

## PROPOSITIONS AND RELATIVE *APRIORITY*

Kai-Yee Wong

Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

### Abstract

This paper is intended as a contribution to the debate concerning the interplay between two important notions in philosophical logic: the proposition and the *a priori*. It is argued that a full appreciation of the interplay between these two notions is the key to an adequate assessment of one of the most hotly debated issues to have emerged from Saul Kripke's classic lectures "Naming and Necessity"—the issue of necessary *a posteriori* truths. Through a critical analysis of a recent suggestion by Nathan Salmon that *apriority* in the traditional absolute sense is still the basic notion of *apriority* in the way-of-taking-relative framework motivated by the theory of singular propositions, it is shown that whether propositions are direct objects of the application of "*a priori*" depends on one's conception of propositions.

**Key Words:** theory of reference, proposition, *a priori*, the necessary *a posteriori*, Saul Kripke