

## ***Orientalism's Discourse*** **—Said, Foucault and the Anxiety of Influence\***

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### **Abstract**

This article will reconsider Edward W. Said's notion of "traveling theory" in light of his most influential work *Orientalism* and its appropriation of Michel Foucault's theory of "discourse," which has prompted criticism from a number of scholars, including James Clifford and Robert J. C. Young. Rather than looking at the question of whether Said misappropriates the work of Foucault, I will, via Harold Bloom's concept of "misprision," argue that he "misreads" the French philosopher in order to add a *political* valence that is missing or attenuated in the original work. Also, I will show why Said is less concerned with constructing a theory of Orientalism than with speaking truth to power about the distorted image of the

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non-EuroAmerican other in Western art and culture, and its impact on global politics and history.

**Key Words:** Edward W. Said, traveling theory, *Orientalism*, Michel Foucault, discourse

## I. Introduction

'Theory' is a product of displacement, comparison, a certain distance. To theorize, one leaves home. But like any act of travel, theory begins and ends somewhere.  
—James Clifford (1989: para. 2)

The notion of traveling theory, as originally outlined by Edward W. Said in *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (1983), raises a number of questions about the ontological function and status of theory. For instance, what happens to theory once it travels to another place or context? How does this temporal and spatial shift alter its form and content? And what determines the material conditions in which theory and theorists travel in the first place?

One case worth considering is Said's own appropriation of Michel Foucault's concept of "discourse" in *Orientalism* (1978) and the various methodological problems it poses, including whether or not it is possible to critique the West and its intellectual tradition by incorporating another aspect of the same. In other words, can Western thought be used to critique itself? Indeed, this question has troubled many of Said's critics, not to mention admirers, who feel that his critique of Western civilization and its misrepresentation of the Orient relies too heavily on the work of Foucault and other Continental theorists.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper, I would like to address these concerns by looking at the work of two critics, James Clifford and Robert J. C. Young, who take issue with Said's methodology in *Orientalism* and raise serious questions that transcend mere political or ideological differences.<sup>2</sup> I will attempt to critique their critique by way of a

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<sup>1</sup> Witness Tariq Ali in a piece published shortly after Said's death in which he remarks that "Foucault was, alas, an important influence" (2003: 61).

<sup>2</sup> The range of ad hominem attacks against *Orientalism* include claims that Said was

third, intermediary line of polemic—namely, Harold Bloom’s concept of “misprision” from *The Anxiety of Influence* which calls for a “dynastic” reading of the problem of literary influence through the “creative” act of misinterpretation (1997: xxiii). I will argue that Said deliberately misreads Foucault as a “strong” theorist in order to politicize his ideas and put them into praxis. Therefore, beyond its rhetorical or polemical value, the writing (and publication) of *Orientalism* represents an act of political resistance against the dominant discursive forces that have been used to objectify and denigrate nonwestern peoples and their cultures since the dawn of European imperialism. By shedding light on the relationship between knowledge and power, *Orientalism* shows us how the reach of scholarship extends beyond the ivory towers of the academy and into the world at large, where it can be used to uphold or resist authority and its hegemonic institutions.

## II. Theory and Its Itineraries: *Orientalism* as Traveling Theory

What is at stake in writing is  
the very structure of authority itself.  
—Barbara Johnson (1995: 48)

In *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, Said claims that ideas tend to travel “from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another” (226). Moreover, the lifeblood of

[c]ultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of ideas, and whether it

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anti-Western (Lewis, 1993), blind to the faults of Islam and the Middle East (Hitchens, 2011: 498-512) and anti-Marxist (Ahmad, 1992). For a rebuttal of these claims, see Iskandar and Rustom (2010).

takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a useful . . . condition of intellectual activity. (226)

Of course, the question of why theory travels in the first place is related to the fact that it is a human activity. Since theory is bound by the same rules and restrictions as any other worldly activity, it fails to transcend its own limits as well as the “reality” it attempts to inscribe. Similarly, the role of the theorist is marked by certain restrictions in time and space. In the case of *Orientalism*, one might say that the story of its origins begins in the late sixties at a time when university campuses were mired in protests and the practice of theory was in the throes of being reclaimed by its once marginalized subjects. No longer “a product long associated with Western discursive spaces,” theory would be refashioned as a tool for “non-Western and feminist writers” to negotiate their identity and “write back” to the metropolis (Clifford, 1989).

