

U.S. CHINA POLICY IN THE LATE 1920s: AN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE NATIONALISM

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The signing of a "Sino-American Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the Republic of China and the United States of America" by American Minister to China John Van Antwerp MacMurray and T. V. Soong, Minister of Financial Affairs of the Nanking government, on July 25, 1928, was a turning point in twentieth-century Sino-American relations.

The treaty itself consisted of only two simple clauses. Despite criticism that it was, so far as the tariff autonomy was concerned, a change in name only,¹ the treaty was to become one of the corner-stones of Sino-American relations for decades. By signing it, the United States succeeded in maintaining the initiative which she had held among foreign powers in China since her announcement of the Open Door Policy in 1900. In retrospect, the Sino-American tariff treaty of 1928 was a by-product of the 1922 Washington Conference. By granting tariff autonomy to China the United States became the first power to fulfill the promise made by the Powers in the Washington Conference. From November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, under the sponsorship of the United States, was convened at Washington, and, therefore, the Conference later became known as the

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¹ Leang-li T'ang, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1930), 350. T'ang himself was a follower of Wang Ching-wei, leader of Left Wing and Chiang Kai-shek's major rival in the Kuomintang. Therefore, T'ang's viewpoints were more or less prejudiced toward Chiang and his followers.

Washington Conference.²

Out of the Conference there came a nine-power treaty and some resolutions dealing with China problems, which became the so-called Washington formula. According to the formula, the Powers were to convene a tariff revision commission to revise the rates of import duties to an effective five per cent, and to hold a special tariff conference to consider granting interim surtaxes to China. A fact-finding commission on extraterritoriality was also set up with a view to recommending measures "to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality."³ But because of the renewal of the Civil War in China, the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff and the Commission on Extraterritoriality, in both of which the United States played important roles, came to naught.⁴

Tracing back the proceedings through which the Sino-American tariff treaty had been reached, it was significant to find that aside from international complications, American China policy in the late 1920's had been further brought into question by the disagreement between the policy makers at Washington and their field representatives in China, which was mainly due to their different interpretations of the Washington formula.

During the 1920's the most important figure among China policy makers at Washington was, without any doubt, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg. President Coolidge appointed Kellogg chiefly, so it is said, because he had been kind to

² For detailed proceedings of the Washington Conference, see U.S. State Department, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922).

³ *Ibid.*, 1644; *Foreign Relations*, 1922, II, 282-7.

⁴ For the detailed description of the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff and the Commission on Extraterritoriality, see Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), chapters VI and VIII.

Coolidge, when the latter, as Vice-President, was a silent and somewhat snubbed presiding officer of the Senate.⁵ Without either secondary school or college education, Kellogg began his career at the bottom of the social ladder. Harsh experiences of his early youth probably caused him to have a sneaking inclination toward the underdog. Kellogg's record showed that he had voted for women's suffrage, for the maternity and infancy law, and vigorously supported the cause of the Chinese in the Japanese steal of Shantung.⁶

Kellogg's sympathy toward the Chinese Nationalist Revolution became evident as early as 1925 when he said: "It is reasonable to suppose that a great nation like China will not long permit foreign control of its domestic affairs," and he further indicated that it was his idea that in the future the United States should release China from its conventional tariff and give up extraterritoriality.⁷ The most significant elements in Secretary Kellogg's reaction to the Chinese demand for treaty revision were his basically sympathetic attitude and his willingness to go beyond the limit set at the Washington Conference. He believed that the difficult situation existing in China after 1925 had been created by the failure of the Powers to fulfill the commitments to China which they made at the Washington Conference.

Moreover, Kellogg was convinced after the 1925 May 30th incident that it was hopeless to appease the Chinese with programs outlined at the Washington Conference and impossible to counter the tides of nationalism and radicalism spread by the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists respectively.⁸ As a result, he decided to drop the Washington formula in meeting with the Chinese demand of treaty revision when he stated in his instruction to the American Delegation to the Special Conference on Tariff that ". . . with respect to the Tariff, the

⁵ Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown, *The American Diplomatic Game* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1935), 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1925, I, 849; Borg, 419-420

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1925, I, 842.

Special Conference ought to go beyond the strict scope of its activities” as defined in the Washington formula and enter into a discussion of the entire subject of the conventional tariff, even “including proposals looking toward ultimate tariff autonomy.”⁹

Another important figure in the State Department, Nelson T. Johnson, strongly supported Kellogg’s decisions. Born in an old-stock American family, Johnson went to China in 1907 at the age of twenty, completing only the first year of his college education at George Washington University, as a student interpreter, and later had served as a consular officer under the great scholar-diplomat W.W. Rockhill. In his entire career in the diplomatic service of more than four decades, except for the final fourteen years of his life, Johnson dealt primarily with China, as a student interpreter, consular officer, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State, Minister and Ambassador.

After serving about eighteen years in the Far East, Nelson Johnson was named by Secretary Kellogg as Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1925, just in time to grapple with the difficult policy problem occurring as a result of the Shanghai Incident. A self-taught scholar who knew Chinese history, art, and literature well, and an extremely affable individual with a sense of humor and great patience, Johnson had the respect and friendship of the Chinese, which made him qualified to be Secretary Kellogg’s Far Eastern expert. Consistent with his oft-stated belief that the United States should do all that was practicable to befriend the Chinese, Johnson believed, with the same conviction as Kellogg had, that the United States should go beyond the letter of the Washington treaties and initiate discussions that would eventually lead to the end of tariff controls and extraterritoriality. With this conviction, Johnson had continuously urged, during the period from 1925 to 1929, conciliation in the face of China’s internal strife.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 483.

