

The Situatedness of Evaluative Judgment in the Emotions—An Early Study

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Abstract

Solomon, an important advocate of cognitivism in philosophy of emotions, maintains that emotions are judgments. Emotional judgments, according to Solomon, may be non-propositional; such judgments are likely to be episodic, procedural or even kinesthetic. Emotions, in consideration of their intentionality, may be seen as subjective engagements with the world. Thus, the emotions are put into various forms. This paper investigates those forms in view of their situatedness.

This paper discuss Solomon's notion of evaluative judgment, on the one hand, and learn the notion of the situatedness concerning emotions from Griffiths & Scarantino (to appear), on the other. Griffiths and Scarantino suppose that the notion of situatedness does not have a position in cognitivism. This paper, however, argues that Griffiths & Scarantino's notion of situatedness is posited in Solomon's notion of evaluative judgment. This implies that the notion of situatedness can be blended into cognitivism. This paper, as a consequence, connects cognitivism in the philosophy of the emotions with situatedness research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

Key Words: philosophy of emotions, cognitive theory of emotions, evaluative judgment, situatedness, Robert Solomon