

The Resolution of Epistemology's Paradox

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Abstract

Hetherington argues that each and every epistemological thought will inevitably lead to what he calls "Epistemology's Paradox," and therefore that no epistemology is possible. This is because every epistemological thought, he argues, necessarily has two mutually incompatible presuppositions: the Presupposition of Epistemological Distinctness and the Presupposition of Epistemological Preoccupation. I argue, however, that Hetherington is wrong about the two presuppositions. The mistakes stem from both his confusion of the vindication of epistemological thinking with the Knowledge-Knowledge Principle (or Chisholm's Objectivity Principle) and from his confusion about Alston's two levels of epistemic justification. I conclude, thus, that Epistemology's Paradox can be resolved.

Key Words: Epistemology's Paradox, level confusion,
Kowedge-Knowledge Principle,
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