Yet, what came about was *not* a rupture or break in theory’s form and content, but rather a shift in its focus and orientation. Many of the scholars who came out of this period attempted to reinscribe the Western tradition passed onto them by a long line of dead white males. One such scholar was Edward W. Said, whose life and work can be read as a classic case study for the modern oppositional theorist. Born in Palestine, raised in colonial Egypt, and educated in the United States, Said, throughout his academic and political<sup>3</sup> career, played an active role in trying to redress the mischaracterization of Arab and Asian cultures in the West.

Central to Said’s oppositional discourse in *Orientalism* and subsequent books such as *Covering Islam* (1981) and *Culture and*

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<sup>3</sup> From 1977 to 1991, Said was a member of the Palestinian National Council, a legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

*Imperialism* (1993) is the Nietzschean-cum-Foucauldian idea that the will to knowledge leads to the will to power, and that the notion of “pure” scholarship is at best a fiction. If anything, *Orientalism* teaches us that as soon as knowledge “becomes institutionalized, culturally accumulated, overly restrictive in its definitions, it must actively be opposed by counterknowledge” (Clifford, 1988: 256). A quarter century after its initial publication, Said reiterated this point by suggesting that the main idea of the book was to “use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us” (Said, 2004b: 874).

Still, Said’s “humanistic critique” relies on the anti-humanistic notion of “discourse” introduced by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (*L’archéologie du savoir*), a groundbreaking work that first appeared in 1969, three years after the now-famous Johns Hopkins conference on structuralism which introduced to North America many of the rising stars in French theory, including Jacques Derrida, Lucien Goldmann, Jacques Lacan, and Roland Barthes, all of whom would leave their mark on the Anglo-American academy.

As a young scholar fluent in French, Said made his first foray into the “Franco-American dialogue in literary theory” (Said, 1999: 134) during the early 1970s when he published in *boundary 2* an article titled “Michel Foucault as an Intellectual Imagination,” which helped introduce the philosopher’s ideas to a wider audience in the US who were still unfamiliar with his work and the “new habit of thought” that it presented (1972: 4).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Spanos (2001). It is of course important to remember that at the time Said’s article was published, the flow of information was much slower and less regular. For instance, the proceedings from the 1966 Johns Hopkins conference were not published in book form until 1970, two years before the appearance of Said’s article. Moreover, since Foucault’s writings were largely the product of dense “bibliographic saturations” and were thus difficult to reproduce through “simple mimicry,” he was also, among his French cohorts, “one of the last to be imitated”

Yet, despite the influence of poststructuralism on his first major publication, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (1975), Said's liaison with French theory was for the most part short-lived. Not long after the success of *Orientalism*, he began to lament what he described as a one-way "dialogue" between French and American scholars, which he blamed on the insular "self-quarantined" world of Parisian academics, who regarded all things French as universally important.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, he railed against American scholars for "institutionalizing" theory and in the process trivializing and rarefying many of its ideas. In the case of Foucault, "[o]ne immediate result was that certain terms like *episteme* and *discourse*," which he labored with precision to define, "now clotted the prose" of all those who "wrote criticism" and who "seized on the words as if they were magic wands by which to transform [their] humdrum scholastic readings into eye-catching theoretical 'texts'" (Said, 1999: 146).

Of course, it would hardly be unfair to ask why Said himself does not also deserve to be included among those accused of trivializing Foucault's ideas. In his original treatise on traveling theory, Said refers to Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) in order to illustrate how the author's concept of "reification," which originated in revolutionary struggle, became watered down by the time that it reached institutional settings like

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(Said, 1999: 146).

<sup>5</sup> According to Perry Anderson, "if one looks at the social sciences, political thought or even in some respects philosophy in France, the impression left is that for long periods there has been a notable degree of closure, and ignorance of intellectual developments outside the country. Examples of the resulting lag could be multiplied: a very belated and incomplete encounter with Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy or neo-contractualism; with the Frankfurt School or the legacy of Gramsci; with German stylistics or American New Criticism; British historical sociology or Italian political science. A country that has translated scarcely anything of Fredric Jameson or Peter Wollen, and could not even find a publisher for Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Extremes*, might well be termed a rearguard in the intellectual exchange of ideas" (2004).

