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EU-China Relations in the Age of Globalization and Regionalization*

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Abstract

Until the beginning of 2005, the “mood” in EU-China relations was generally optimistic, boasting that a new “Europe-China” axis was in the making, and the arms embargo might be lifted eventually. During the last five years the relationship between these two powers has been full of controversy and competition, though cooperation remains the main theme. With the change of leaders in the major European powers, notably the advent to power of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicholas Sarkozy in France, the lustre that could be found in Europe-China relations during the days of Chirac and Schroeder gradually faded. The new leaders are more critical on the issue of human rights in China, the Tibetan problem etc., and also appear to be more ready to voice

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their dissatisfaction over the growing trade deficit with China. This paper will focus on whether and how China could play a role in the minds of European policy-makers in mapping the future of Europe, taking into consideration four contextual factors: the implications of globalization for Europe, regionalization efforts in Asia, the “peaceful rise” or the subsequent “peaceful development” of China, and multilateralism in Europe-Asia relations. The paper aims to investigate how political leaders in Europe and China think and proceed on the prospects for cooperating with one another, the political implications of their cooperation and conflict over the future international political order, and the difficulties ahead that might interfere with cooperation in various fields.

Key Words: globalization, regionalization, arms embargo, multilateralism, peaceful development

I. Introduction

In my previous paper, “China’s Strategic Thinking: The Role of the European Union” (Ting, 2008), the significance, to Chinese leaders, of maintaining a stable relationship with the European Union (EU) during the rise of China’s economy, is analyzed from three different angles. From a realist point of view, as a rising power, China wishes to align with Europe in order to counterbalance the unilateralism of the United States (US) and promote the so-called “democratization of international relations”; and from a liberalist point of view, China seeks to integrate itself in the international community by joining international institutions and regimes, thus accepting the international norms inherent in these institutions. However, China could not eliminate the immense difficulties originated from the ideological and political divergences with Europe. The ideational factor still plays a crucial role in EU-China relations. The paper was written in 2005, which seems to be a “watershed” year, since until the beginning of that year, the mood was rather optimistic regarding the further development of EU-China relations, in part because it seemed that the arms embargo might be lifted eventually. It was even said that a new “Europe-China axis” was in the making, given the turbulent state of north Atlantic relations following the US-led occupation of Iraq. However, since 2005 the discussion on lifting the arms embargo has been suspended. What is more, it was proven that the saying “Europe-China axis” was deemed to be immature. During the last five years the relationship between the two powers has been full of controversy and competition, though cooperation remains the main theme.

In this paper, we will continue our analysis on EU-China relations, focusing on whether and how China could play a role in influencing European policy-makers as they map the future of Europe, taking into consideration four contextual factors: the implications of globalization for Europe, regionalization efforts in

Asia, the “peaceful rise” or the subsequent “peaceful development” of China, as well as multilateralism in Europe-Asia relations. On the one hand, the EU, after two enlargements in 2004 and 2007, faces tremendous problems in integrating further and seeking consensus regarding policy-making, and the grandiose task of formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains incomplete. On the other hand, China has encountered numerous problems in the course of its socio-economic transformation, and needs to ponder the international implications of its “peaceful development” in addition to developing and fulfilling her strategic interests. This paper aims to investigate how these two “poles” think and proceed to examine their prospects of cooperation, the political implications of cooperation and conflict between them for the future international political order, and the difficulties ahead that might obstruct their cooperation in various fields.

With the change of leaders in the major European powers, particularly Angela Merkel in Germany in 2005, Nicholas Sarkozy in France and Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom in 2007, the lustre that could be found in Europe-China relations during the days of Chirac and Schroeder gradually faded. These new leaders are more critical of the state of human rights in China, the Tibetan problem etc., and appear to be more vocal in voicing their dissatisfaction with the growing trade deficit with China. The Olympic Games in Beijing foregrounded the rather cool and distant atmosphere between China and Europe. German leaders attended neither the opening nor closing ceremonies; the French President attended the opening ceremony, but made it explicit beforehand that he would boycott the ceremony if the Tibetan situation were not be improved and formal contact between Beijing and Dalai Lama did not resume. The British Prime Minister only attended the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games (Shen, 2008: 46-47). Moreover, the current French and German leaders are definitely closer to the US than were their predecessors. In sum, it seems that there is a loss of mutual political confidence between the European and Chinese leaders. The deterioration of EU-China

relations in 2008 simply demonstrated that there was still a high degree of “personalization” in the relationship between the EU and China, and that the degree of “institutionalization” in the relationship remained rather low. When there are leadership changes in Europe, the differences in perceptions and understanding of China result in a shift of emphasis in their policies towards the Chinese development. Over the last five years, “competition” has been used as often as “cooperation” to describe relations between Europe and China, as an increasingly powerful China has obviously aroused skepticism and suspicion among the European nations which feel increasing economic and political-strategic pressure from China. It seems that the “softer” approach, long appreciated by European leaders who stress on the importance of using “soft power”¹ to influence the others, is not regarded as useful and effective today. Instead, there seems to be a tendency among European leaders to adopt the “harder” American approach. Nevertheless, the financial tsunami has given China significantly more leverage in her relationship with the US, notwithstanding the attitude of the Obama administration which adopted a more reconciliatory attitude towards Beijing in 2009 before taking a tougher line in 2010.

The limited degree of institutionalization in EU-China relations may be characterized by the catchword “strategic partnership.” Apart from the fact that this is a kind of “diplomatic nicety” as playfully proclaimed by Berkofsky,² what is the essential character of EU-China relations? It seems that both EU and China are aspirational and normative in their thinking. Both have

¹ The European sense of “soft power” means that Europeans tend to use soft approaches like dialogue, low-profiled interactions, and moral conviction in order to influence the others. The idea of “soft power” according to Joseph Nye means the culture, values, institutions and ideas that a nation-state possesses which make it superior to the others. A power that appears to be more appealing and attractive to the others is due to the fact that it gets soft power rather than hard power, which means economic and military capabilities (Nye, 1990, 2004).