While the viewpoints shared by Secretary Kellogg and Johnson were sympathetic toward Chinese Nationalists, Minister MacMurray frequently disagreed with the decisions made by the State Department. MacMurray's views represented the opinions of many people at the time and especially of many of the leading foreign officials in China. To understand the marked difference between the views of the State Department at Washington and the American Minister at Peking, one must consider the angle from which MacMurray approached the Chinese situation.

In 1921, MacMurray, then Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, attended the Washington Conference and devoted himself to the work undertaken by the Conference. MacMurray regarded the realization of the Washington formula through cooperation between the interested Powers as the only practical and reasonable way to solve the Chinese problems, and therefore he adhered to it with insistence on every occasion, even at the risk of confronting the State Department.

But, Secretary Kellogg considered the Washington formula from a different aspect. He understood quite well that for many years the avowed policy of the American Government toward China had aimed to destroy Europe's hegemony there, which had been entrenched in the treaty system and protected by the cooperative or concerted method of dealing with issues arising from interpretation and infractions of the treaties.¹⁰ The only part of the Washington formula, therefore, that Kellogg adhered to with real enthusiasm was the idea that the United States should maintain leadership among the Powers on a progressive policy toward China.

The friction between MacMurray and Kellogg had become apparent since 1926 when the Canton regime levied the so-called "consumption and production taxes" on all merchandise passing through the maritime customs at Canton. Despite

¹⁰ Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 14; Thomas F. Millard, "Undermining Our Chinese Policy; American Officials in China and the Department of State at Cross-purposes," *Asia*, XXVII (November, 1927), 952.

MacMurray's suggestion that the United States take resolute action with other Powers, even to the extent of using military pressure if necessary, to prevent the Chinese from repudiating the treaties, the Administration in Washington made little effort to stop the levy of the presumably illegal duties at Canton.¹¹ MacMurray was greatly disappointed by the conciliatory attitude of the State Department.

Since coming to China in 1925 MacMurray had insisted that the United States and other Powers had a "responsibility for effort directed toward saving the Chinese from their own folly," which in his mind had involved the foreigners directly and continually in the disasters in China.¹² One could immediately recognize this argument if he were familiar with the imperialistic British poet, Rudyard Kipling's theory of the "white man's burden."

Besides the assumption from which he considered the Chinese problem, there was another coincident fact, which was possibly related to if not the decisive factor in MacMurray's attitude toward the Chinese. He was the son-in-law of Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, a prominent American political scientist. Goodnow had been denounced by the Kuomintang because he had been the legal advisor to Yuan Shih-k'ai. Goodnow had presented two memoranda to Yuan in 1914 and 1915 in which he suggested that conditions then existing in China warranted a monarchical rather than a republican form of government. The memoranda were used by Yuan to justify his monarchical ambition. Although Yuan's emperor-dream had ended as a farce, Goodnow had been blamed in China and in the United States for his affiliation with the monarchical movement. Although no evidence was found yet from documents, there was a reasonable possibility that the American Minister's attitude toward the Chinese Nationalists and the Kuomintang had been, more or less, influenced by that of his father-in-law.

The most serious difference of opinion between the State

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1926, I, 863-9, 885-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 899.

Department and the American Minister occurred after the Nanking Incident, in which foreigners in Nanking were looted, injured and murdered by the Nationalist troops. Convinced that the outrage was "not only officially countenanced by and directed but even prearranged," MacMurray favored an ultimatum with military sanctions by the Powers as revenge and tried to persuade his government to participate in such an action.¹³

But, Secretary Kellogg took a more moderate position. He had long been convinced that the United States should not attempt to enforce American rights in China by a "firm policy" that was designed to threaten the Chinese, to say nothing of so drastic an action as international sanctions. Thus, in regard to the Nanking Incident, he was determined not to apply sanctions or to exert any military or naval pressure against the Chinese on the ground that sanctions by the foreign Powers would weaken the moderate leaders in the Kuomintang in their struggle against the radicals and would finally drive them to the side of the extremists, which would be disastrous.¹⁴ He further indicated that to invoke sanctions under the circumstances then existing might prove to be dangerous to Americans in China and certainly would lack support in the United States.¹⁵

Secretary Kellogg had reverted to a policy of independent action because he felt that the Powers were drifting into dangerous waters. A revision to a gunboat policy at this time, so he thought, would undo all that had been accomplished since 1925 by sympathetic consideration for Chinese aspirations. MacMurray accused the Secretary, or those upon whom he relied, of formulating policy on the basis of conceptions differing from the factual picture which he was reporting and bluntly stated that hesitation on the part of the American Government in meeting the situation created by the Nanking

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1927, II, 151; Millard, 955.

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1927, II, 204; Borg, 424.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

affairs filled him with consternation.¹⁶

The Chinese had demonstrated strong demand for treaty revision since the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident in mid-1925. Sympathetic American policy makers like Kellogg and Johnson regarded this as real sign of awakening Chinese nationalism while men like MacMurray and some other foreign diplomats attributed it to Russian stimulation. In fact, the Chinese rights recovery movement was more the product of nationalism than of foreign agitation.