Raymond Williams's lectern at Cambridge University (Said, 1983: 238-239). Therefore, in the case of Said, it is just as important to ask whether any of the "original power or rebelliousness" of Foucault's theory had subsided by the time it crossed the Atlantic and found its way into the pages of *Orientalism* (Said, 2001: 436). Or, to put it bluntly, was something lost in translation?

To tackle this question, I will turn to James Clifford and Robert J. C. Young, who provide what is perhaps the most trenchant critique of Said's book. Any defense of *Orientalism* worth its weight must confront the objections of these two scholars whose own work (much like Said's) is committed to providing a voice for the indigenous and subaltern.

According to Clifford, *Orientalism* transforms what was once an "old-fashioned scholarly discipline" into "a synecdoche for a much more complex and ramified totality" that Said labels as a "discourse" (1988: 257). For Foucault, the idea of discourse refers to a "group of statements" belonging to "a single system of formation" (Foucault, 1972: 197) that "governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement, and replacement" (34).<sup>6</sup> As a "strongly bounded area of social knowledge," it is responsible for producing "a system of statements within which the world can be known" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1998: 83). Rather than "reality" being "simply 'there' to be

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<sup>6</sup> For Foucault, discourse has at least three possible meanings. It can "sometimes" refer to the "general domain of all statements," whether they be written or spoken. It can also be defined as "an individualizable group of statements" in relation to a particular field or discipline such as medicine, science or law. Thirdly, it can refer to "a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements" (Foucault, 1972: 80). For Said and others, it is the third definition that is most pertinent since it is "less interested in actual utterances/texts that are produced than in the rules and structures which produce particular utterances and texts" in the first place (Mills, 1997: 7).



talked about . . . it is through discourse itself that the world itself is brought into being" (Clifford, 1988: 257).

In Clifford's view, *Orientalism* "concerns the status of all forms of thought and representation for dealing with the alien" (1988: 261). Although he credits Said with making "a pioneering attempt to use Foucault systematically in an extended cultural analysis" (264), he nonetheless faults him for not providing a sensible alternative to Orientalism nor for that matter "any developed theory of culture" (263). As a result, Said's critique of the West and its misrepresentation of the other tends to be "incestuously self-referential" and relies on the Western discourse of humanism for its insights and conclusions (Clifford, 1988: 272). "The West," then, "becomes a play of projections, doublings, idealizations, and rejections of a complex, shifting otherness" while "the Orient" takes on "the role of origin or alter ego" (272). Based on Clifford's reading, not only is Said's appropriation of Foucault misguided, but his "oppositional critique of Orientalism" (259) is prone to becoming a version of its other, Occidentalism.

In *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (1990), Robert J. C. Young takes issue with Said's stubborn adherence to the "values of humanism" including "the notion of the 'human spirit'" (1990: 170). Young declares that Said's humanism runs afoul as soon as he applies Foucault's ideas to his critique of Orientalism as an institution, ideology, and profession.<sup>7</sup> Whereas

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<sup>7</sup> Although Said's use of the term "humanism" tends to be idiosyncratic at times, I will put forth the following working definition: Humanism is a Western philosophy or mode of thought associated with the rise of modernity, which posits the individual as "the focus of all knowledge and understanding about the world." This style of thinking was clearly a reaction to the pre-Renaissance notion of a Theocentric world. Many poststructuralists like Foucault, however, "rejected humanism as being theoretically unsound, because subjectivity was to be seen as a site upon which various social forces worked, rather than the location of an autonomous being, and because the idea of 'the human' itself was a historically bounded category" (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 1999: 25). See also Said in which he discusses humanism as "a useable praxis for intellectuals and academics who want to know what they are doing, what they are committed to as scholars, and who

Foucault regards the term “human” as a problematic, socially constructed category or “episteme” (often opposed to the equally dubious “savage”), Said insists that only a humanistic critique can provide a sane and rational alternative to the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism. However, to avoid the possibility of contradicting himself, Said ignores the “suspicion that the ontological category of ‘the human’ and ‘human nature’” have become inextricably tied to the “violence of Western history” (163).

