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[人文] Rationality—Constraints and Contex 介紹 Rationality—Constraints and Contex

Rationality: Contexts and Constraints is an interdisciplinary reappraisal of the nature of rationality. In method, it is pluralistic, drawing upon the analytic approaches of philosophy, linguistics, neuroscience, and more. These methods guide exploration of the intersection between traditional scholarship and cutting-edge philosophical or scientific research. In this way, the book contributes to development of a suitably revised, comprehensive understanding of rationality, one that befits the 21st century, one that is adequately informed by recent investigations of science, pathology, non-human thought, emotion, and even enigmatic Chinese texts that might previously have seemed to be expressions of irrationalism.

本書目錄
List of Contributors
Preface
I: Introduction
Introduction
Chapter 1: Rationality and its Contexts
Abstract
Acknowledgments
II: Science
Introduction
Chapter 2: Bayesian Psychology and Human Rationality
Abstract
2.1. Introduction
2.2. The standard picture and the standard empirical challenge
2.3. The standard challenge to human rationality
2.4. Rationality reanimated
2.5. Rationality rechallenged
Acknowledgments
Chapter 3: Scientific Rationality: Phlogiston as a Case Study
Abstract
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Chang on retaining phlogiston
3.3. Evaluating the benefits of retaining phlogiston
3.4. The rationality of eliminating/retaining phlogiston
3.5. Scientific rationality more generally
3.6. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Differences in Thinking: Some Thoughts on Psychological Paradigms
Abstract
4.1. Introduction: a universal mind game
4.2. Piecemeal intellectual endeavours
4.3. Is the psychology of thinking inherently culturally biased toward explaining western behavior?
4.4. A holistic analysis of holistic versus analytic thinking
4.5. Some thought experiments
4.6. What of cognitive universals?
4.7. Resolutions
III: Pathology
Introduction
Chapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of RationalityChapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of Rationality
Abstract
5.1. Introduction
5.2. The epistemic conception of delusion
5.3. The absence of reasoning deficits
5.4. The challenge from cognitive neuropsychiatry
5.5. The demarcation challenge
5.6. The functional conception of delusion
5.7. Conclusions
Chapter 6: Outline of a Theory of Delusion: Irrationality and Pathological Belief
Abstract
6.1. Delusions
6.2. A social theory of delusion
6.3. Rationality redux: formulating the problem
Chapter 7: Is Depressive Rumination Rational?
Abstract
7.1. Introduction
7.2. The analytical rumination hypothesis
7.3. Rumination
7.4. Rumination and the resting state hypothesis of MDD
7.5. The resting state, depressive rumination, and rationality
7.6. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
IV: Irrationality
Introduction
Chapter 8: Reason and Unreason in Chinese Philosophy
Abstract
8.1. Incommensurability thesis
8.2. The very idea of correlative thinking
8.3. Ineffability of yi (oneness) in Zhuangzi’s daoism
8.4. In what sense is yi ineffable or unnamable?
8.5. Transcendence of logic and rationality in Zen Buddhism
8.6. Does zen transcend logic and rationality?
8.7. Conclusions
Chapter 9: Irrationally Intelligible or Rationally Unintelligible?
Abstract
9.1. Introduction
9.2. The semantic concept of truth in ancient Chinese philosophy
9.3. Paradoxical expressions and the white horse paradox
9.4. Charity and humanity
Chapter 10: Does Classical Chinese Philosophy Reveal Alternative Rationalities?
Abstract
10.1. Introduction
10.2. Identifying different rationality by identifying different logic
10.3. Attribution of inconsistency and different logic: a circular argument t
10.4. Attribution of inconsistencies and different paradigm of rationality: an alternative defence
10.5. Assumption of consistency in the interpretation of multiple authors texts t
10.6. Conclusions
V: Nonhuman
Introduction
Chapter 11: Bridging the Logic-Based and Probability-Based Approaches to Artificial Intelligence
11.1. Introduction
11.2. Two systems to switch between
11.3. Modeling systems 1.5 and 2.0
1.4. What rationality permits
11.5. Reasonable nonmonotonic logic?n
11.6. Main results
11.7. Concluding remarks
Acknowledgments
Chapter 12: Rationality and Escherichia Coli
Abstract
12.1. Introduction
12.2. Three theses and their inconsistency
12.3. Possible solutions and E. coli’s rationality
12.4. Objections and replies
12.5. Further questions
VI: Communication and emotion
Introduction
Chapter 13: Rational Belief and Evidence-Based Update
Abstract
13.1. Introduction
13.2. Reliability of testimony
13.3. Rational acceptance
13.4. Reliability and update
13.5. Rational update
Acknowledgments
Chapter 14: Reason and Emotion in Xunzi’s Moral Psychology
Abstract
14.1. Soek’s two models
14.2. The high reason model
14.3. The high reason model and Xunzi’s moral psychology
14.4. Clarification of the concepts: xin and qing
14.5. The roles xin and qing play in moral reasoning
14.6. Moral reasoning as conscious cost-benefit analysis
14.7. More on the role qing plays in the reasoning process
14.8. Xunzi’s hybrid model and his conception of moral reason
Acknowledgments
Index


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