Dr. Hu Shih, Father of the Chinese Renaissance, told the Foreign Policy Association on February 26, 1927, that as a concrete means of expressing its sympathy, the United States should offer to negotiate a separate treaty with the Chinese immediately, without waiting for other nations to agree on a policy satisfactory to all for the stabilization of Chinese affairs.¹⁷ With the Peking regime politically unstable and militarily weak, the strongest voices for this view came from the Kuomintang. On December 12, in an interview with foreign newspaper correspondents in Shanghai after the Kuomintang Preliminary Conference had nominated him for the position of Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek said that "the time has arrived for the Powers to meet China in a friendly attempt to break the treaty deadlock," and he further declared that the Nationalists would welcome an American commission to China to discuss treaty revision and that "China would consider this a friendly gesture on the part of the United States."¹⁸

When the Nanking Incident was finally settled in late March, 1928, by the signing of three notes between Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Fu and Minister MacMurray, and after Peking was taken by the Nationalist forces in early June, the Nanking government insistently raised the question of treaty

¹⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1927, II, 174; David Bryn-Jones, *Frank B. Kellogg, a Biography* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), 219; Lewis E. Ellis, *Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1931* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), 126.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, February 27, 1927.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, December 12, 1927; *China Weekly Review* (December 17, 1927), 86.

revision. On July 13, in a statement to the American people, Marshal Li Tsung-jen, the leader of the influential Kwangsi military clique, declared that all treaties that fettered China must be revised or forcibly abrogated at the earliest possible moment, regardless of cost. He further warned that the fruits of the Chinese Revolution might be destroyed by Communism without "the sympathetic cooperation of America and other treaty powers."¹⁹

At the same time, American domestic support for an immediate negotiation of treaty revision stepped up, which in turn hastened the tempo of decision-making in the State Department. Secretary Kellogg decided to go more than half way to meet the Chinese. He had become increasingly determined to bring about some basic readjustment of the treaty relations between the United States and China in order to fulfill at least part of his program of relieving China from foreign controls, a commitment which he made on January 27, 1927. By doing this, he wished to strengthen the new Nationalist Government, which to him represented the conservative element in the Kuo-mintang, and the Nationalists should be given a chance of establishing a stable government.

In a dispatch to MacMurray by mid-June, 1928, Secretary Kellogg stated that he was prepared to fulfill the promises set forth in his statement on January 27, 1927, by initiating the tariff negotiations immediately. He also indicated that he was prepared to negotiate a gradual relinquishment of extraterritoriality, with the condition that guarantee of protection of American citizens and their interests in China should be given by the Nationalists. In the same dispatch, the Secretary inquired about MacMurray's views in regard to the probability of establishing a reasonable government by the Nationalists and the advisability of immediate negotiation.²⁰

Again, the American Minister raised opposition. In answer to the Secretary's inquiries, he stated that the prospect for the

¹⁹ *New York Times*, July 14, 1928.

²⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 181-2.

establishment by the Nationalists of a government responsible in the sense of being seriously capable of living up to its domestic and international responsibilities was “extremely problematical,” nor did he expect it “within any predictable future.”²¹ Although he agreed that it would be possible and advisable for the United States to reach a tariff agreement with the Kuomintang, which was then, at any rate, the dominant party; nevertheless, he thought that it would be a “tactical mistake” for the United States to show any inclination toward haste or to take any positive initiative in the matter.²²

As to the Secretary’s idea of negotiating a treaty on the subject of extraterritoriality, MacMurray opposed it unreservedly. He believed that the state of Chinese laws and judicial system did not justify the relinquishing of extraterritoriality by the United States. He felt, with justification, that if the United States undertook to initiate negotiations and then “stopped short of a complete and unconditional surrender” of extraterritorial privileges, it might direct much of the anti-foreign hostility in China against the American Government.²³ Thus, he earnestly recommended that the issue of extraterritoriality be postponed until there emerged a stable government capable of meeting its responsibilities in such matters.²⁴

Nevertheless, being still doubtful about the stability of the Nanking government and the advisability of the immediate negotiation, MacMurray was hesitant to take immediate action. A week later, Secretary Kellogg sent another telegram, urging the Minister to act at once and in addition to send on the Secretary’s behalf a note to Dr. C. T. Wang, in which Kellogg re-emphasized his sincerity to keep his promise of returning full tariff autonomy to China made by him in the famous state-

²¹ *Ibid.*, 185; U.S. State Department, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations of the United States with China, 1910-1929* (Washington, 1960), Decimal File (hereafter referred to as Decimal File), 711. 93/179.

²² *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 184-5, 457.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1927, II, 369-370.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1928, II, 458-9; Decimal File, 711. 93/160 (December 28, 1927).

ment of January 27, 1927.²⁵

In accordance with this insistent instruction, Minister MacMurray took action immediately. Taking the occasion of the visit to Peking by T. V. Soong, Minister of Financial Affairs of the Nanking government, he discussed with Soong on July 20, 1928, the general attitude of the United States and indicated his readiness to start negotiation. To MacMurray's surprise, Soong suggested that the Minister negotiate with him a tariff treaty prior to his return to Nanking on July 26. MacMurray gladly accepted this suggestion.²⁶ The process of the negotiation went quite smoothly and agreements were reached out of which the simple Sino-American tariff treaty, containing only two articles, was signed in the afternoon of July 25, at Peking.²⁷

So far as the Chinese were concerned, the treaty did not bring actual "tariff autonomy" because the United States still enjoyed the most-favored treatment accorded to other Powers. But the treaty did increase substantially the prestige of the Nanking government. In the first place, the signing of the treaty constituted the de jure recognition of the Nanking gov-

²⁵ For the text of Secretary Kellogg's note of July 20, 1928, see *ibid.*, 465-6. For his note of January 27, 1927, see *ibid.*, 1927, II, 350-3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1928, II, 467-8.