Young also points to the way that Orientalism is viewed as both a “discourse” and “reality,” despite Said’s denial that the Orient is a “real” place or territory. Therefore, a “major theoretical problem” arises when Said invokes Orientalism as a Western discourse while affirming that such knowledge about the Orient was put to real uses, including “the service of colonial conquest, occupation, and administration” (169). For Young, it seems almost paradoxical that something unreal or imaginary could have such an impact on an actual region (in this case, South Asia and the Middle East) and its history.

Unlike Foucault, Said refuses to abandon the notion of the author. It is here where he begins to radically diverge from the rigidity of Foucault’s philosophy. Whereas Foucault dismisses the author in the same manner that he discredits the “role of individual agency,” Said on the other hand reinforces the humanist idea of a “determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism” (Said, 1978: 23). As a result, he adopts what he calls a “hybrid perspective” which is not only theoretical but “broadly historical” as well, presupposing that “all texts” are “worldly and circumstantial” (23).

For critics like Clifford and Young, Said’s equivocal position

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want also to connect these principles to the world in which they live as citizens” (2004a: 6).

begs more questions than it answers. Young views Said's "faith" in individual agency as a reflection of "his retrieval of the category of the human, and his endorsement of the validity of individual experience as affording a theoretical and political base" (1990: 173). However, without the concept of the individual, *Orientalism* and its central thesis would lose much of its meaning and value. For Said, it becomes necessary to show how an individual "act" like writing relates to the social or, in the case of *Orientalism*, how a collective ensemble of Western writers who were responsible for shaping the "imaginative meanings" of the Orient also played a role in the actual history that took place "there" (Said, 1978: 3). The problem for Young is that Said wants to hang on to the individual as a willful agent while preserving the notion of system and historical determination. He must do the latter in order to affirm the actuality of *Orientalism*, and the former to retain the possibility of critiquing and perhaps transforming it. In other words, by maintaining that the political is both personal *and* structural, Said would like to have his cake and eat it too.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, critics like Clifford and Young raise serious questions about the faults or shortcomings of *Orientalism* which, according to them, outweigh its strengths and successes. Yet, despite attracting its fair share of detractors, *Orientalism* has not only become canonized throughout the humanities and social sciences, but is partly responsible for launching the field of postcolonial studies. The fact that Said's work remains controversial and that its main points continue to be disputed (Irwin, 2006; Varisco, 2007; Warraq, 2007). is surely a healthy, positive sign (at least, in terms of its posterity). Yet amid the incessant quarrel and rancor that have followed the book (including the vitriolic response of modern-day Orientalists like Bernard Lewis [1993]), the more important question is how to define its legacy.

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<sup>8</sup> Thanks to Chih-ming Wang for calling my attention to this point.

### III. *Orientalism* and Beyond

I will long remember the day I read  
*Orientalism*. . . . For me, a child of a  
 successful anti-colonial struggle,  
*Orientalism* was a book which talked of  
 things I felt I had known all along but had  
 never found the language to formulate with  
 clarity. Like many great books it seemed to  
 say to me for the first time what one had  
 always wanted to say.  
 —Partha Chatterjee (1992: 194)

In order to appreciate *Orientalism* and its impact on the production of knowledge in the West, we must first situate the book within its proper context. Said's project largely stems from the problem of representation and the inferior image that the West has projected onto its other. This distorted image is the product of a diverse body of textual knowledge affiliated with French and British colonialism. Historically, such knowledge was utilized for defining not only how the West saw other cultures but how it viewed itself as well. In other words, the self-perception of the West was mutually constitutive in that it depended on the existence of an other to compare or contrast itself with. Therefore, what Said set out to write was a critique against a discourse that had largely remained unchallenged since its beginnings. Although Said, as much as his critics, was aware of *Orientalism*'s "theoretical inconsistencies" (1994a: 339), the fact that his writing is sprinkled with a detailed reading of history and sociopolitical analysis indicates that his priority was not so much in constructing a "theory" of Orientalism than in developing a way to counteract and refute a "real" body of knowledge with firm historical roots and consequences. Or, as Said concluded in his 1994 afterword, "*Orientalism* is a partisan work, not a theoretical machine" (339).