² A. Berkofsky said that strategic partnership masks a lack of “common values of multilateralism or global governance” (cited in Scott, 2007: 32).

launched excellent ideas on how to build a better relationship in the future, but the crucial question remains: how do we go from here to there? Europe aspires to establish a foundation for democracy, human rights, and rule of law in China. But how could this be done? Though the EU insists on the usefulness of subtle, low-profile measures such as promoting regular dialogues in various sectors, what is the effectiveness of these dialogues in facilitating changes within the Mainland? And how can their effectiveness be evaluated? On the other hand, amongst various other objectives, Beijing is seeking to enlarge the European market for its products, foster European inward direct investments, acquire more advanced technology from Europe, and construct a multi-polar world with Europe and China being the two poles on the eastern and western sides of the vast Eurasia continent. China may be interested in the EU's measures and technologies regarding energy efficiency and environmental protection. Economically speaking China is facing increasing difficulties, especially given that the enlarged European Community, now with 27 members, must promote investment in its relatively poorer new members, and the possibility that, given a greater internal market, the EU might become more protectionist. Politically, the EU is trying to promote multilateralism rather than the Chinese-favoured concept of multi-polarity. How then could the Chinese objectives be achieved? Without common values or a collective identity, in what direction might EU-China relations evolve?

II. Economic Dimension of EU-China Relations: Implications for Intra-Regional and Inter-Regional Relations

It is frequently postulated that China tends to adopt a more realist perspective in international politics, is keen on a mercantilist approach to trading with the outside world so as to accumulate a large trade surplus, and seeks to improve her position to forge ahead with the formation of a multi-polar world. On the contrary,

the EU is considered as the best model not only in the eyes of liberal-institutionalists but also constructivists. The establishment of an international institution, with clear and strict norms and regulations, enforces the acceptance of a common political culture by all member nations, thus reducing potential conflicts that typically arise from a conflict of interests among nations. The EU integration model, with all the sovereign power eventually passed to the supra-national organization, is considered an excellent model by liberal-institutionalists for the eradication of national conflicts (Chang, 2006: 31-58). According to neo-liberal institutionalism, there are three factors that explain China's policy vis-à-vis the EU since the end of Cold War. First, economic and commercial exchanges will increase the need for further cooperation. Second, the multiplication of international issues will enforce and strengthen multilateral cooperation. Third, economic cooperation will produce a "spillover effect" leading to cooperation in other arenas, especially political, security and social-cultural development (Chang, 2006: 38-39). Moreover, constructivists pay particular attention to the EU, as the construction of a new and "superior" collective identity, that is, European identity, fosters the formation of common culture and common norms, superseding the divergences of national cultures (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 397-398).

However, despite the dominance of liberal institutionalism and constructivism in mapping the future of Europe, the attitudes of the new European leaders, especially the leaders of the "big three," have suggested some subtle changes. According to a British scholar Callahan, "against US suspicion of China's rise, Europe has been downright enthusiastic" (Callahan, 2007: 779), but this was true only during the 2003-05 period, when both China and Europe were anxious with the unilateralism of the Bush administration, and when the EU succeeded in its enlargement and realizing the endorsement of a new European Constitution in 2004. Beginning in 2006, European leaders, like those in the US, started to express dissatisfaction with increasing trade deficits, and worry over the

negative consequences for Europe given the rise of China. Skepticism originating from a realist perspective now prevails.

Since 2000, in the EU, the highest average annual growth rate for imports was registered for China, which attained 18% per year. Since 2006, China has replaced the US as the largest source of imports to the EU, and in 2007 China's share in total EU imports was 16%. The EU has become China's foremost trading partner, while China is the EU's the second-largest trading partner. However, the rising trade deficit has aroused negative feelings in both the private and public sectors of Europe. China's imports of European products only amount to 6% of total EU exports—an amount that trails even Switzerland, which imported Euro 89.1 bn in 2007, accounting for 7% of the EU's total exports (Thornhill, 2008). The US, long-suffering from enormous trade deficits with China, has persistently pressed China to appreciate the Renminbi, the Chinese currency, though the low value of Chinese products has had a deflationary effect on Western economies. The French President echoed the American complaint, referring to a Chinese “monetary tsunami” (Thornhill, 2008). In reality, in response to growing dissatisfaction in the West, over the past five years the Chinese currency has appreciated gradually, but now consumers in the West are lamenting the situation once again as China is considered to be the main factor responsible for inflation, as *Financial Times* indicates:

In this changing world, China is blamed for pushing up commodity prices and increasing the cost of energy and food in Europe as the country's voracious industries scour the world for raw materials. In European eyes, China has become synonymous with globalization, for better and worse. (Thornhill, 2008: 7)

The global financial tsunami of 2008 led to a decline in the European economy, causing a downturn in imports from China,

Table 1 EU-China Trade Statistics, 2000-2007, in Euro bn

Year	EU Exports to China	EU Imports from China	Trade Balance
2000	25.9	74.6	-48.8
2001	30.6	81.6	-51.0
2002	34.9	89.6	-54.7
2003	41.2	105.4	-64.2
2004	48.0	126.7	-78.7
2005	51.8	160.3	-108.5
2006	63.8	194.8	-131.1
2007	71.8	231.4	-159.6

Source: Gambini (2008).

and together with a weakened Euro facilitating European exports, it was hoped that the trade deficit might be reduced. But in the global economy, there is increasing concern about the growing competition between Europe and China. In the past, Chinese exports were mainly basic industrial goods, such as clothing, shoes etc., but now high-end and high value-added products such as electronics, machinery and equipment are flooding Western markets. Both low-end and high-end products enter Europe, causing alarm that competition will grow sharper between China and Europe (Barysch, Grant, & Leonard, 2005: 12). It is thus correct to say that,

EU enlargement expresses different aspirations... but in the economic sphere it clearly reveals a concern with the rising pressures of globalism, and perhaps especially those emanating from Asian industrialization . . . in both Europe and East Asia, a process of reducing competitive tensions intra-regionally may have the effect of increasing competitive pressures inter-regionally. (Kerr, 2007: 293)

This would certainly lead to more rigorous competition between the two regions, and promote a sense of regional identity which would provide an impetus towards further regionalization in Asia and Europe. Undoubtedly, further globalization also enhances the process of regionalization; or at least, regionalization grows in

parallel with the deepening of globalization. Intra-regional identity and solidarity develop with more transnational flows of resources, products and capital, and so the danger of inter-regional conflicts tends to rise. The collapse of financial markets all over the world in late 2008 aroused the regional consciousness of Asia, where many countries suffered from the stringent conditions imposed by International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. Asia's big three, China, Japan and Korea, with the consensus and support of the ASEAN-10, have already arrived at an agreement to establish a US\$120bn "collective foreign currency reserve fund," which means an "Asian Monetary Fund," with the big three contributing 80% of the total fund (Chen, 2008: 34; "Leaders of Korea, China and Japan," 2008).³ The fund provides assistance to countries in need in order to maintain domestic financial stability in case of another transnational financial crisis. There is some concern regarding the effectiveness of this fund, as former Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong mentions, "if the conditions for acquiring the loans are too strict, countries might then turn to the IMF; but if the conditions are too slack, there is the danger that the fund cannot be well maintained" (Goh, 2008). However, increasing Asian consciousness and relying on self-help have urged the Asians to stand up against the influence from the West, especially from the turbulent global financial market, instigated by the irresponsible fund managers or investment bankers.