²⁷ The ratification of the treaty was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 11, 1929. China ratified the treaty on November 30, 1928. Ratifications exchanged at Washington on February 20, 1929; and the treaty entered into force on June 20, 1929. It was superseded by Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of November 4, 1946.

²⁸ The question of a de facto or a de jure recognition implied by the treaty had been in confusion for a while. Although both President Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg agreed that the signing of the treaty constituted de jure recognition, the State Department did not make an official announcement to the effect. For this, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 192-3, and especially 194.

On September 27, 1928, the State Department finally made a formal announcement that the signing of the treaty constituted de jure recognition. Furthermore, it added that no new credentials need be presented by Dr. Sze or Mr. MacMurray to clarify their accredited diplomatic status, which was described as already complete. See *New York Times*, September 28, 1928; H. S. Quigley, "Chiang Kai-shek Becomes President of China," *Current History*, XXIX (November, 1928), 352.

ernment as the legal and competent government of China by the first major foreign power and thus further strengthened the Nationalists' position.²⁸ In the second place, by signing the treaty, "the way has been pointed and a model has been provided for a procedure whereby the Powers may relinquish their so-called 'control' over China's tariff."²⁹ In making this statement Secretary Kellogg pointed out the most important aspect of the tariff treaty that by concluding such an agreement with the United States, the Nanking government had a far better chance of obtaining similar treaties with other Powers.³⁰ This hypothesis was proved by the fact that within five months after the signing of the Sino-American tariff treaty, eleven other Powers had signed similar treaties with the Nanking government.³¹

Basically, the Treaty of 1928 was an American response to strong Chinese nationalism. For nearly a hundred years China had been a splendid hunting ground for the European powers—later joined by the United States and Japan. But after the First World War, when a world-wide movement of nationalism developed, the scene in China took an abrupt change. By 1925 the situation in China deteriorated from the foreign view-

²⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1929, II, 492.

³⁰ Secretary Kellogg's viewpoints were shared by several Chinese authors. For similar opinions, see Chang Taoshinot, *Chung-wai t'iao-yueh tsung-lun* (treaty relations between China and foreign powers. Taipei: Wuchou Publishing Co., 1969), 136; Fu Ch'i-hsueh, *Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih* (history of China's diplomacy. Taipei: Shanming Press, 1966), 378; Ch'ien Tai, *Chung-kuo pu-p'ing-teng t'iao-yueh chih yuan-ch'i chi ch'i fei-ch'u chih ching-kuo* (the origin of China's unequal treaties and their relinquishment. Taipei: Institute of the National Defense, 1961), 140; Yu Nen-mo, *Fei-ch'u pu-p'ing-teng t'iao-yueh chih ching-kuo* (the relinquishment of unequal treaties. Taipei: Commerical Press, 1951), 23.

³¹ Those eleven Powers were Germany (August 17); Norway (November 12); Belgium and Luxemburg (November 22); Italy (November 27); Denmark (December 12); Portugal (December 19); the Netherlands (December 19); the British Empire (December 20); Sweden (December 20); and France (December 22). All the treaties except that with France were signed at Nanking. See *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 178; James W. Christopher, *Conflict in the Far East: American Diplomacy in China from 1928-1933* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1950), 62.

point when the May 30th Incident in Shanghai triggered a nationwide anti-foreign movement. Riot, boycott, and bloodshed made the scene so horrible that for the first time the foreigners in China sensed the reality that "the game is over." It was significant, and by no means accidental, that the United States, the most moderate among foreign Powers, assumed the leadership in setting China free. For what reasons beyond her traditional friendship toward China did the United States take such independent action despite the opposition of the other Powers? To answer this question, one must consider the situation then existing in China.

In early 1926, the anti-foreign movement spread over all China like a wild fire. Taking advantage of unrest over the Peking government's unpopular soft attitude toward imperialism, the Kuomintang launched the Northern Expedition in July, 1926, with the newly emerging figure of Chiang Kai-shek as the commander-in-chief. The expedition proved to be necessary and useful to both the Kuomintang and the United States. To the Kuomintang it was a life-or-death struggle for existence with warlords, a prerequisite to unifying the country, the ultimate goal of the party. On the other hand, the rivalry between the northern warlords and the southern nationalists was the major problem that the Administration of President Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg had to meet in China. To the United States, the expedition not only broke the stalemate between Northerners and Southerners which had existed for almost ten years but also served as a compass that showed the correct direction in the fog of diplomatic confusion because the Nationalists came out on top and were, therefore, the party to deal with.

After launching their expedition in July, 1926, the Nationalist troops marched northward with surprising rapidity. Within three months of its start, the Nationalist forces had gained control of the important cities of Wuhan (Hanyang, Wuchang, and Hankow) by middle October. By the end of December, Kiangsi and Fukien were taken by the troops led by Chiang Kai-shek himself and Chiang set up his headquarters

at Nanchang, Kiangsi, with a group of moderates and Right-wingers around him.