It is in this respect that Bloom's understanding of influence and its inherent "anxieties" allows us to reexamine the problem of tradition and the role that individual authors play within it.<sup>9</sup> While "[w]eaker talents" tend to "idealize" and faithfully reproduce the work of those who come before them, "stronger" ones are "figures of capable imagination" who "appropriate for themselves" by misreading others and thus clearing an "imaginative space for themselves" (Bloom, 1997: 5).<sup>10</sup> While the outlook of an individual author is largely determined by the work of her forebears who have left a lasting mark or influence, the process of self-individuation requires a misprision or a "creative interpretation" of such sources (Bloom, 1997: xxiii). Since the world in which we are born is always "belated" in the sense that culture never appears as a *tabula rasa* but as a set of pre-established traditions or canon, it remains vital for a writer to individuate herself without necessarily breaking away from those traditions, which can only be achieved through the process of misprision. In order to acquire a sense of her own worth or individuality, a writer must avoid merely mimicking the work of her predecessors and therefore be unfaithful to their work. Only through the process of misprision, "a complex act of strong misreading," can a writer (whether she be a poet or a critic) acquire her own voice and style (Bloom, 1997: xxiii).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Like Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, I am critical of Bloom's masculinist reading of literary tradition. And by adopting the general outline of his theory, I do not discount the validity or importance of the feminist critique of his work, particularly Gilbert and Gubar's discussion of the Anxiety of Authorship. See Gilbert and Gubar (1979).

<sup>10</sup> Bloom uses the term "strong poet," which I will avoid here. Although the scope of his analysis is largely confined to English poetry, there is no reason why it does not apply to any "story, novel, play, poem, or essay" (1997: xxiii). While poetic misinterpretation tends to be "more drastic than critics' misinterpretations or criticism," this difference, as Bloom points out, is only "a difference in degree and not at all in kind" (94-95).

<sup>11</sup> Although many critics have viewed the "anxiety of influence" in terms of "Freudian Oedipal rivalry," Bloom denies that there is any merit to this reading

By applying Bloom's ideas to a reading of *Orientalism*, we can claim that Said is playing the role of a strong critic who misreads Foucault in order to apply his ideas and add a layer of resistance that is missing in the original context. Not surprisingly, Said faults Foucault for a lack of "political commitment" within his work, arguing that he is more interested in the mechanics of power as a fetish than as an object to be opposed or resisted (Said, 2001: 77). In other words, Foucault appears to be "more fascinated with the way power operates than committed to trying to change power relations in society" (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 1999: 72). Consequently, his theory of power leaves no room for resistance and becomes a "Spinozist conception" that "has drawn a circle around itself, constituting a unique territory in which Foucault has imprisoned himself and others with him" (Said, 1983: 245). Rather than being trapped within such a system, Said "articulate[s] the potential to resist and recreate" such power (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 1999: 72), which he does by reading Foucault's theory of discourse against the grain and thereby setting himself up as a "bad" Foucauldian. This is congruent with his belief in humanism and the worldliness of writing in general. Likewise, his "inconsistency" as a theorist is consistent with his call for "non-coercive" knowledge (Said, 2001: 80). For when theory or, for that matter, any form of knowledge is no longer subject to the process of interpretation, it becomes ossified into a form of ideology or, worst of all, theology.

Allow me then to return to the criticisms of Clifford and Young, starting with the claim that Said fails to provide any "alternative" to the phenomenon he sets out to critique. If this is the case, then neither does Clifford nor Young. While Clifford rebukes Said for applying "the tools of a Western theoretical tradition to critique that [same] tradition," he also fails to provide a

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(1997: xxii). Likewise, I will avoid making any similar claims about the relationship or rivalry between Said and Foucault.

sensible alternative for anyone in a similar position. Rather, he merely faults Said for relying on the “master’s toolbox,” including his [*sic*] language, tradition and culture. However, to abandon the tools of the Western tradition is to abandon all hope of trying to critique that same tradition. It is no coincidence that Said often cites C. L. R. James whose monumental work *The Black Jacobins* tells the story of Toussaint L’Ouverture, a former slave, who was inspired by the tricolor of the French Revolution to lead the most successful antislavery revolt in history (Said, 1993, 1994b). Not unlike Toussaint, neither James nor Said could have achieved what they have without being privy to the body of thought that came out of Western Europe and the Enlightenment.