Chinese studies of globalization express worries about the growing "political localization" which arises in response to economic globalization. According to Zhen Bingxi, research fellow at the Institute of International Studies in Beijing, elements of production (capital, products, and raw materials) circulate rapidly in the global economy, but free trade policies have to be supported by domestic political forces. However, in some European countries,

³ Both China and Japan contribute 32% respectively, South Korea 16%, and the ten countries of ASEAN 20%.

as well as the US, there is a rising trend of “economic nationalism, economic isolationism, and trade protectionism” among the people (Zhen, 2007: 8).⁴ He points out two other contradictions related to the above analysis on globalization and regionalization. First, there exists a contradiction between the mechanisms of global free trade and bilateral or regional preferential trade arrangements. For instance, the US is enthusiastic in promoting bilateral and sub-regional free trade arrangements, but in the Doha round of the WTO negotiations has serious disagreements with Europe concerning agricultural subsidy policy. Second, there exists a contradiction between short-term results and the long-term effects of globalization. To date, many countries have not much benefitted from globalization, and thus are dissatisfied with the process, contrary to those nations such as China that benefit substantially from an increasingly globalized world.

Within the context of globalization proceeding in parallel with regionalization, we consider four levels of analysis in the study of the relationship between China and Europe:

- 1) Bilateral relations between China and individual European countries;
- 2) Relationship between China and the whole region (EU);
- 3) Intra-regional relations within the EU and their implications towards China;
- 4) Inter-regional relations: between Asia and EU.

Due to the lack of a CFSP, the EU’s policy towards China is subject to the perceptions of the leaders of major European powers and their domestic political imperatives. With the change of leaders in Germany, France and then Britain, Chinese analysts seem anxious about the current status of the relationship. Though the relationship between China and Europe has been nicely described as “multilateralism under a bilateral framework, and a bilateral structure with multilateral exchanges” (Yu, F., 2008: 46),

⁴ It is interesting to see that the Chinese have become the major defender of neo-liberalism.

changes have arisen within the EU in order to secure better Atlantic relations, solve internal problems such as the failure of the new European Constitution, digest the consequences of eastern enlargement of the EU, and find better ways to deal with this rapidly growing power, China. The EU makes it very clear that “China is the single most important challenge for EU trade policy” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a: 3). China is not only a partner, but is also increasingly considered as an emerging competitor, and it seems that some Europeans are looking to prop up India as a counter-weight to China.

Both EU and Chinese authorities criticize each other as “protectionist.” Though there are many formal Agreements (seven in total) and sectoral dialogues (22) that cover virtually all areas of cooperation,⁵ as well as institutionalized mechanisms such as Annual Summits and half-year Strategic Dialogues at the Vice-Foreign Minister level, it can hardly be said that the relationship between the two sides is fully institutionalized. Additional mechanisms continue to be established. Just like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue established between Washington and Beijing, a high-level EU-China Economic and Trade Dialogue was launched in April 2008 upon the initiative of China, at the Vice-Premier level, in order to resolve various kinds of problems, such as market access, intellectual property rights and barriers to investment. However, closer ongoing contacts in all fields do not necessarily imply better, more fruitful cooperation. Chinese complaints concerning European protectionism originates from a central argument as follows. For products from the developing countries which have a competitive edge in the EU market, the

⁵ The dialogues cover areas including intellectual property right, market access, transportation, civil aviation, energy, environment, agriculture, education and culture, global satellite navigation services, trade policies, consumer products safety, macroeconomic and financial sector issues, competition policy, customs cooperation, regulatory and industrial policy and even food safety. See “Commission of the European Communities” (2006a: 13-14); EU-China Policy Dialogues Support Facility (n.d.).

latter sets a lot of restrictions on their exports to Europe. For some products that the developing countries are not in a position to compete with their European counterparts, the Europeans claim that they are free to open competition. EU protectionist measures include anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and anti-quota regulations that involve many trade investigations resulting in restrictions on Chinese exports of shoes, clothes and steel products. For products such as lights and toys, the EU has imposed technological barriers making it difficult for them to enter the EU market. According to Chinese analysts, China is now no longer regarded as a developing country, but as a strong industrial power, and an increasingly competitive opponent. Europe has actually become the greatest overseas market of China. Europe wishes China become a market for European products and a major outlet for their investments, that is, to benefit from China's stunning growth, but if the competitive pressure grows too great, it will be in the interests of Europe to restrain China's development. Thus the psychological and cognitive feeling vis-à-vis China leads the Europeans to treat it as a major competitor that needs to be well "engaged" and "socialized" so that China would accept norms imposed by Europe (Zhang, J., 2007: 7).

On the other hand, EU officials and analysts also criticize China's many measures that obstruct free and fair trade, as well as foreign investments in China (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a: 7-11). These include:

- difficulties in market access in services, though the export of EU services in China expanded six-fold in the period 1994-2004;
- counterfeiting and all kinds of problems relating to intellectual property rights;
- difficulties created by Chinese regulatory authorities for foreign news agencies and journalists, though the regulations of foreign journalists are somewhat loosened after the Beijing Olympic in 2008;
- Restrictions on European investments in banking and

- telecom;
- lack of a level playing field within the domestic Chinese market;
- difficulties in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles;
- difficulty in merge and acquisition within China, and enforced joint partnerships;
- discriminatory licensing systems and regulations.

In short, what the EU persistently emphasizes is fair trade; or, as the former European Trade Commissioner Mandelson maintains, what is needed is “fair economic globalization.” But in Chinese eyes, this insistence on fair trade only epitomizes the growing trend of protectionism.