During Chiang's absence from Canton, Michael Borodin, the Kuomintang's Soviet political adviser, took advantage of the opportunity to persuade the Kuomintang Left-wingers to move the Government to the Wuhan cities because, according to Communist theory, the industrial cities were exceptionally fertile for agitation. On January 1, 1927, the Nationalist Government moved to Hankow and became known as the Wuhan regime dominated by Soviet influence.

Backed by the Communists, the Leftists held the Third Central Executive Committee Plenum between March 10 and 17, 1927, at Hankow, and Chiang was removed from his unique political and military positions as Chairman of the CEC and commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army.³² Chiang defied the Wuhan regime and took measures for the maintenance of his position. His men continued the southeastern campaign, which was opposed by the left-wingers, and gained control of the Shanghai area on March 22. Simultaneously there was a race between his men and those of General Cheng Chien, the representative of Hankow, for the capture of Nanking. Cheng's men won and entered the city on March 24, and the Nanking Incident occurred, during which foreigners were wounded and murdered by Cheng's troops.

The inside story of the Nanking Incident has never been fully told, but generally it was believed to have been precipitated by the Communists for two purposes, both of which had the same objective: the precipitation of armed intervention by the powers and thus the ruining of Chiang Kai-shek as a political and military leader.³³ But owing to Japan's conciliatory attitude and the refusal of the United States to sanction armed intervention, the intrigue of the Communists failed and the

³² C. M. Wilbur and J. L. How, ed., *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 397.

³³ *China Weekly Review*, (December 24, 1927), 94.

incident was peacefully settled.³⁴

On April 7, 1927 the Wuhan government made the next move against Chiang. A mandate was published abolishing the post of Generalissimo of the Nationalist armies, a position which Chiang had held since the beginning of the Northern Expedition, and appointed him instead commander-in-chief of only the First Army which was to attack from the Shanghai-Nanking area northward toward Peking.³⁵ Two days later another mandate was issued, further announcing that the seat of the Nationalist Government would be removed from Hankow to Nanking. The obvious purpose of this change was to insure that in directing the military operation from Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek would be under the control of the Leftist government. In retaliation, Chiang ordered a suppression of the Communists in Shanghai and Canton in mid-April. On April 17 the Hankow government published an edict dismissing Chiang from all his government positions and expelling him from the Party. A day later, Chiang, with the support of the moderate wing and the rightists of the Kuomintang, called a Party Convention and established a rival Nationalist Government at Nanking.³⁶ Thereafter for a period of several months there were two governments in China, each claiming to represent the Nationalist cause. However, the government at Nanking, better known as the right-wing Nanking government, had the greater resources, both military and financial, and it prevailed.

Though the Nanking and Hankow governments were now rivals for the domination of China, they wasted no time or re-

³⁴ As to the Nanking Incident and the American attitude, there was a specific study, "Nationalists and the Nanking Incident, 1927: Sources and Impact on United States China Policy," a 1968 Master's thesis done by Carl E. Dorris at Oklahoma State University.

³⁵ Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1933), 330; H. Owen Chapman, *The Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927: a Record of the Period under Communist Control as Seen from the Nationalist Capital, Hankow* (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1928), 109.

³⁶ Ch'ien, 95; *North China Herald*, (April 16, 1927), 102-4, and (April 23, 1927), 142-4; *China Year Book* (1928), 1004-9.

sources in attacking each other at this time. Both groups still considered themselves heirs of the Nationalist Party, and both still regarded the northern warlords and their foreign "imperialist" friends as their enemies. But, generally speaking, while the Nanking government sought to stabilize itself, the position of the Wuhan regime was deteriorating. A Russian intrigue to sovietize China was revealed by Chang Tso-lin's raid on the Russian Embassy at Peking on April 6, 1927.³⁷ The discovery proved to be fatal to the Wuhan Left-wingers. They were suspected by both foreign Powers and by conservative Chinese, and their cause was further weakened. Owing actually to its resentment of the Leftists' anti-British agitation at Hankow, Great Britain recalled its representative at Hankow, Mr. B. C. Newton, on May 17. Other Powers followed suit by ceasing to have further dealings with the Wuhan regime.³⁸

For arbitrating the antagonism between Wuhan and Nanking, a conference was convened by Feng Yu-hsiang, the newly emerging strong warlord, at Chengchow, Honan. Both Nanking and Wuhan leaders attended the meeting. Feng insisted that the Communist movement at Hankow should be suppressed. After their return from the Chengchow Conference, Wang Ching-wei and other Wuhan leaders decided to send Borodin and his Russian team home and oust Communists from the Kuomintang.³⁹ By the end of June, 1927, Chiang, joined by the Kwangsi military leader Li Tsung-jen and Feng Yu-hsiang, further delivered an ultimatum to the Wuhan regime, demanding that the Soviet advisors be relieved of their duties and the Communists be expelled from the Kuomintang immediately.⁴⁰

By the end of July, the anti-Communist General Ho Chien carried out a coup d'état at Hankow, expelling Eugene

³⁷ The April 6th raid had been studied in detail by Wilbur and How's book.

³⁸ *Parliamentary Debates* (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1927), Vol. 206, 19-23; Pollard, 307.

