

Nozick and Indigenous Truth

Kai-Yee Wong

Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
E-mail: kyw@alumni.cuhk.net

Abstract

Applying two-dimensional modal semantics, some philosophers, most recently Frank Jackson and David Chalmers among others, have sought to provide analyses of Kripke's examples of the necessary *a posteriori*. Despite the massive amount of attention that two-dimensionalism has received of late, Robert Nozick's recent accounting of Kripke's examples, which bears striking similarities to these two-dimensionalist analyses but reached a *different* conclusion, has gone unnoticed. This paper argues that (a) underlying such a difference is a serious problem with the two-dimensionalist approach to the necessary *a posteriori* and (b) thinking through this problem will go a long way towards a proper understanding, and thus assessment, of this approach.

Key Words: two-dimensional semantics, Saul Kripke, Robert Nozick