Excepting military and related technologies, the EU wishes to export high value-added products to China, and to compete with Chinese enterprises in all fields, but it has encountered significant difficulties. Indeed, it is obvious that Chinese government is not yet prepared to fully open its domestic market and to freely allow foreign competition. Chinese enterprises have to be further strengthened, in terms of technological development and managerial skill, before they are able to compete with sophisticated and high value-added European products even in the domestic market. According to the European Commission, “barriers ‘behind the border’ in the Chinese market are costing European businesses more than Euro 20bn every year in lost exports” (European Commission Trade, 2008a). Additionally, China has been identified as the source of 83% of counterfeit goods intercepted by the EU customs in 2006 (European Commission Trade, 2007).

By the same token, the EU does not wish to see a massive inflow of Chinese cheap products to compete with industrial sectors already in decline in Europe. Again, Europe does not welcome free trade in these areas, as unlimited inflow of Chinese products will ultimately destroy the relevant industries within Europe. Though the Chinese insist that for the sake of fairness, they have refrained from expanding exports of textile products in a disorderly way since the 2005 EU-China crisis, meaning that China

does not abuse (or freely apply) the principle of free trade (Zhang, C., 2008: 379), this restraint has not much alleviated the problem of growing protectionism in Europe. Consequently, deploying arguments based on fairness, and employing heavy-handed anti-dumping measures, the EU pursues a course at odds with free trade. The differing levels of development of China and Europe, and varying levels of competitive advantage in different sectors renders trade conflicts difficult to resolve with both sides wishing to “contain” trade in sectors they wish to protect. Europe might expect to face similar challenges from India, Brazil and Russia over the next decade.

It is in these reasons that the EU refuses to grant market economy status (MES) to China, even if the same status has been granted to Russia and Ukraine, the market economies of which are undoubtedly less developed than China. MES is now used as a political-economic lure to encourage further reforms in the Chinese economic system. According to EU officials, there are four major obstacles (technical standards) to be solved: the dominating influence and intervention of the government in the economy; unfair implementation of the law on bankruptcy; inadequate application of accountancy standard and regulations; insufficient reform of financial services sector, especially in the banking sector (Crossick, 2007: 64; Gu, Zhang, & Fang, 2007: 44; Li, J. S., 2007: 174). Unfortunately for China, “The MES might seem to be a marginal issue for the Chinese economy, but it goes to the heart of the how the Chinese government views its position in the world trading system and underpins its fears about Western protectionism. Granting of MES by the WTO members, particularly the major players, has become a matter of national pride for Beijing” (Li, J. S., 2007: 172). Recently, Beijing has requested strenuously that MES be granted by the EU—witness the repeated attempts of Vice-Premier Wang Qishan to raise the issue during meetings with the EU officials. During the 2nd EU-China high-level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED) held in May 2009 in Brussels, as well as his encounter with the British Business Secretary Peter

Mandelson in September 2009 in Beijing, Wang urged the EU to recognize China's market economy status. ("China appeals for Britain's recognition," 2009; "China, EU to discuss," 2009.)

When Chinese leaders speak of "comprehensive strategic partnership," they stress their hope that cooperation between EU and China will be built on equality, mutual benefits, mutual respects and mutual confidence, in order to enlarge the areas of common interest for both parties. Here, the issue of asymmetry in the relationship has aroused the attention of Chinese scholars. Although the EU also stresses equality as a normative principle, it demands that China assumes more responsibilities as it rises, echoing the US request that China should become a "responsible stakeholder":⁶

The EU's fundamental approach to China must remain one of engagement and partnership. But with a closer strategic partnership, mutual responsibilities increase. The partnership should meet both sides' interests and the EU and China need to work together as they assume more active and responsible international roles, supporting and contributing to a strong and effective multilateral system. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b: 2)

Differences in perspective regarding the idea of equality means that China pays attention to mutual respect on the basis of equality, especially with respect to divergences arising from different values and belief systems, thus wishes to have a kind of "spiritual equality." On the contrary, Europe inclines to influence and normatively "regulate" the behaviour of China. When the EU talks about the norm of equality, what it stresses is responsibility, duty, and the equality of interests. In other words, the EU seeks to align China with European norms (Zhu, 2007: 139-140). This kind of thinking is dominant among Chinese analysts, who commonly believe that "civilian power Europe" has also become a "normative

⁶ Former US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, voiced this request in September 2005.

power” trying to convert other parts of the world, including China. The better coordination of foreign policies by EU member states would definitely enhance the capability of the EU to shape the international order.

The “asymmetrical” character of this relationship is manifest in the idea that while China is still struggling to become a “modern” state (safeguarding national sovereignty and maximize national interests etc), the EU has already evolved into a “post-modern state” (Wu, 2006: 17-38). As a post-modern state, the EU finds itself in search of “moral integration” in lieu of the tradition of maintaining stability through the use of force. Security between nation-states is bolstered by mutual interdependence, transparency, and consultation to solve conflicts. The EU hopes that upholding such principles will inevitably “transform” China, resulting in its integration into a new international economic and political order, largely shaped by its value system. The idea of an “asymmetrical” relationship thus formed causes some dissatisfaction among Chinese analysts who lament that the Europeans, since the earlier years after they first entered China, have always sought to play the role of China’s “saviour.” They see a “missionary mentality” still at work among European policy makers.

In short, China is not satisfied by the current means of managing the international economic system. The rules governing economic globalization are seen to be unfair, as they are designed to tilt in favor of developed countries and to disadvantage developing nations. International regimes like the WTO should be built on respect for state sovereignty and they should have full autonomy in making concessions, but in reality these only provides platforms for competition between commercially and financially powerful Western nations (Zhen, 2007: 11).

Regarding European investment in China, in terms of number and total value, the EU does not compare even with Hong Kong. However, in terms of total value, the EU can be compared with

Japan and the US, though not in terms of the number of investments. Thus, Europeans proudly state that they are investing much more than the other major investors on a per project basis. The Chinese appreciate that Europeans are more willing to transfer sophisticated technology to China, so as to produce goods of higher value. However, the total value of European investments still lags that of the US and Japan, while the Western triad (EU, US and Japan) altogether (US\$175.0bn) makes up only half of total combined investments of Hong Kong and Taiwan (US\$354.3bn). In part, the reason for this is the enlargement of the EU and need for regional integration, which attracts investment from Western Europe to the new, but relatively poorer member nations of the East, and away from far-flung global markets. “West European companies have invested at least three times as much in the Central and East European countries as in China—and they continue to outsource more to the region than to China” (Barysch, Grant, & Leonard, 2005: 14). This speaks to the insight that globalization contributes to regionalism and explains why China is intent on expanding its trade and investment links in the vast Asia-Pacific region.