³⁹ H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 121.

⁴⁰ Chin-pu Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), 47.

Chen, foreign minister of the Wuhan regime, as well as Borodin and his Russian subordinates to Kuling. Borodin left Hankow on July 27 by taking a train across northwestern China and Mongolia, while Eugene Chen and his daughter, as well as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, a Communist, left for Shanghai and Moscow.⁴¹ On the first day of August, the Communist revolt led by Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, Communists and subordinate leaders of Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironside" Fourth Corps, the best of the Wuhan units, split the Wuhan armies asunder and saw the better part of it go over to the Communist cause. Losing many of its able leaders and having no military force to sustain it, the Wuhan regime found itself unable to survive before the challenge of the Nanking government and finally was forced to reunite with the latter.

For the purpose of reunifying the Party, Chiang Kai-shek also resigned his military command under the Nanking government on August 12, 1927, and shortly afterward went to Japan. After Chiang's resignation, there were several regroupings of leadership within the Kuomintang, but none in dominant position. Chiang Kai-shek returned to Shanghai from Japan on November 10 and a month later was offered his former post of commander-in-chief of the Nationalists Army, which he accepted immediately. On December 11 a Communist uprising occurred at Canton, with bloodshed and much destruction of property, but was suppressed by the Nationalist troops.⁴²

Believing that certain members of the staff attached to the Russian consulate at Canton had been directly involved in the insurrection, the Nanking government severed relations with Soviet Russia on December 14, 1927, thus formally ending the five-year collaboration between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang.⁴³ While Wang Ching-wei, having failed several times, had again withdrawn into European exile, Chiang Kai-shek pledged himself to complete the task of the Northern Ex-

⁴¹ Chapman, 235; MacNair, 121; and Liu, 49-50.

⁴² *North China Herald* (December 17, 1927), 473-4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 485; *China Weekly Review* (December 24, 1927), 90.

pedition. With the support of Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, the "Model Warlord" of Shansi, and Kwangtung-Kwangsi military leaders, Li Chi-shen, Li Tsung-jen, and Pai Chung-hsi, Chiang started the final phase of the northern campaign in the first week of April, 1928, with the objective of capturing Peking and ousting Chang Tso-lin, the overlord of Manchuria and the last bulwark of the northern warlords.

Paralleling the military operation, Chiang simultaneously sought the revision of the "unequal treaties," which would appeal to Chinese people. Besides, the severance of relations with Russia placed the Nanking Nationalists in desperate need of foreign favor as a prestige-producing factor to fill the vacuum left by the Russians. The United States, owing to her growing influence among the foreign Powers and basically sympathetic attitude toward the Nationalist aspiration, became the first to be wooed by the Nanking government. Fortunately, Secretary Kellogg, being impressed by the recently changing attitude of the Nationalists and their severance with the Communists, was just as enthusiastic as the Nanking Nationalist leaders and even ready to go more than half-way to meet them. But, it was obvious that before any agreement on treaty revision could be reached, the existing problems between the two countries left by the Nanking Incident, during which Americans in Nanking were looted, wounded and some of them murdered, must be solved.

General Huang Fu, foreign minister of the Nanking government, made a statement to the press in late February, 1928, in which he addressed himself immediately to the work of re-establishing relations with the Powers. The keynote of his policy was moderation.⁴⁴ Taking the occasion of American Minister MacMurray's recent visit to the Yangtze Valley region, General Huang had several conversations with him, for the purpose of arranging a settlement of the Nanking Incident. In

⁴⁴ For complete text of Huang Fu's statement, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1928 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943), Vol. II, 406-7. This volume hereafter referred to as *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II.

one of these conversations which took place at Shanghai on February 26, 1928 Huang Fu also raised the subject of negotiations for treaty revision, but nothing was done at that time.⁴⁵

As an earnest proof of its good faith, the Nanking government issued a mandate on March 16, announcing that nineteen soldiers who had been implicated in the Nanking disorders had been executed in addition to thirty-two other "local desperados," and also that orders had been issued for the arrest of Lin Tsu-han, the Communist Director of the Political Department of the Sixth Army, who had been principally responsible for the incident. A second mandate published at the same time ordered full protection to be given to foreigners and their property.⁴⁶ When Minister MacMurray returned to Shanghai from his trip, Huang Fu met him again on March 29. Next day, an agreement for the settlement of the Nanking Incident was reached between him and MacMurray by the exchange of three notes.⁴⁷ Therefore, the Nanking outrage, so far as the United States was concerned, was satisfactorily solved.

While diplomatic relations with the United States improved, Nationalist armies moved northward with success. The campaign against Chang Tso-lin started on April 4, 1928, with four armies led respectively by Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Li Tsung-jen. Chiang reached Tsinan, Shantung, on May 1, where two days later the Japanese-instigated Tsinan Incident prevented him from participating directly in the continued advance to Peking. Nevertheless, the Japanese intervention could not save the northern warlords' cause. Despite the reverses of Chiang's troops, other Nationalist armies advanced toward Peking.

Realizing his precarious position, Chang Tso-lin left Peking in the morning of June 3rd despite the opposition of his Japanese advisers. A day later, Chang was killed when his

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 408-9.

⁴⁶ For text of the Mandates, see *North China Herald* (March 24, 1928), 466.