According to Timothy Brennan, when viewed in “its proper time and place,” *Orientalism's* “central construct” is not so much discourse but rather “institution” (2000: 582). In other words,

Said’s point is the inescapable fact of dominance in the act of amassing information on an area whose coherence is predicated on an internal, or domestically defined, set of attitudes. The outlook is itself inseparable from the pursuit of policies of expansion, forcible inclusion, and appropriation. (582)

Therefore, to equate, à la Clifford, Said’s critique of Orientalism with the practice of Occidentalism (whose practitioners are never identified) is not only wrongheaded but fails to grasp the oppositional nature of Said’s project, including his attempt to redress the West’s distorted image of the other.

Likewise, Young’s analysis contains similar distortions, including his claim that Said neglects to separate “himself from the coercive structures of knowledge that he is describing.” In other words, he is unable to avoid “the terms of his own critique” (1990: 167). As a result, his “account will be no truer to Orientalism than Orientalism is to the actual Orient, assuming there could ever be such a thing” (167). However, the problem with Young is that like Clifford he completely fails to see the oppositional nature of Said’s

discourse. Surely, anyone who reads *Orientalism* alongside any of the Orientalist texts in question would be able to tell the difference. Young's argument is almost tantamount to saying that a reader would not be able to tell the ideological difference between, say, a novel like Rudyard Kipling's *Kim* (1901) and E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India* (1924), since both are set during the time of the British Raj and are part of the same vaguely-defined tradition known as the British novel.

Although Young is quite correct to point out the hypocrisy of Western humanism as a philosophical tradition, including its links to slavery and colonialism, many of its basic tenets or principles are still accepted (and refined) by intellectuals both in and outside the West. A good illustration of this tension can be found in the work of Frantz Fanon, one of humanism's harshest critics, who called for not its abandonment but rather its fullest or, dare I say, universal application. In fact, in the closing pages of *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon, arguing for the creation of a "new humanism," declares, "Let us endeavor to invent a man in full, something which Europe has been incapable of achieving" (2004: 236).

The other key point that Young raises concerns Orientalism's status as a "real" phenomenon. According to Young, Said fails to make a proper distinction between a real and fake Orient, which leads to some confusion over what Orientalism may or may not be. The problem with Young's assertion is its binary or Manichean logic. Such critics overlook the fact that while the Orient may be imaginary, Orientalism—as a body of knowledge in the service of empire—has had real consequences on the imperial policies of Western nations (including Britain, France and the United States) throughout the Near and Far East. Of course, the same could be said for other imaginary concepts like "nation" and "race" in terms of the real and metaphysical violence that have been inflicted on others in their name.



## IV. Conclusion

If history, as Fredric Jameson proclaims, is “what hurts” (1982: 102), then for Said, the act of writing *Orientalism* is not only a way of speaking truth to power but also coming to terms with imperialism’s brutal legacy. By misreading Foucault’s theory of discourse, Said, as an individual author, is able to challenge the discourse of colonialism by providing a much-needed corrective to “the way the world [has] thought about the relationship between the West and its ‘others’” (Iskandar & Rustom, 2010: 291). In doing so, *Orientalism* will continue to exert its anxiety of influence on the next generation of scholars and beyond.

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## 《東方主義》之論述： 薩伊德、傅柯與影響的焦慮

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### 摘 要

本文將以愛德華·薩伊德最具影響力的《東方主義》與對米歇爾傅柯論述理論的挪用為起點，重新考量薩伊德「旅行理論」的概念，以後者尤其招致如詹姆斯·克利福德與羅伯特·楊等學者的批評。與其探討薩伊德是否錯誤地挪用了傅柯的作品，我將藉由哈羅德·布魯姆的「誤解」概念，來證論薩伊德「誤讀」傅柯的作品是為了補充原作品裡缺少或薄弱的政治價值。再者，我會說明為何薩伊德較不熱衷於建構東方主義的相關理論，而是選擇對權勢說出在西方藝術和文化中，非歐美他者的形象被扭曲的事實及其對全球政治與歷史的衝擊。

**關鍵詞：**愛德華·薩伊德、旅行理論、《東方主義》、米歇爾·傅柯、論述