Table 2 Foreign Investments in China until 2007

Country/ Region	Number of Projects	Proportion of Total (%)	Total Value (USbn)	Proportion of Total Value (%)
Hong Kong	285,763	45.19	308.5	39.02
Taiwan	75,146	11.88	45.8	5.79
US	54,838	8.67	56.7	7.17
Japan	39,688	6.28	61.7	7.81
EU	26,430	4.18	56.6	7.16

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2008: 197).

As a consequence of the growing intra-regionalism in Europe, European investment in China dropped in 2007 to approximately 2% of all European foreign direct investments (FDI). In 2007, according to EU statistics, the European share of all FDI in China

dropped to 5.13%. Even as a share of EU investment in the “BRIC” countries, China lags behind, like Brazil attracting only 18%, while Russia took the lion’s share at 39% and India claimed 25%, in the period 2003-2007 (European Commission Trade, 2008b).

III. Political-Strategic Encounter between Two Potential Global Powers

Apart from growing European concern of China’s economic actions in Africa, there are no conflicts of interests between the EU and China in geo-political and geo-strategic aspects, and the leaders of so-called “Old Europe,” including the former leaders of France and Germany, were—like China’s leaders—upset by the unilateralism and ready resort to force of the Bush administration. This led to a short “honeymoon” period from 2003 to 2004, when the issue of lifting arms embargo was considered seriously and strongly promoted by Paris and Berlin. However, a lack of conflict and common concerns regarding the US provide insufficient reasons for more in-depth cooperation in the political-strategic arena. Moreover, different political cultures create enormous difficulties in establishing common values—and common values leading to collective identity are crucially significant in foster better political cooperation. Thus constructivism, which emphasizes the effects of common values and norms in establishing a common identity, seems more informative in the search for solutions regarding the future of EU-China relations.

Given that, it is unsurprising that both Europe and China have expressed a similar concern and skepticism about what kind of actor the other might be in a hypothesized future international political order. As one European analyst said, “There is some uncertainty in Europe as to what kind of international actor China is becoming. . . . It is still unclear to the Europeans if China will strengthen or undermine the role of international law and its institutions” (Zaborowski, 2007: 47). In other words, Europe is

worried that China, upon being integrated into the international community, might not seek to modify the regulations and norms of international institutions . . . and be successful, given its size and influence. On the other hand, former Chinese Ambassador to the EU, Ding Yuanhong, has expressed concern with the dilemma between enlargement and integration within the EU. European leaders sought to deepen and strengthen EU institutions through the introduction of a constitution in 2003 that would help the emerging polity cope with its changing needs, but the proposed constitution could not obtain the requisite approval of the French and Dutch. The question of where the EU should go from here has not yet been settled by reaching a consensus between Europe's member nations, political elites and voters. The Franco-German axis—once the locomotive driving European integration—has lost momentum and begun to split as a result of power shifts and policy disagreements (Ding, 2006: 45-49). Now the Treaty of Lisbon has been passed, but further integration is still in suspense. According to Tony Blair, the EU is a superpower, but not a super state, and as such it lacks a common foreign policy. As for Beijing leaders, they are perplexed by the uncertainties they face in dealing with this supra-national organization. Thus the perceptions of both the EU and China and lack of a well-defined, robust institutional environment results in uncertain interactions and the relationship is easily influenced by domestic conditions in various nations, including third parties such as the US.

Two problems stand out in EU-China relations. Taiwan, though Chinese leaders and analysts insist it is an internal affair, is nevertheless the most important problem in Sino-American relations. In responding to strong voices in the past that the Taiwan problem should be considered as part of the CFSP of the EU in the making, the last official policy paper on China published by the European Commission in 2006, is the first such document that dedicates an entire section on the Taiwan issue. EU policy includes:

- opposition to any measures which would amount to a unilateral change of the status quo;
- strong opposition to the use of force;
- encouragement for pragmatic solutions and confidence building measures;
- support for dialogue between all parties;
- continuing strong economic and trade links with Taiwan. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b: 11)

Though the essence of the EU position regarding Taiwan is basically the same as that of Washington, namely a one-China policy and peaceful resolution, there are subtle differences due to the status of the US as the major supplier of arms to Taiwan and the lack of substantive EU strategic interests in Taiwan Strait. In seeking a peaceful resolution, the ultimate goal of Washington is to prevent a war across the Taiwan Strait, as such a war would place the US in a great dilemma: If the US refused to intervene, then Taiwan would be “lost” and conquered by the PRC. If the US intervened, then it would find itself in direct, open conflict with China. In order to avoid these unwelcome scenarios, Washington seeks stringently to maintain a “strategic equilibrium” across the Strait, helping Taiwan to upgrade its armed forces to counterbalance the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA). Thus, when the PLA obtained Su-27 fighters and SU-30s from Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, the Bush administration responded by selling 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan—denying China strategic superiority in the air. When the PLA deployed a greater number of missiles in Fujian, directed against Taiwan, Washington permitted Taipei to acquire Patriot missiles to defend against attack.

The US policy of “urging both sides to solve the issue of reunification by peaceful means,” the corollary of which, undoubtedly, is to “prevent a war across the Strait by all means,” has been very consistent. In 1962, the President of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, seriously considered the time right to overthrow the communist regime and “recover the Mainland,”

given that China was suffering from, and much weakened by the chaos and famine that were the results of the Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958. However, President Kennedy categorically rejected the idea as would risk dragging the US into a war with China. Kennedy's administration even informed the PRC, via the Warsaw talks, that "(they) did not intend to back Chiang Kai-shek in a military attack on the mainland" (Tucker, 2001: 175-177). This stance is consistent with the Republic of China-US Treaty on Mutual Defense signed in 1954, but also explains why the PRC government persistently paints the US China policy (to prevent war) as a means of sustaining the division of China.

