

## EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND RELIABILISM

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### ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with reliabilism as a theory of justified belief. According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition P if and only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. It is a reliable process theory. (RP) Likewise, Swain claims that S rationally believes P on the basis of reason R if and only if S's believing that P on the basis of indication theory. (RI)

In this paper, I have discussed some problems of reliabilism, especially the problem of whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not. I have argued that reliabilists have not solved all of these problems:

1. Reliability is not a sufficient condition for a justified belief. It is not necessary for justifiedness. I have argued that several proposals are unsatisfactory.
2. Reliabilism encounters "the problem of generality." Reliabilists fail to give any account of the type of relevant processes or the relevant characteristics that are broad enough to avoid "the single case problem" but not so broad as to encounter "the no-distinction problem." I have argued, in particular, that reliabilists do not provide an acceptable solution to the no-distinction problem.
3. Reliabilism is an externalism. It cannot avoid the difficulties of externalism.
4. As for whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not, I have argued that reliable processes may be one of the cognizer's relevant characteristics C. So conceived, RP is consistent with RI. The problem is how to provide an account of the relevant characteristics.