List of Contributors | | |
Preface | | |
I: Introduction | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 1: Rationality and its Contexts | | |
Abstract | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
II: Science | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 2: Bayesian Psychology and Human Rationality | | |
Abstract | | |
2.1. Introduction | | |
2.2. The standard picture and the standard empirical challenge | | |
2.3. The standard challenge to human rationality | | |
2.4. Rationality reanimated | | |
2.5. Rationality rechallenged | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
Chapter 3: Scientific Rationality: Phlogiston as a Case Study | | |
Abstract | | |
3.1. Introduction | | |
3.2. Chang on retaining phlogiston | | |
3.3. Evaluating the benefits of retaining phlogiston | | |
3.4. The rationality of eliminating/retaining phlogiston | | |
3.5. Scientific rationality more generally | | |
3.6. Conclusions | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Differences in Thinking: Some Thoughts on Psychological Paradigms | | |
Abstract | | |
4.1. Introduction: a universal mind game | | |
4.2. Piecemeal intellectual endeavours | | |
4.3. Is the psychology of thinking inherently culturally biased toward explaining western behavior? | | |
4.4. A holistic analysis of holistic versus analytic thinking | | |
4.5. Some thought experiments | | |
4.6. What of cognitive universals? | | |
4.7. Resolutions | | |
III: Pathology | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of RationalityChapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of Rationality | | |
Abstract | | |
5.1. Introduction | | |
5.2. The epistemic conception of delusion | | |
5.3. The absence of reasoning deficits | | |
5.4. The challenge from cognitive neuropsychiatry | | |
5.5. The demarcation challenge | | |
5.6. The functional conception of delusion | | |
5.7. Conclusions | | |
Chapter 6: Outline of a Theory of Delusion: Irrationality and Pathological Belief | | |
Abstract | | |
6.1. Delusions | | |
6.2. A social theory of delusion | | |
6.3. Rationality redux: formulating the problem | | |
Chapter 7: Is Depressive Rumination Rational? | | |
Abstract | | |
7.1. Introduction | | |
7.2. The analytical rumination hypothesis | | |
7.3. Rumination | | |
7.4. Rumination and the resting state hypothesis of MDD | | |
7.5. The resting state, depressive rumination, and rationality | | |
7.6. Conclusions | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
IV: Irrationality | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 8: Reason and Unreason in Chinese Philosophy | | |
Abstract | | |
8.1. Incommensurability thesis | | |
8.2. The very idea of correlative thinking | | |
8.3. Ineffability of yi (oneness) in Zhuangzi’s daoism | | |
8.4. In what sense is yi ineffable or unnamable? | | |
8.5. Transcendence of logic and rationality in Zen Buddhism | | |
8.6. Does zen transcend logic and rationality? | | |
8.7. Conclusions | | |
Chapter 9: Irrationally Intelligible or Rationally Unintelligible? | | |
Abstract | | |
9.1. Introduction | | |
9.2. The semantic concept of truth in ancient Chinese philosophy | | |
9.3. Paradoxical expressions and the white horse paradox | | |
9.4. Charity and humanity | | |
Chapter 10: Does Classical Chinese Philosophy Reveal Alternative Rationalities? | | |
Abstract | | |
10.1. Introduction | | |
10.2. Identifying different rationality by identifying different logic | | |
10.3. Attribution of inconsistency and different logic: a circular argument t | | |
10.4. Attribution of inconsistencies and different paradigm of rationality: an alternative defence | | |
10.5. Assumption of consistency in the interpretation of multiple authors texts t | | |
10.6. Conclusions | | |
V: Nonhuman | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 11: Bridging the Logic-Based and Probability-Based Approaches to Artificial Intelligence | | |
11.1. Introduction | | |
11.2. Two systems to switch between | | |
11.3. Modeling systems 1.5 and 2.0 | | |
1.4. What rationality permits | | |
11.5. Reasonable nonmonotonic logic?n | | |
11.6. Main results | | |
11.7. Concluding remarks | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
Chapter 12: Rationality and Escherichia Coli | | |
Abstract | | |
12.1. Introduction | | |
12.2. Three theses and their inconsistency | | |
12.3. Possible solutions and E. coli’s rationality | | |
12.4. Objections and replies | | |
12.5. Further questions | | |
VI: Communication and emotion | | |
Introduction | | |
Chapter 13: Rational Belief and Evidence-Based Update | | |
Abstract | | |
13.1. Introduction | | |
13.2. Reliability of testimony | | |
13.3. Rational acceptance | | |
13.4. Reliability and update | | |
13.5. Rational update | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
Chapter 14: Reason and Emotion in Xunzi’s Moral Psychology | | |
Abstract | | |
14.1. Soek’s two models | | |
14.2. The high reason model | | |
14.3. The high reason model and Xunzi’s moral psychology | | |
14.4. Clarification of the concepts: xin and qing | | |
14.5. The roles xin and qing play in moral reasoning | | |
14.6. Moral reasoning as conscious cost-benefit analysis | | |
14.7. More on the role qing plays in the reasoning process | | |
14.8. Xunzi’s hybrid model and his conception of moral reason | | |
Acknowledgments | | |
Index | | |