In the EU document (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b: 11), the principle of "peaceful resolution" is reiterated, following the US official position, but there is no danger at all of Europe being dragged into a war between the Mainland and Taiwan. The backup from Europe to this very consistent principle of US-policy on China serves to secure a common position of the West, thus augmenting the pressure on China if she were to seek reunification through the use of force. The Taiwan issue is now not only a problem between the US and China, but also Europe and China, albeit to a lesser extent, with the entire Western world exerting pressure against forceful action by Beijing. It is in this context that the issue of EU lifting arms embargo should be analyzed. If the EU lifts the arms embargo it imposed on China after the June 4, 1989 massacre, and if Beijing succeeds in obtaining more sophisticated and advanced weapons or high technology from European suppliers and significantly improves its armed forces, the strategic equilibrium between the Mainland and Taiwan would be upset and the stronger side (Mainland) might be tempted to attack the weaker. The arms race resulting from the current situation definitely benefits the defense industries in both US and Europe, but renders the cross-straits relations more precarious. Washington does not wish to see China equipped with better European weapon; if there were to be American intervention in an armed conflict, US soldiers may be killed by European

weapons: a scenario unacceptable to Washington authorities.

The National People's Congress (NPC) of China enactment of an "Anti-secession Law" in March 2005 was the precipitating factor for suspending European discussions on lifting the embargo. The origin of the arms embargo dated back to a declaration of the European Council following the June 4th incident, but it is not legally binding. In 1998, the EU issued a "Code of Conduct on Arms Exports" to regulate and restrain member states' arms exports, but again, this is not legally binding. More important is a resolution passed by the European Parliament, in April 2005, opposing the lifting of the ban.⁷ The central concern is not China's poor human rights record, but that a rising China with robust economic and military capabilities—but scant progress in democratic development and respect for human rights—would render the rising power a fearsome threat to other states in the region. However, it can also be argued that the passage the "Anti-secession Law" makes it less likely that Beijing would launch an attack against Taiwan, provided that Taiwan does not declare formal independence.

Chinese analysts tend to play down the military value of lifting the embargo. They emphasize that lifting the arms embargo would be of greater political significance rather than military value. Firstly, the European nations would never sell to China their most advanced weapons. China also cannot rely on importing armaments from Europe for the modernization of her armed forces. Second, lifting the embargo does not mean that all kinds of restrictions regarding exports of European arms will be totally eliminated; there will still be many conditions. Beijing still has to face enormous difficulties if it wishes to import advanced weapons and core technology (Gao, 2006: 170). This is confirmed by an official document of the European Commission which explicitly requires that "current and incoming presidencies should finalize

⁷ It is thus not surprising to learn that some Chinese analysts maintain that the European Parliament is dominated by "Anti-Chinese elements."

technical preparations to ensure lift would not lead to a qualitative or quantitative increase in arms sales, and continue to explore possibilities for building a consensus for lift” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b: 11).

Apart from the military value of trading in European arms, China also considers the issue of relative strengths of the shared North Atlantic identity, and the emerging understanding between Europe and China, and understands that the former overrides the latter (Zhang, C., 2008: 380). Ideological differences, manifested in the human rights problems in China, constitute the major obstacle to establishing a shared identity between China and Europe. Beijing’s options in overcoming this obstacle are rather limited, and it regards human rights as a domestic issue. Therefore, Chinese analysts emphasize the political significance of lifting the arms embargo—which could demonstrate Europe’s goodwill—as much more significant than its military value. What China wants is to scrap what it sees as political discrimination and interference in its domestic politics. Lifting the arms embargo does not necessarily mean therefore that China will increase its military imports from Europe.

Starting in September 2003, China started to participate in the Galileo project, the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), the third such system after the American GPS and the Russian GLONASS. Out of a total budget of Euro 3.4 bn, Beijing contributes Euro 200 million: an amount comparable to the contributions of major EU countries (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2007: 48). At the time, the Europeans were probably not aware that China had already begun, in 2000, to develop her own satellite navigation system, called *Beidou*, set to include a total of more than 30 satellites eventually.⁸ By 2008, five satellites had been launched, and by the end of 2009, another 12 satellites were

⁸ The research on Chinese navigation satellite system started in 1994 (Hu & Zhuo, 2008; “Beidou’ becomes important,” 2008). The system provided much help in communication during the rescue work of Sichuan earthquake in May 2008.

launched, meaning that in 2010 the system was capable of providing basic services. The participation of China in Galileo has aroused serious attention from European scientists who suspect that China acquired some crucial and indispensable high technology from Europe. Though Galileo is considered as a civilian project, the Chinese participation in Galileo was “greeted with some dismay in Washington” (Scott, 2007: 26).

In October 2007, the ruling coalition of Germany, CDU/CSU presented a new Asia Strategy, in which it declared that Germany and Europe face competition from China on energy issues, Africa, and external trade. China also brings challenges to the democratic institutions on both sides of the Atlantic (Li, Y. H., 2007: 29). China’s political economy presents a strategic challenge to German economic and political interests, so Germany has “called for greater cooperation with democratic partners such as Japan, India and South Korea, thereby hedging Germany’s bets against China” (Fulda, n.d.). This reflects a growing sentiment among Europeans, who increasingly sense the pressure exerted by an awakening dragon that is emerging as an influential global power difficult to check. The EU has called for cooperation with China on African issues, but what could come of such a dialogue remains in doubt.

The ambitious Chinese demarche to ensure access to oil and natural resources in African countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Angola, Congo, Gabon and Mozambique has aroused rigorous reactions from European powers. Though it would be an exaggeration to say that Chinese actions in Africa amount to a wave of “neo-colonialism,” those actions have been influential. For one, the granting of loans for infrastructure construction in Africa countries without conditions undermines the IMF’s efforts to transform the economic and political institutions of these nations (Alden, 2007). The passive attitude of China vis-à-vis Darfur arouse the ire of the West, and prompted some to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics. However, though based on the principle of non-intervention in domestic politics, China’s economic activities in Africa have also aroused some negative

feelings from local populations, who question China's ends and means. Thus, in May 2007, nine Chinese petroleum workers were killed by the Ogaden National Liberation Front, who accuse China as exploiting their resources. In October 2008, five workers were killed in Sudan. China must consider how to protect its increasing number of overseas citizens, especially in those African countries which are torn by ethnic conflicts ("There be dragons," 2008).

