| List of Contributors | | |
| Preface | | |
| I: Introduction | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 1: Rationality and its Contexts | | |
| Abstract | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| II: Science | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 2: Bayesian Psychology and Human Rationality | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 2.1. Introduction | | |
| 2.2. The standard picture and the standard empirical challenge | | |
| 2.3. The standard challenge to human rationality | | |
| 2.4. Rationality reanimated | | |
| 2.5. Rationality rechallenged | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| Chapter 3: Scientific Rationality: Phlogiston as a Case Study | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 3.1. Introduction | | |
| 3.2. Chang on retaining phlogiston | | |
| 3.3. Evaluating the benefits of retaining phlogiston | | |
| 3.4. The rationality of eliminating/retaining phlogiston | | |
| 3.5. Scientific rationality more generally | | |
| 3.6. Conclusions | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Differences in Thinking: Some Thoughts on Psychological Paradigms | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 4.1. Introduction: a universal mind game | | |
| 4.2. Piecemeal intellectual endeavours | | |
| 4.3. Is the psychology of thinking inherently culturally biased toward explaining western behavior? | | |
| 4.4. A holistic analysis of holistic versus analytic thinking | | |
| 4.5. Some thought experiments | | |
| 4.6. What of cognitive universals? | | |
| 4.7. Resolutions | | |
| III: Pathology | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of RationalityChapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of Rationality | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 5.1. Introduction | | |
| 5.2. The epistemic conception of delusion | | |
| 5.3. The absence of reasoning deficits | | |
| 5.4. The challenge from cognitive neuropsychiatry | | |
| 5.5. The demarcation challenge | | |
| 5.6. The functional conception of delusion | | |
| 5.7. Conclusions | | |
| Chapter 6: Outline of a Theory of Delusion: Irrationality and Pathological Belief | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 6.1. Delusions | | |
| 6.2. A social theory of delusion | | |
| 6.3. Rationality redux: formulating the problem | | |
| Chapter 7: Is Depressive Rumination Rational? | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 7.1. Introduction | | |
| 7.2. The analytical rumination hypothesis | | |
| 7.3. Rumination | | |
| 7.4. Rumination and the resting state hypothesis of MDD | | |
| 7.5. The resting state, depressive rumination, and rationality | | |
| 7.6. Conclusions | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| IV: Irrationality | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 8: Reason and Unreason in Chinese Philosophy | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 8.1. Incommensurability thesis | | |
| 8.2. The very idea of correlative thinking | | |
| 8.3. Ineffability of yi (oneness) in Zhuangzi’s daoism | | |
| 8.4. In what sense is yi ineffable or unnamable? | | |
| 8.5. Transcendence of logic and rationality in Zen Buddhism | | |
| 8.6. Does zen transcend logic and rationality? | | |
| 8.7. Conclusions | | |
| Chapter 9: Irrationally Intelligible or Rationally Unintelligible? | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 9.1. Introduction | | |
| 9.2. The semantic concept of truth in ancient Chinese philosophy | | |
| 9.3. Paradoxical expressions and the white horse paradox | | |
| 9.4. Charity and humanity | | |
| Chapter 10: Does Classical Chinese Philosophy Reveal Alternative Rationalities? | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 10.1. Introduction | | |
| 10.2. Identifying different rationality by identifying different logic | | |
| 10.3. Attribution of inconsistency and different logic: a circular argument t | | |
| 10.4. Attribution of inconsistencies and different paradigm of rationality: an alternative defence | | |
| 10.5. Assumption of consistency in the interpretation of multiple authors texts t | | |
| 10.6. Conclusions | | |
| V: Nonhuman | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 11: Bridging the Logic-Based and Probability-Based Approaches to Artificial Intelligence | | |
| 11.1. Introduction | | |
| 11.2. Two systems to switch between | | |
| 11.3. Modeling systems 1.5 and 2.0 | | |
| 1.4. What rationality permits | | |
| 11.5. Reasonable nonmonotonic logic?n | | |
| 11.6. Main results | | |
| 11.7. Concluding remarks | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| Chapter 12: Rationality and Escherichia Coli | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 12.1. Introduction | | |
| 12.2. Three theses and their inconsistency | | |
| 12.3. Possible solutions and E. coli’s rationality | | |
| 12.4. Objections and replies | | |
| 12.5. Further questions | | |
| VI: Communication and emotion | | |
| Introduction | | |
| Chapter 13: Rational Belief and Evidence-Based Update | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 13.1. Introduction | | |
| 13.2. Reliability of testimony | | |
| 13.3. Rational acceptance | | |
| 13.4. Reliability and update | | |
| 13.5. Rational update | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| Chapter 14: Reason and Emotion in Xunzi’s Moral Psychology | | |
| Abstract | | |
| 14.1. Soek’s two models | | |
| 14.2. The high reason model | | |
| 14.3. The high reason model and Xunzi’s moral psychology | | |
| 14.4. Clarification of the concepts: xin and qing | | |
| 14.5. The roles xin and qing play in moral reasoning | | |
| 14.6. Moral reasoning as conscious cost-benefit analysis | | |
| 14.7. More on the role qing plays in the reasoning process | | |
| 14.8. Xunzi’s hybrid model and his conception of moral reason | | |
| Acknowledgments | | |
| Index | | |