⁴⁷ The first note dealt with the Nanking Incident; second with American bombardment of Nanking; third with the treaty revision. For text of the notes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 331-3.

special train was blown up near Mukden, presumably by Japanese agents in Manchuria. On June 8th Shansi troops entered Peking to be followed three days later by Yen Hsi-shan himself. The death of Chang Tso-lin and the capture of Peking by the Nationalists brought the era of northern warlords to a nominal end in China proper within the Great Wall.

The conquest of Peking by the Nationalists immediately raised two important questions in the mind of Secretary Kellogg: should the United States accord recognition, either on a de facto or a de jure basis, to the Chinese Government at Nanking and start immediately to negotiate a new treaty? On July 11, 1928, Secretary Kellogg received a formal request from Dr. C. C. Wu, a special representative of the Nanking government in Washington, to open negotiations for a new treaty between China and the United States "on a footing of equality and reciprocity." Two days later, the Chinese Minister to the United States, Dr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze, sent Secretary Kellogg a copy of the Declaration made on July 7 by the newly appointed Nanking Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, in which Dr. Wang declared that all unequal treaties would be either abrogated or replaced by new treaties.⁴⁸

In the face of such insistence, Secretary Kellogg lost no time in adjusting himself to the new conditions which confronted the Powers in China. On the same day as he received Dr. Wang's declaration, Kellogg sent a telegram to MacMurray, indicating that there was a rising demand by American public opinion that the United States recognize the Nanking government and proceed with treaty revision. Kellogg asked the Minister to start the negotiation. However, he agreed with the argument by MacMurray that the forthcoming negotiations

⁴⁸ General Huang Fu had been criticized by his political enemies for signing the agreement with Minister MacMurray concerning the Nanking Incident, and he was blamed also for failure to prevent the clash between the Nationalist and Japanese troops at Tsinan early in May. He resigned as foreign minister on May 22, and Dr. C. T. Wang replaced him on June 6. For texts of C. C. Wu's note and C. T. Wang's declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, II, 415-7.

would be confined to tariff only.⁴⁹

As proved later by the content of the Sino-American tariff treaty, MacMurray's recommendation concerning extraterritoriality was accepted by the Secretary, and the scope of negotiation was confined, as suggested by the American Minister, to tariffs only. Although discussions on extraterritoriality were subsequently carried on in Washington between the State Department and Chinese representatives, the Chinese failed to secure American cooperation in removing the millstone of extraterritoriality for another fifteen years.⁵⁰

History shows that in determining their policy in China, Americans were motivated by both the acquisitive and altruistic sides of their character. It might have been the unselfish side of the American character that moved American policy toward a sympathetic direction in China, but altruism never really gained the fore in U.S. policy. As Nelson Johnson himself admitted, the sympathetic policy toward China applied by him and his superiors during the late twenties was "the altruism of a very practical, acquisitive, energetic people." He considered the fundamental of U.S. policy to be promotion of American self-interest.⁵¹

Johnson attributed these two sides of American diplomacy to the tradition of early pioneer life, which taught

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 460-1.

⁵⁰ After the Sino-American tariff treaty had been signed, the negotiations on extraterritoriality were carried on in Washington. Without any result, the negotiation was interrupted by the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Extraterritoriality was not formally abolished until 1943, exactly one hundred years after the Cushing treaty, which provided them in 1843.

For seven years following the recognition, the American Legation had been kept in Peking rather than transferred to Nanking, the Nationalist capital. Nelson Johnson succeeded MacMurray as minister to China in 1929. After Johnson was promoted to Ambassador on June 18, 1935, a branch office of the American Embassy was set up in Nanking, but the U.S. Embassy had not been transferred for another seven years until middle 1942 when it followed the Nationalist Government to the war capital of Chungking. For this see *Register of the Department of State* (1930), 33; *Press Releases*, Department of State, 1935, 210-1.

⁵¹ Russell D. Buhite, *Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy toward China, 1925-1941* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1968), 11, 16.

Americans to be materialistic as well as to be cooperative. Both of these two characteristics of a "realist" and an "idealist" were to be found in the person of Nelson Johnson when he advocated elevating the position of China in the Far East in order to check Japan and to preserve American influence in that area. Johnson believed in the preservation and protection of big business. But, as to the Chinese issue, he was certainly more far-sighted than most of the American businessmen. He believed that the sacrifice of American interests would be far greater if the United States did not realistically meet the Chinese demands with consideration.⁵² Here again, his sympathy toward the Chinese was colored with realism. It was also this consideration of business interests that made him refuse Chinese suggestions in early 1929 that the United States should give up extraterritoriality voluntarily without an adequate guarantee on the part of the Chinese.

By the late 1920's there were two parties in America, the impractical-realists, if a paradoxical term can be applied here, who believed that the Chinese troubles could be settled for the good of China and the world by the use of unlimited force, and the idealists, those who believed that the good of China could only be attained by the withdrawal of all pressure. The former neglected the dangerous situation then existing in China while the latter ignored the rest of the world. Both were wrong. The American Government had been cursed by both sides because it had taken a middle course. It had assumed leadership in a policy of moderation.

Without this moderate and sympathetic policy pursued by the far-sighted American policy makers like Frank B. Kellogg and Nelson T. Johnson, the course of Sino-American relations during the late twenties could not have run as smoothly as it did. On the whole, it may be concluded that the Sino-American tariff treaty of 1928 represented a reasonable adjustment to a revolutionary Chinese Nationalist Movement, which was moving from turbulence toward stability.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 27.

