’s three logical sentiments from his conception of probability.

Key Words: Charles S. Peirce, Hilary Putnam, logic, sentiment, probability