IV. Social-Cultural Dimension: The *Grandeur* of China and Europe as Savior

China and European countries had a series of encounters in the annual United Nations Human Rights conference in the early 1990s, when European nations raised the issue of human rights conditions in China and sought to condemn China through resolutions. This approach was replaced in 1996 by the Human Rights Dialogue, which was considered a softer, more low-profile and thus fruitful means of influencing China, as it took into consideration the China's dignity and values—sensitive issues after a century of national humiliation. However, after ten years the EU expressed its dissatisfaction with the results of that softer approach, and queried the usefulness and effectiveness of the Human Rights Dialogue. EU documents from 2006 indicate, in a subtle manner, that

the EU's expectations—which have increased in line with the quality of our partnership—are increasingly not being met. The dialogue should be more focused and results-oriented, with higher quality exchanges and concrete results. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 4)

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how human rights conditions in China could be improved through a series of dialogues between high-level officials. The same argument sounds valid for all the sectoral dialogues. Though such meetings provide excellent

opportunities for exchanging views and improving communication and arriving at a better mutual understanding, differences in perception, resulting from divergent values, and the primary concerns over national or regional interest, seem to render these dialogues ineffective. The so-called “soft power” of Europe, the use of political consultation and bilateral exchanges and communication, appear insufficient to dissipate the worries of China regarding European intentions to transform China according to Western norms and values.

The Chinese government signed the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997, and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights in 1998, in order to demonstrate its determination to ameliorate the human rights situation in China and align the country with “international standards.” However, though the first covenant was ratified by the NPC in 2001, the second, which is considered more important in human rights protection, has not yet been ratified by the NPC. On the one hand, by signing the covenants, China signals to the international community that it is determined to improve its human rights situation, and to abide by international norms. On the other hand, by not ratifying the second covenant, China leaves itself some maneuvering room for excuses should it be condemned by the West in the future.

The Europeans, in particular political think-tanks, aim to “Europeanize” China and set “standards” for her evolution, but their long-term objective of establishing a civil society in China will not likely succeed so long as the society remains under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, even though the party-state’s control over society is much loosened, apart from cultural and publishing industries. The omnipotent party renders the creation of a civil society—meaning the proliferation of autonomous organizations struggling for their own interests—as extremely difficult. Market economies and even elections at the grass-root level are still under the party’s control and leadership. It is still too early to say whether the “Western” model will prevail,

that is, whether economic reforms and the emergence of market economics will eventually lead to a growth of middle class and lay the foundation for the democratization of state institutions; or whether a new political-economic model is emerging, with economic development subject to the state oversight, which assumes the overall responsibility to assure economic and political stability, and civil rights sacrificed as a result. China is most impressed not by the European model, but that of Singapore. Recently, a Chinese theorist, Yu Keping, even argued that democracy could be established under a one-party dictatorship.⁹

The somewhat regular visits of Tibetan religious leader the Dalai Lama to numerous European countries are another source of discontent between China and Europe. While the Europeans see the Dalai Lama as a world religious leader fighting for the freedom, dignity and human rights of his people, Beijing sees the warm welcome extended by Europeans as providing support to the secession activities of the Dalai Lama, and hence an infringement of Chinese sovereignty. Chancellor Merkel's Berlin meeting with the Dalai Lama in September 2007 (*Merkel angers China on Dalai Lama*, 2007), and President Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama in December 2008, in Warsaw, drew serious rebukes from Beijing, with the EU-China Summit, to be held in Lyons, being cancelled following Sarkozy's meeting (Brunnstrom, 2008).

A prominent Chinese scholar in international relations, Shi Yinhong, laments about the misgivings towards the amelioration of relationship between US and Europe, and the rising pressure plus discontents from Europe on Tibet, trade and even Africa issues (Shi, 2008: 9-11). The perception that Europe used to play the role as a "moral instructor" is widespread among Chinese scholars. This is even related to the so-called "post-modernism" as a new stage of development in Europe, manifested by a kind of "moral

⁹ Interview of Yu Keping, Deputy Director, Central Bureau of Translation, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 28 February 2009, during the launch of his new book, *Let Democracy Benefits China*, see "Yu Keping" (2009).

superiority” inherent in European behaviour vis-à-vis China. The Europeans have no real strategic security concern outside Europe and the Middle East, but they possess a strong ambition to become a future “world leader” or global power, this exacerbates their feelings of ideological superiority, which results in a kind of “romanticism” in freely giving lessons to the others including China (Shi, 2008: 10). As a result of Europeans increasingly seeing China as a strategic competitor, in much the same way as US President Obama characterizes China, Shi proposes an amelioration of relations with neighbouring Asian nations, most notably Japan and India, and acceleration of the process of establishing East Asian regional or sub-regional multilateral economic institutions. Again, European concerns on the rise of China gives impetus to Chinese efforts in advancing regionalization process. The encounter between such a “moral teacher,” which possesses a glamorous intellectual and cultural tradition, and a country proud of its *grandeur* and the long history of its civilization, but obsessed with a century of national humiliation at the hands of the West, demands cautious, subtle consideration and policies from both parties. The EU’s policy regarding China must take into consideration the future role of China in Asian regionalism.

The European reaction to the above-mentioned difficulties is the proposal of “effective multilateralism” (Wissenbach, 2007: 47-53). Europe seeks to identify new multilateral ways to solve problems and invite partners to participate in rule-making, based on a foundation of dialogue, reconciliation and confidence-building measures. The European Security Strategy (ESS) established, in December 2003, promoted the idea for the provision of global public goods (GPG).¹⁰ Effective multilateralism means effective global governance, which is thus conducive to the access to GPG. The EU seeks to incorporate EU-China bilateral relations from a wider strategic perspective, within a greater context of Europe-Asia

¹⁰ GPG includes four categories: physical security, rule of law and human rights, an open economic order, social well-being. See Odgaard and Biscop, 2007: 54-77.

multilateralism. China is treated as a “strategic partner,” and the engagement of EU would induce China to play a more responsible role in international affairs. In relation to GPG is the promotion of “good governance”, a principle that the EU wishes to export, but it appears that Beijing wishes to ignore this idea.