附 錄

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TREATY REGULATING TARIFF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Signed on July 25, 1928;
Ratifications exchanged on February 20, 1929;
Entered into force on June 20, 1929.
Superseded by Sino-American Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation of November 4, 1946.

The Republic of China and the United States of America, both being animated by an earnest desire to maintain the good relations which happily subsist between the two countries, and wishing to extend and consolidate the commercial intercourse between them, have, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty designed to facilitate these objects, named as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government Council of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China:

T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China; and

The President of the United States of America:

J. V. A. MacMurray, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China;

who, having met and duly exchanged their full powers, which have been found to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following treaty between the two countries:

ARTICLE I

All provisions which appear in the treaties hitherto concluded and in force between China and the United States of America relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply subject, however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other with respect to the above specified and any related matters treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever

美 國

整理中美兩國關稅 關係之條約

十七年七月二十五日簽訂
十八年二月二十日互換批准書
十八年六月二十日生效
已為三十五年十一月四日所簽訂之
中美商約所代替

大中華民國大美國因咸欲維持兩國間所享有之睦誼，及發展固結彼此貿易之往還，是以為會議條約便宜此項目的起見，簡派全權：

大中華民國國民政府特派：

大中華民國國民政府財政部長宋子文為全權；

大美國大總統特派：

大美國特命駐華全權公使馬克謀為全權；

各將所奉文據互相核閱，均屬妥協，會商議定條約如左：

第一條

歷來中美兩國所訂立有效之條約內所載關於在中國進出口貨物之稅率、存票、子口稅並船鈔等項之各條款，應即撤銷作廢，而應適用國家關稅完全自主之原則。惟締約各國對於上述及有關係之事項，在彼此領土內享受之待遇應與其他國享受之待遇毫無區別。

締約各國不論以何藉口，在本國領土內不得向彼國人民所運輸運

to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon their importations and exportations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

The above provisions shall become effective on January 1, 1929, provided that the exchange of ratifications hereinafter provided shall have taken place by that date; otherwise, at a date four months subsequent to such exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE II

The English and Chinese texts of this Treaty have been carefully compared and verified; but, in the event of there being a difference of meaning between the two, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to prevail.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Washington as soon as possible.

In testimony whereof, we, the undersigned, by virtue of our respective powers have signed this Treaty in duplicate in the English and Chinese languages and have affixed our respective seals.

Done at Peiping, the twenty-fifth day of the seventh month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the twenty-fifth day of July, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight.

(Signed) Tse Vung Soong

(Signed) J. V. A. MacMurray

出口之貨物勒收關稅或內地稅，或何項捐款超過本國人民或其他國人民所完納者，或有所區別。

如於民國十八年，即西曆一九二九年一月一日前，經雙方政府按照以下所規定業經批准以上之條款，則於是日發生效力，否則隨時按批准日起四個月後，發生效力。

第二條

本約之華文及英文業經詳加校對證實；惟遇有意旨兩歧之處，應以英文為準。締約各國批准本約，應按各本國憲法所訂之手續，且應以最早之日期在華盛頓互換批准。

因此，以上條約繕為華英文各二份，兩國全權畫押蓋印，以昭信守。

大中華民國十七年 七月二十五日
西曆一九二八年七月二十五日
在北平簽訂

宋子文 (印)

馬克漢 (印)

一九二〇年代後期的美國對華政策： 美國對中國民族主義的反應

(摘要)

魏 良 才

第一次世界大戰後，民族主義浪潮在歐亞風起雲湧，但是在中國由國父孫中山先生所領導的民族主義運動却內遭軍閥的阻撓，外受強權的敵視。在列強之中以蘇聯對中國民族革命破壞最力，採取分化的伎倆，從根本上削弱國民革命的力量，手段最爲陰狠毒辣。所幸的是列強中深具影響力的美國對中國民族主義運動深表諒解與同情。

民國十七年六月北伐完成，全國統一，國民政府立刻與美國政府商談修改滿清政府與美國所簽訂的有關關稅及治外法權之不平等條約。雖然當時美國駐華公使馬克謨 (J.V.A. MacMurray) 對中國民族主義運動及國民政府之態度頗不友善，幸而國務卿凱洛格 (Frank B. Kellogg) 以及國務院遠東事務專家強生 (Nelson T. Johnson) 爲人高瞻遠矚而富正義感，極力主張對中國民族主義運動採取同情與鼓勵的立場。幾經折衝商談，國民政府財政部長宋子文與馬克謨公使在民國十七年七月二十五日在北平簽訂「整理中美兩國關稅關係之條約」。

雖然此一條約並未帶給國民政府實質上的重大利益，而治外法權也遲至民國三十二年才告廢除；但此一中美關稅新約却成爲中美外交史上的一個里程碑。因爲它產生了兩項重大而深遠的影響：(一)成爲其它列強與國民政府商談平等互惠新約的範本。(二)透過此一關稅新約的簽訂，美國政府給予國民政府在法律上的正式

承認，爲此後中美友好外交關係奠下了基石。就美國而論，它在一九二〇年代對中國民族主義運動所持的同情及友好態度，並非純粹基於天真的理想主義，而是本著正義的原則，在盱衡實際情勢下所作的理智的抉擇。