Nevertheless, Europe still occupies a favourable position as Chinese leaders and scholars appreciate the so-called “social model” of Europe. Owing to the financial fiasco created in the US resulting from the lax control over the financial market, Sarkozy’s denunciation of “Anglo-American capitalism” and boasting that continental European capitalism featuring state regulation certainly earns applause from China, as the PRC consistently emphasizes the leading role of the state in regulating and monitoring the market economy, in helping the backward regions to develop, in ameliorating the social security system for the poor and the underprivileged, and in macroeconomic control. Europe has much experience on which China can draw, and Europe is keen to assist in transforming China into an environmental-friendly and energy-efficient country. Green investments and recycling industries are key areas of concern. Though this is obviously also a primary concern of the Chinese authorities, it will take time and great effort for China to shift its industries in that direction. However, the high degree of environmental consciousness and advanced technology Europe offers could be very useful to China in safeguarding its ecology. For one, bilateral cooperation under the China-EU Partnership on Climate Change has started to research near-zero emissions coal power generation technology. The China-EU Partnership on Climate Change has also started cooperation on climate programmes in the provinces (Council of the European Union, 2007).

V. Conclusion

It is impossible to treat EU-China relations adequately

without reference to the larger context. The four major contextual factors to consider are globalization, regionalization efforts in both Europe and Asia, the rise of China, and Europe's relations with other Asian states. As shown above, globalization provides an impetus for enhancing intra-regional relations, within both Europe and Asia. Within Asia, ASEAN states push for regionalization as they cannot benefit significantly from globalization, whereas closer economic relations with China enables them to benefit from its fast-growing economy. Strongly impacted by globalization, Central and Eastern European states are seeking to strengthen their economic ties with Western Europe and attract further investment from within the region. The regionalization efforts of smaller states in the two regions may affect inter-regional relations, but the demand for better mutual understanding and more cooperation also rises, as demonstrated by the leaders who participate in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) meeting once every two years. However, the realist approach seems to be more powerful and meaningful in explaining the evolution in EU-China relations, as the rise of China, an increasingly powerful but undemocratic nation, has aroused increasing concern among Western leaders during the past few years. Those leaders find themselves, on the one hand, wishing to engage China, and yet anxious about what she might do.

Here the "US factor" comes into play. The ups and downs of EU-China relations since 2003 can be viewed as a function of transatlantic relations: 2003-2004 was a period during which "Old Europe" under France and German leadership was hostile to maladroit American actions in Iraq, but once Schroeder and Chirac left the political stage, the transatlantic relationship returned to its former dynamism. Further, the structural tensions in US-China relations, characterized by "hedging, mistrust over intentions, and a perceived gap in values" (Small, 2007: 73-80), placing constraints on the EU-China relationship. In the second term of the Bush administration, the security policy was modified and greater emphasis placed on multilateral engagement. The advent to power

of President Obama paved the way for better US-China relations following the global financial tsunami. Yet those relations reached a new low in 2010, when Obama seems to shift to stronger actions against China. However, though transatlantic relations are crucially important for Europe, going forward the EU should view China in its own right, reconsider its role as a global actor in international community, and understand China's position in Asia, a continent which appears to be increasingly important to European economic interests, though the EU has no strategic presence or influence in the region. It seems that on the basis of their successful experiences in regional integration, the EU is keen to contribute to the construction of multilateral frameworks in Asia, thus binding China to norms inherent in such institutions, making her behaviour more predictable, and her freedom of maneuver under close monitor.

However, although there has been a proliferation of multilateral and bilateral agreements, consultations, dialogues and high-level summits in Asia, Asian regionalization goes the "ASEAN way," or a kind of "soft regionalism" which imposes the fewest constraints upon the autonomy and independence of individual states. Any engagements and obligations must be built on mutual consensus. This kind of soft regionalism, or what David Kerr called "ethical- communitarian interdependence" (Kerr, 2007: 296), is by nature fundamentally different from the European integration model, which is legal-institutional or legal-constitutional. The central question for the Asians is whether or not they can put regional interests and regional identity before national interests and national identities? Many Asian scholars, notably in China, Korea and Japan, wish to apply the European integration model to Asia so as to resolve nationalist rivalries among the three, with regional identity overriding national identity, and regional solidarity plays a crucial role in each nation's development.

The EU faces major structural changes in the international geo-political order. It has to learn how to adapt to the emergence of "G-2," that is, China and the US in determining world affairs

(Geeraerts, 2009), and the future formation of the “East Asian Community,” proposed by the former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama in September 2009. Apart from these calculations resulting from *realpolitik*, the EU must seek out common ground with China, but given their divergent values, particularly their disagreements over human rights in China, difficulties remain. However, it is hoped that the ongoing institutionalization will provide impetus for deepening the relationship between EU and China.

At the beginning of this paper, it is pointed out that China, as a rising power, sought to align with Europe in order to counterbalance the unilateralism of US, especially during the first term of the George W. Bush administration. However, the “Europe-China axis” was never formalized, and greater cooperation between Washington and Beijing today might provide some leeway for Chinese leaders to seek political-strategic interests in cultivating their relations with the Europeans, as the latter might be anxious to find new means of coping with the formation of a “G-2” and the subsequent structural change of the international political order.

More essential to studies of China’s rise is that question of whether or not, apart from the rapid development of economic and military power, China could develop the “soft power”—that is, culture, institutions, values and ideology—to counterbalance that of the West? Though the issue of soft power has aroused serious attention from Chinese intellectuals over the last decade, its development lags far behind. Only the superiority built on top of soft power can the leadership position of China be consolidated and the neighbours are appeased. Perhaps it will be in this area that Europe most inspires and instructs China.

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全球化與區域化時代的歐盟與中國關係

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摘要

直到二〇〇五年初，歐盟與中國關係的總體氣氛仍是相當樂觀，有人甚至認為一個嶄新的「歐洲－中國」軸心正在形成，而歐盟對中國的武器禁運將會最終取消。但最近五年，歐洲與中國的關係卻充滿爭論與競爭，儘管合作仍是主調。隨著主要歐洲國家領袖更替，比如德國的默克爾總理及法國的薩爾科齊總理上臺，之前希拉克總統及施萊德總理執政時期歐中關係的「光芒」已逐漸消失。新領袖對中國的人權狀況及西藏問題等較具批判性，也對歐中貿易不斷增長的赤字勇於表露不滿。本文旨在研究中國如何在歐洲統治者設想歐洲前景時扮演一定的角色，並考慮四大因素：全球化對歐洲的意義、亞洲的區域化趨勢、中國的「和平崛起」以至「和平發展」、以及亞歐關係中的多邊主義。文章還會探討歐洲與中國如何考慮合作前景，兩者的合作及衝突對未來國際政治秩序帶來的政治涵意，還有在各個領域阻礙雙方合作的種種困難。

關鍵詞：全球化、區域化、武器禁運、多邊主義、和平發展